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REPORT REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
RECOMMENDATIONS AND
RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE
DEATH PENALTY AND CALLING FOR A
MORATORIUM ON EXECUTIONS
Randall Coyne and Lyn Entzeroth
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The ABA Has Given Careful
Considerationto Issues Surroundingthe
DeathPenaltyfor the Past Several Decades
The American Bar Association (ABA)
is a voluntary, national membership organization of the legal profession, dedicated to the promotion of a fair and
effective system for the administration of
justice.1 The ABA's more than 365,000
members come from each state and territory and the District of Columbia. Its
constituency includes prosecutors, public defenders, private lawyers, trial and
appellate judges from the state and federal courts, legislators, law professors,
law enforcement and correctional personnel, law students, and a number of
"non-lawyer" associates in allied fields. 2
Although the ABA takes no position
on the constitutionality or morality of
the death penalty, it has worked hard to
try to ensure that the death penalty is
administered fairly. To that end, during
the past several decades the ABA has
passed numerous resolutions dealing
VOLUME

with various legal issues presented by
capital cases. 3 Firm ABA policies exist
governing the provision of competent
counsel in capital cases, proper procedures for adjudicating claims in capital
cases (including federal habeas corpus),
race discrimination in capital cases, and
standards for determining who is eligible for the death penalty. ABA members frequently have testified before Congress on myriad capital punishment
issues. 4 Further, the ABA has filed numerous amicus curiae briefs in capital cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court,5 has conducted and supported training programs for lawyers and judges handling
capital cases, and has conducted a wide
range of public education programs deal6
ing with the death penalty.
In 1986, the ABA created a Death
Penalty Post-Conviction Representation
Project. Since then, the Project has recruited more than 400 volunteer lawyers
to represent death row inmates and has
sought to create programs that provide
qualified, compensated counsel to capital post-conviction petitioners. The ABA's
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Bar Information Project has assisted in
the development of the new Louisiana
Indigent Defense Board. The ABA'sJudicial Administration Division is presently
preparing a trial handbook for judges
who preside over capital cases. Moreover, the ABA has commissioned several
studies that focus on the experiences of
counsel in capital post-conviction cases
7
and judicial review in capital cases.
In 1988, the ABA formed a Task Force
on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (ABA
Task Force), which undertook an intensive, year-long study of the process of
review of capital convictions and sentences.8 The ABA Task Force formulated
concrete recommendations that, if implemented, would enhance the efficiency
and fairness of state and federal review
9
procedures.
Notwithstanding the enormous efforts of the ABA, the crisis in capital
cases has only worsened, in substantial
part because the ABA's recommendations largely have been ignored. Judicial
decisions have contributed to the crisis.
As two scholars recently observed in the
Harvard Law Review, "the Supreme
Court's chosen path of constitutional
regulation of the death penalty has been
10
a disaster."'
U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Alex
Kozinski recently described the current
state of the Supreme Court's death penalty case law:

and unjust "machinery of death." As
Judge Kozinski explained,
[Flully 40 percent of the death sentences imposed since 1972 have been
vacated, sometimes 5, 10 or 15 years
after trial. One worries about the effect
on the families of the victims, who have
to endure the possibility-often the
reality-of retrials, evidentiary hearings and last-minute stays of execution
2
for years after the crime.1
Greatly exacerbating the situation is a
chronic lack of lawyers willing to work
on capital cases. Judge Kozinski observed, "thejurisprudence of death is so
complex, so esoteric, so harrowing, this
is the one area where there aren't nearly
enough lawyers willing and able to
handle all the current cases." 1 3 The
result is a "peculiar limbo."
[W]e have constructed a machine that
is extremely expensive, chokes our legal institutions, visits repeated trauma
on victims' families and ultimately produces nothing like the benefits we would
expect from an effective system of capital punishment. This is surely the worst
14
of all worlds.

Assuaging death penalty opponents, the
Court has devised a number of extraordinary safeguards applicable to capital
cases; but responding to complaints
that these procedures were used for
obstruction and delay, it has also imposed various limitations and exceptions to these safeguards. This pull and
tug has resulted in a procedural structure-what Justice Harry Blackmun
called a "machinery of death"-that is
remarkably time-consuming, painfully
cumbersome and extremely expensive."1

Prosecutors likewise have begun speaking out against our current system of
capital punishment. At a recent ABAsponsored program, Ernest Preate, Jr.,
former Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, observed,
"[I] n too many of our capital cases there
is ineffective assistance of counsel on
both sides." 15 Attorney General Preate
publicly endorsed capital resource centers for prosecutors and defense attorneys and the establishment of rigorous
standards for trial and appellate counsel
16
in capital cases.
In another ABA-sponsored program,
Andrew L. Sonner, the State's Attorney
for Montgomery County, Maryland, who
has prosecuted numerous capital cases,
observed:

Nor is the criminal justice system the
only victim of this grotesquely inefficient

There is absolutely no value to the
prosecution of having the death pen-
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alty. There is an absolutely huge cost in
the administration of it. As conscientiously as I try to do it, I must confess
that I do not know how to do it and
achieve fairness. I wish at the time of
the Gregg v. Georgia decision, the Supreme Court would have indulged in
Dickens's [A] Christmas Carol and gone
forth and looked at capital punishment
previous, capital punishment as it existed then, and capital punishment as it
was to be administered; had they known
the mess they would create for us prosecutors, I think it would have been
opposing the death pennine-to-zero
17

al ty.

In 1995, Robert M. Morgenthau, the
Manhattan District Attorney, revealed
"the dirty little secret [prosecutors] too
often share only among themselves: The
death penalty actually hinders the fight
against crime."1 8 This prominent prosecutor described the system of capital
punishment in operation in the United
States as follows:
Promoted by members of both political
parties in response to an angry populace, capital punishment is a mirage
that distracts society from more fruitful,
less facile answers. It exacts a terrible
price in dollars, lives and human decency. Rather than tamping down the
flames of violence, it fuels them while
draining millions of dollars from more
promising efforts to restore safety to
our lives. 19
Similarly, after New York reinstated
capital punishment in 1995, the Bronx
District Attorney, Robert Johnson, announced that he would not seek the
death penalty, opting instead for life
without parole. Johnson explained that
as a young prosecutor he convicted a
man of intentional murder, after utterly
destroying the man's alibi. Three witnesses identified the defendant but, after the conviction, the defendant's
brother confessed. The brother, knowing that the defendant was innocent,
expected that the jury would acquit.
Johnson explained his refusal to seek

death in future cases: "What [appellate]
courts look for is legal errors, and there
2
were no legal errors in the case I tried.

B. The ABA Is Not Taking a Moral or
PhilosophicalPosition in Favorof or in
Opposition to the Death Penalty
Nothing in this Report and accompanying Resolution should be read to contravene the freedom of individual ABA
members to take philosophical or moral
positions in favor of or in opposition to
capital punishment. Rather, as former
ABA President John J. Curtin, Jr. told a
congressional committee in 1991: "Whatever you think about the death penalty, a
system that will take life must first give
21
justice. "

C. Nevertheless, the Failureof Capital
Jurisdictionsto Implement the Various ABA
PoliciesDeveloped over the Past Twenty Years
and the Consequent Erosion of Fairnessin
CapitalCases Compels the Conclusion That
a Moratoriumon Executions Should Be
Imposed Until the ABA PoliciesAre Fully
Implemented and FairnessGuarantees
Are Restored
The most frequent criticisms of the
"day-to-day operation of the death penalty system" were recently catalogued as
follows:
The process of selecting those offenders who will be put to death by the states
has been described by one prosecutor
as "random, chance, [a] throw of dice;"
other observers refer to the system as
"a sham," ''scandalous," "shameful,"
and "deplorable." While elaborate procedures and rules peculiar to capital
punishment have been developed to
ensure that only those defendants "most
deserving of death" are singled out for
execution, in practice those who have
been sentenced to death, as a class, are
largely indistinguishable from convicted murderers who have been spared
the ultimate punishment. As applied,
these procedures have done too little to
remove the influence of prejudice and
caprice in decisions made by prosecutors, judges, and juries in capital cases.
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Many attribute this failure to the pervasive influence of racism. Numerous empirical studies have linked sentencing
patterns in death penalty cases with the
racial characteristics of the defendant
and the victim. Others point to the
distorting effects of politics on a death
penalty system that is administered at
the local level by popularly-elected prosecutors and judges. The fear of voter
backlash from an electorate that overwhelmingly supports the death penalty
colors the way in which discretion is
exercised by the central decision-makers in the capital punishment system.
Still others, such as formerJustice Harry
Blackmun, have concluded that the
problem is more fundamental: efforts
to accommodate basic constitutional
values such as consistency, reliability,
and fairness in the context of capital
punishment have spawned constitutional rules that cannot be reconciled
with one another and cannot achieve
their intended ends. This view maintains that even if the lingering influences of racism and politics could be
wrenched from the system tomorrow,
the system would still yield unacceptably arbitrary results.

22

The trend away from fairness guarantees and due process protection in capital cases has not gone unnoticed by
members of the Supreme Court. Significantly, former Supreme Court Justices
Lewis Powell and Harry Blackmun both of whom dissented in Furman,which
invalidated the death penalty nationwide, and concurred in Gregg, which
reinstated capital punishment four years
later-ultimately have concluded that
the systems of capital punishment in
effect today serve no useful purpose and
23
should be abolished.
As noted above, 24 the ABA has worked
long and hard to improve the system of
capital punishment in this country. The
ABA believes that the policies and recommendations it has promulgated over the
years must be fully implemented to minimize arbitrariness in capital sentencing
and lead to more rational, more consistent, and ultimately more fair sentences

in capital cases. 25 Virtually all death penalty jurisdictions have ignored the ABA
recommendations and policies. Although
a few states may have followed some ABA
recommendations, no state has implemented even most recommendations.
26
To the contrary, as documented below,
far from embracing the ABA's recommendations and policies, most capital
jurisdictions in fact have gone in the
opposite direction.

D. The ConstitutionalFramework
1. The ConstitutionalFoundationof
27
Modern Death PenaltyJurisprudence
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Furman v. Georgia28 struck down all thenexisting death penalty statutes essentially because these statutes gave the jury
unbridled discretion to impose death or
spare the life of the defendant. Four
years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,29 the
Court found constitutional certain newly
enacted death penalty statutes that endeavored to narrow the class of persons
subject to the death penalty and to guide
the jury's capital sentencing determination while at the same time allowing the
jury the ability to take into consideration
the unique characteristics of each defendant and each case. The constitutional
provisions at issue in these and other
death penalty cases decided during this
period were: the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. Brief highlights of these key early Court decisions
are provided immediately below.

2. Trop v. Dulles"°
In 1944, Alfred L. Trop, a private in
the United States Army, was convicted,
sentenced and punished for wartime
desertion. In addition, under a federal
statute, Trop was stripped of his U.S.
citizenship because of his conviction for
desertion. 31 Relying on the "principle of
civilized treatment guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment, '3 2 the Supreme
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Court, in a plurality opinion, stated,
"the words of the [Eighth] Amendment
are not precise and their scope is not
static. The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."' 33 Interpreting the
Eighth Amendment in accordance with
"evolving standards of decency," the
Court held that the "use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the
34
Eighth Amendment.
Since Trop was decided, the Court has
recognized that the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is not an immutable
principle. Because the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society," the
theory of "original intent" has no application to the Cruel and Unusual Punish35
ment Clause.
36

3. McGautha v. California

Dennis McGautha challenged his
death sentence on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, arguing that where death
was a possible sanction, due process
required that the decisionmaker's discre37
tion be guided by concrete standards.
The Court not only rejected McGautha's
Fourteenth Amendment challenge, but
suggested that identifying standards to
channel jury discretion in capital cases
might well be impossible:
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly
understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which
38
are beyond present human ability.

Notwithstanding the McGautha Court's
categorical rejection of the Fourteenth
Amendment claim, in the very next
Term the Court considered a challenge
to standardless sentencing discretion
grounded on the Eighth Amendment.

4. Furman v. Georgia'9
Within a month of the McGautha decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a group of three cases to decide
whether "the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty [in these cases]
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. '40 All three
cases involved black defendants, two of
whom-Lucious Jackson and Elmer
Branch-received death sentences for
raping white women. The third defendant, William Furman, received his death
sentence for murder. In each case, the
jury had complete, unguided discretion
to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or death.
By a vote of five to four, the Supreme
Court set aside all three death sentences
in Furman v. Georgia.41 As a result of the
decision, Jackson, Branch, Furman, and
nearly 600 other condemned persons
then incarcerated on "death rows"
throughout the country avoided execution. In striking down the death penalty
laws of thirty-nine states and various
federal statutory provisions, the Court
held that the imposition and infliction
of the death penalty under arbitrarily
and randomly administered systems in
which juries are given unrestricted and
unguided discretion to impose a sentence of life or death constitutes "cruel
and unusual" punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend42
ments.
After Furman, a number of states, including Georgia, Florida, Texas, North
Carolina, and Louisiana, revised their
death penalty statutes in an effort to
satisfy the requirements of Furman. In
1976, the Court addressed the constitutionality of these death penalty statutes
in a group of five consolidated cases.
5. Gregg v. Georgia43 and the 1976 Cases
While holding that the death penalty
"could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial
risk that it would be inflicted in an
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arbitrary and capricious manner," the
Court in Gregg v. Georgia" and four
companion cases 45 concluded that the
Eighth Amendment erected no per se
barrier to the punishment of death. The
Gregg Court found that the revised Georgia death penalty statute remedied the
constitutional defects raised in Furman.
The new Georgia statute required specific findings as to the circumstances of
the crime and the character of the defendant and provided a list of aggravating
circumstances. The jury was not authorized to consider imposing a death sentence unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances was present
in the case. In addition, the statute
provided for automatic review of a death
sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court.
That court was required to determine
whether the sentence was influenced by
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and whether the death sentence was "excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar
cases. "46
On the same day the Court issued its
landmark Gregg decision, the Court decided four companion cases addressing
the constitutionality of post-Furmandeath
penalty statutes in Florida, Texas, North
Carolina, and Louisiana: Proffitt v.
47
Florida,
Jurek v. Texas,48 Woodson v. North

50
Carolina,49 and Roberts v. Louisiana.
In Proffitt and Jurek, the Court found
that the death penalty statutes of Florida
and Texas provided sufficient procedural safeguards to withstand constitutional challenge. The Court rejected
attacks on the Florida death penalty
statute on the grounds that aggravating
and mitigating circumstances were vague,
overbroad, and imprecise. Justice Powell
wrote, " [w] hile the various factors to be
considered by the sentencing authorities
do not have numerical weights assigned
to them, the requirements of Furmanare
satisfied when the sentencing authority's
discretion is guided and channeled by
requiring examination of specific factors
that argue in favor of or against imposi-

tion of the death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capricious51
ness in its imposition."
Texas' death penalty statute was markedly different from the Georgia and
Florida statutes. Rather than using aggravating circumstances to narrow the class
of death-eligible defendants, Texas simply identified five offenses punishable by
death.5 2 If a defendant was found guilty
of one of these five offenses, then the
jury was required to answer three questions that will determine whether death
53
is the appropriate penalty.
Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens
concluded that "each of the five classes
of murders made capital by the Texas
statute is encompassed in Georgia and
Florida by one or more of their statutory
aggravating factors." 54 Justice Stevens
reasoned that, "in essence, the Texas
statute requires that the jury find the
existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance before the death penalty may
be imposed, '55 and "requires the sentencing authority to focus on the particu56
larized nature of the crime."
Not all legislative attempts to cure the
constitutional defects identified in Furman were as successful as those in Georgia, Florida, and Texas. The Court struck
down the mandatory death penalty statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana in
Woodson v. North Carolina5 7 and (Stanislaus) Roberts v. Louisiana.58 In striking
down mandatory death penalty statutes,
the Court noted that mandatory death
sentences had long been viewed with
disfavor because such mandatory sentencing practices were perceived as "unduly harsh and unworkably rigid."5 9 In
addition, the Court identified two other
reasons to strike down the North Carolina statute. First, the mandatory sentencing procedure did not address "Furman's rejection of unbridled jury
discretion in the imposition of capital
sentences.''60 "North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute provides no
standards to guide the jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine
which first-degree murderers shall live
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and which shall die." 61 Moreover, studies showed thatjurors faced with mandatory death sentences were reluctant to
return guilty verdicts because of the
"enormity of the sentence automatically
62

imposed."
The second reason for invalidating
the North Carolina statute is that the
mandatory sentencing procedure did
not allow for "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character
and record of each convicted defendant
before the imposition upon him of a
sentence of death." 63 " [W] e believe that
in capital cases the fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment ...requires consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances
of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death."' 64 Thus,
Woodson imposed a requirement of "individualiz[ed] sentencing" in capital
65
cases.
In reaching its decision in Woodson,
the Court acknowledged the fundamental truth that "death is different." According to Woodson:
[T] he penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100-year prison term differs
from one of only a year or two. Because
of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need
for reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in
a specific case. 66
E. Death is Different and Individualized
Consideration
In holding that Georgia's revised capital statute satisfied the concerns identified in Furman, the Greggplurality recognized that "[t]here is no question that
death as a punishment is unique in its
severity and irrevocability. When a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has been
particularly sensitive to ensure that every

safeguard is observed. ' 67 The "death-isdifferent" doctrine has been a basic
tenet of capital jurisprudence since Gregg.
As Justice Stevens observed in another
case: "We must ... be as sure as possible

that novel procedural shortcuts have not
permitted error of a constitutional magnitude to occur. For after all, death cases
are indeed different in kind from all
other litigation. The penalty, once imposed, is irrevocable." 68 According to
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Callins v. Collins:.
There is a heightened need for fairness
in the administration of death. This

unique level of fairness is born of the
appreciation that death truly is different from all other punishments a society inflicts upon its citizens. "Death, in
its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two."
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Because of the qualitative difference of
the death penalty, "there is a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in
69
a specific case."
In Woodson, a decision striking down
mandatory death penalty statutes as unconstitutional, a plurality of the Court
explained: "A process that accords no
significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual
offender or the circumstances of the
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind."7 0
While the risk of mistake in the determination of the appropriate penalty may
be tolerated in other areas of the criminal law, in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the
Eighth Amendment... requires consideration of the character and record of
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the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of
the process of inflicting the penalty of
death." Woodson, at 304. Thus, although individualized sentencing in
capital cases was not considered essential at the time the Constitution was
adopted, Woodson recognized that
American standards of decency could
no longer tolerate a capital sentencing
process that failed to afford a defendant individualized consideration in the
determination whether he or she should
71
live or die.
The requirement that sentencers give
capital defendants individualized consideration is another bedrock feature of
capital jurisprudence. The Court elaborated on the principle of individualized
sentencing in Lockett v. Ohio.72 In Lockett,
a plurality acknowledged that strict restraints on sentencer discretion are necessary to achieve the consistency and
rationality promised in Furman, but held
that, in the end, the sentencer must
retain unbridled discretion to afford
mercy. Any process or procedure that
prevents the sentencer from considering
"as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death,- 73 creates the
constitutionally intolerable risk that "the
death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors that may call for a less severe
penalty." 74 The Court's duty under the
Constitution therefore is to "develop a
system of capital punishment at once
consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of
the individual." 75 This Report concludes
that judicial and legislative developments over the past twenty years have
rendered existing systems of capital punishment inconsistent and arbitrary. Although the ABA has endorsed countless
recommendations and resolutions designed to insure fairness, reliability, and
efficiency in capital cases, these have
largely been ignored.

II.

THE DEATH PENALTY STATES AND THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE LARGELY
IGNORED THE CRITICAL SAFEGUARDS

CONTAINED IN THE VARIOUS

ABA

RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS
REGARDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Although a few states have followed
some ABA policies, many have adopted
none, and no jurisdiction has adopted
all.
A. Competent andAdequately-Compensated
Counsel Is Not Providedin Many Capital
Cases and Guidelinesfor the Appointment
and Performanceof Counsel in Capital
Cases Have Not Been Adopted in Most
Jurisdictions.
1. The Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have

the assistance of counsel for his defence.

76

Perhaps more than any other constitutional guarantee, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is of fundamental importance in capital cases. Although the Supreme Court has long interpreted the
right to the assistance of counsel to
include the right to the assistance of
"effective" counsel, the Court has set
the standard of effective representation
shamefully low, particularly in capital
cases.
Competent and adequately compensated counsel-from trial through postconviction and habeas review-has been
described as "the sine qua non of a just,
effective, and efficient death penalty system." 77 And, to ensure reliability and
fairness, the ABA has adopted detailed
policies that impose rigorous standards
for counsel in capital cases.
2. The ABA Policies
In 1990, the ABA recommended that
"competent and adequately compensated" counsel be provided "at all stages
of capital... litigation." 78 Also, the ABA
urged capital jurisdictions to establish
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organizations to "recruit, select, train,
monitor, support and assist" attorneys
who represent capital clients.
More than seven years ago, the ABA
promulgated Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases (Guidelines) 79 and urged
that all death penaltyjurisdictions follow
them. The Guidelines require appointment of at least two experienced attor80
neys at each stage of a capital case.
Under the Guidelines, appointments in
capital cases are to be made by a select
committee whose mission is to identify
and recruit lawyers with specific professional credentials, experience and skill.
The Guidelines recognize that the practice of representing capital clients is
"specialized" and that ordinary professional qualifications are inadequate in
capital cases.
So that specialist attorneys in capital
cases are permitted to provide adequate
representation, the Guidelines require
that counsel in capital cases be paid at a
level that "reflects the extraordinary
responsibilities inherent in death penalty litigation." 8 1 Further, the Guidelines
insist that counsel receive the funding
necessary for investigators, expert witnesses, and other support services.
Standard 4-1.2(c) of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice8 2 explicitly
recognizes the awesome responsibilities
that attend capital representation:
Since the death penalty differs from
other criminal penalties in its finality,
defense counsel in a capital case should
respond to this difference by making
extraordinary efforts on behalf of the
accused.
Nor has the ABA been alone in examining the critical problems regarding
counsel in capital cases. An Ad Hoc
Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus
in Capital Cases, formed by ChiefJustice
William Rehnquist and chaired by retired Justice Lewis F. Powell, identified a
serious problem in satisfying the need
for qualified counsel to represent in-

mates in collateral review.8 3 According
to the Ad Hoc Committee:
When counsel are not involved in collateral proceedings from the start, both
the prisoners and the courts are less
able to ensure that all meritorious claims
are addressed. The end result may be
the belated entry of a lawyer in the case
only under the pressure of a pending
execution. This postponement of counseled presentation of claims to the eleventh hour increases the difficulty of
ensuring both fairness and finality s4 In
addition, the Committee recognized
that capital habeas litigation is difficult
85
and complicated.
The Committee's report, as modified,
urged states to provide indigent defendants with experienced criminal attorneys at trial, on direct appeal, and in
86
post-conviction proceedings.
3. Strickland v. Washington8 7 Requires
FarLess
In Strickland v. Washington,88 the Supreme Court established an unduly burdensome two-prong test for determining
whether a capital conviction or death
sentence should be reversed. First, a
defendant must show that counsel made
errors "so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense." 8 9 To satisfy the second
prong, the defendant must show "that
there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have
been different." 90
Thus, serious errors by counsel, even
if professionally unreasonable, do not
warrant setting aside a conviction unless
the defendant also shows he was prejudiced by the error. Moreover, under
Strickland, courts must apply a strong
presumption of competency,9 1 and also
must accord substantial deference to an
92
attorney's "tactical decisions."
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Justice Marshall dissented in Strickland, complaining that "the performance standard adopted by the Court is
...so malleable that, in practice, it will
have no grip at all or will yield excessive
variation in the manner in which the
Sixth Amendment is interpreted and
applied by different courts."' 93 Justice
Marshall further commented on Stricklands prejudice prong:
First, it is often very difficult to tell
whether a defendant convicted after a
trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his
lawyer had been competent. Seemingly
impregnable cases can sometimes be
dismantled by good defense counsel.
On the basis of a cold record, it may be
impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would
have stood up against rebuttal and
cross-examination by a shrewd, wellprepared lawyer....
Second and more fundamentally, the
assumption on which the Court's holding rests is that the only purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to reduce the
chance that innocent persons will be
convicted. In my view, the guarantee
also functions to ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures.... Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his
interests are vigorously and conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A
proceeding in which the defendant does
not receive meaningful assistance in
meeting the forces of the State does
not, in my opinion, constitute due pro94
cess.
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has observed:
The Constitution, as interpreted by the
courts, does not require that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective counsel. It
requires representation only by a lawyer who is not ineffective under the
standard set by Strickland v. Washington.

Proof that the lawyer was ineffective
requires proof not only that the lawyer
bungled but also that his errors likely
affected the result. Ineffectiveness is
not measured by the standards set by
good lawyers but by the average- "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms"-and "judicial scrutiny
of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential." Consequently, accused persons who are represented by
"not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be
condemned to die when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least the clemency
95
of a life sentence.
Many lawyers and judges agree that
96
Strickland has proved to be a disaster.
According to the vice-president of the
Georgia Trial Lawyers Association, the
standard for competence in Georgia can
be measured by the "mirror test": "You
put a mirror under the court-appointed
attorney's nose, and if the mirror clouds
up, that's adequate counsel. '9 7 The 1982
capital trial of Jerry White in Orlando,
Florida provides a graphic example of
the "foggy mirror" test in action. Each
morning before trial, the judge had the
prosecutor and defense attorney Emmett Moran come to his chambers so
that the state's attorney could check the
defense attorney's breath for alcohol.
No odor was detected. However, in an
affidavit submitted during post-conviction proceedings, the defense investigator swore that he had seen Moran shoot
up with cocaine during trial recesses and
had also seen Moran use speed, alcohol,
morphine, marijuana, and quaaludes after court recessed for the day. The trial
judge ultimately found no "credible evidence" of intoxication and therefore
held that Moran was not ineffective during trial. Five justices of the Florida
Supreme Court agreed and upheld the
98
conviction and death sentence.
It is significant that the ABA promulgated the Guidelines after the Supreme

Court decided Strickland. Indeed, the
ABA has never accepted that the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance
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of counsel is adequate to ensure fairness
and reliability in capital cases.
Remarkably, since Strickland, the Court
has only increased the burdens on capital defendants who allege ineffective assistance of counsel. In Lockhart v.
Fretwell,99 the Court suggested that the
prejudice prong of Strickland may no
longer be satisfied by a demonstration
that counsel's errors undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Instead, capital defendants must now
"point to some additionalindicia"' 0 0 that
counsel's errors rendered the trial "fun10
damentally unfair." 1
4. State CourtJudges Fail to Ensure that
Capital Counsel Is Adequate
The death penalty and politics-local
and national-are inseparable. This idea
should surprise no one, given that the
vast majority of judges who preside over
capital cases must answer to the electorate, either through judicial elections or
retention ballots. 0 2 As the ABA's Commission on Professionalism concluded
more than a decade ago, 'judges are far
less likely to ...take ... tough action if

they must run for reelection or retention every few years."' 0 3 According to
JusticeJohn Paul Stevens:
The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges may be "too
responsive" is a political climate in
which judges who covet higher office-or who merely wish to remain
judges-must constantly profess fealty
to the death penalty.... The danger

that they will bend to political pressures
when pronouncing sentence in highly
publicized capital cases is the same
danger confronted byjudges beholden
to King George 111.104

Put somewhat more directly,
Judges have come under attack and
have been removed from the bench for
their decisions in capital cases-with
perhaps the most notable examples in
states with some of the largest death
rows and where the death penalty has
VOLUME

been a dominant political issue. Recent
challenges to state courtjudges in both
direct and retention elections have
made it clear that unpopular decisions
in capital cases, even when clearly compelled by law, may cost ajudge her seat
on the bench, or promotion to a higher
court. This raises serious questions
about the independence and integrity
of the judiciary and the ability ofjudges
to enforce the Bill of Rights and otherwise be fair and impartial in capital
cases. 105

The prevalence of this problem becomes
apparent when one considers thatjudges
in thirty-two of thirty-eight death penalty
10 6
states are elected.
The insidious influence of political
pressures on capital cases is by no means
a modern phenomenon. In the notorious "Scottsboro Boys" prosecution of
the 1930s, a group of black defendants
sentenced to death for rape in Scottsboro, Alabama had their convictions and
sentences twice reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.10 7 In 1933, Alabama
Circuit Judge James Edwin Horton
granted the defendants a new trial.' 0 8
The next year, Judge Horton was voted
out of office, ending his judicial and
10 9
political career.
Contemporary examples abound. 1 0
In California, a state with the largest
death row in the nation, Governor
George Deukmejian in 1986 publicly
opposed three justices of the state supreme court who stood for retention
due to their votes in capital cases. 111 All
three lost their seats following a campaign dominated by the death penalty;
Governor Deukmejian appointed their
replacements. 112 During the past six
years, the newly-constituted California
Supreme Court has affirmed nearly
ninety-seven percent of all capital cases it
has reviewed.1 3 The literature is replete
with comparable examples throughout
the country." 14
Of course, this is not to suggest that
elected or retained judges universally
merit reproach. To the contrary,
IV,
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Capital cases put extraordinary pressures on all participants in the legal
system. Even the most conscientious
and independent judge faces an enormous challenge of reining in the emotions that accompany a brutal crime
and the loss of innocent life. If decisions about guilt and punishment are
to be made fairly, objectively, and reliably, it is critical that judges be guided
by the Constitution, not personal politi15
cal considerations."
5. The RelationshipBetween Poverty and
the Death Penalty
The ABA Guidelines on the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases were designed in
substantial part to remedy the situation,
demonstrated in case after case, that
poor people accused of capital crimes
are frequently defended by lawyers who
lack the skills, resources, and commitment required when a defendant's life is
at stake.
Concurring in the Court's decision to
strike down capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia,Justice White concluded
that under then-existing capital statutes,
there was "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death]
is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not." 116 Recent scholarship has identified a troubling basis: It is not the facts
of the crime, but the quality of legal
representation, that distinguishes cases
in which the death penalty is imposed
from many similar cases in which it is not
1 17
imposed.
a. A Crisis of CounselAppointed in
Capital Cases
Virtually all states that impose capital
punishment have refused to adopt the
ABA Guidelines. Many death penalty
states have no working public defender
systems whose resources might parallel
1 18
those of the district attorneys' offices.
Some states simply assign lawyers at random from a general list. The result,
more often than not, is that a capital
defendant's life is entrusted to an under-

qualified and overburdened lawyer, who
may or may not have any experience
with criminal cases.119 Some jurisdictions use "contract" systems, which typically channel indigent defense business
to attorneys who agree to handle all the
indigent defense work in a particular
area for a flat fee. Contracts are often
awarded to the lawyer-or group of
lawyers-who bids the lowest. 12 0 Contract lawyers typically are permitted to
maintain private practices. Also, any
money spent on investigation and experts reduces the fee that the contract
attorneys earn. 12 1 Still other states use
public defender systems, which often
employ remarkably dedicated attorneys
who specialize in criminal law. Although
in theory public defender systems may
appear equipped to provide quality representation for indigent clients, overwhelming caseloads and inadequate
funding frequently make effective repre122
sentation impossible.
Systematic studies reveal the depths of
the national crisis of counsel in capital
cases. A comprehensive report, prepared for the State Bar of Texas, concluded that, contrary to the ABA policies
on the death penalty, states typically do
not use central appointing authorities to
choose counsel in capital cases; states do
not assign more than a single lawyer to
represent a capital defendant; states fail
to monitor the performance of assigned
counsel in capital cases; states do not
compensate appointed counsel adequately; and states fail to fully reim123
burse counsel for support services.
Numerous examples illustrate the inexperience of lawyers typically appointed
to represent capital clients. In Tyler v.
Kemp 124 and Paradisv. Arave,125 state trial
judges assigned capital cases to young
lawyers who had passed the bar only a
few months earlier. Similarly, the lawyer
appointed to defend his client's life in
Bell v. Watkins126 had never completed a
criminal trial of any kind. And, in Leatherwood v. State,127 a third-year law student
was assigned to handle the bulk of the
capital trial.
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Other cases demonstrate the rank incompetence that frequently pervades the
defense in capital cases. For example,

13 6
failed to appear for oral argument;
and failed to comply with a court's re137
quest for a supplemental brief.

defense counsel in Smith v. State' 28 re-

quested extra time between the guilt
and sentencing phases of a capital case
in order to read the state death penalty
statute for the first time. In Frey v. Fulcomer,129 defense counsel limited his presentation of mitigating evidence to comply with a statute that had been held
unconstitutional three years earlier-for
the very reason that it restricted counsel's ability to develop and present mitigating evidence. And in Ross v.
Kemp13 0-a rare case in which a capital
defendant had two attorneys-one attorney presented a weak alibi theory, while
the second attorney advanced a mental
incompetency defense that necessarily
conceded that the defendant had participated in the offense.
Equally tragic were the efforts expended by defense counsel in Romero v.
Lynaugh.13 ' There, the defense lawyer
refused to present any evidence at all
during the penalty phase of a capital
case and then had this (and only this) to
say by way of closing argument: "You are
an extremely intelligent jury. You've got
this man's life in your hands. You can
take it or not. That's all I have to say."
Thejury, of course, sentenced the defendant to death. 132 Finally, in Young v.
Kemp, 133 defense counsel was so depen-

dent on drugs that he offered a mere
semblance of a defense on behalf of his
client. Although the client was sentenced to death, he encountered his
defense lawyer a few months later. The
two met in the prison yard after the
former defense attorney was convicted
and sentenced on state and federal drug
charges.13

4

Counsel on direct appeal can likewise
provide grossly inadequate assistance and
escape a finding that they are ineffective.
Death row inmates on direct appeal have
received supposedly effective assistance
of counsel from attorneys who filed no
brief whatsoever; 3 5 filed a five-page brief
after being threatened with sanctions;

b. OrenthalJamesSimpson and
OtherExamples
That competent counsel literally make
the difference between life and death in
capital cases is a point that was made
with remarkable clarity when Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti decided
not to even seek the death penalty for O.J.
Simpson, whom Garcetti's office charged
with two particularly vicious capital murders. Although Simpson stood accused
of the brutal slashing deaths of his former
wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her
friend, Ronald Goldman, Simpson's
wealth-and consequently his ability to
hire a formidable legal team-spared
him from having to face even the possibility of death under circumstances in which
a poor person would likely be quickly
convicted, sentenced to death, and
shipped to San Quentin to await execu1 38
tion.
The Simpson case is a particularly
dangerous model, however. Because of
the exhaustive media coverage of the
trial and the great latitude afforded Simpson's lawyers by Judge Lance Ito, many
who watched may wrongfully assume
that the unprecedented efforts of Simpson's defense team replicate the defenses mounted by underpaid, courtappointed attorneys who are assigned to
represent indigent defendants. During
an ABA program co-sponsored by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, one veteran capital litigator observed that the preliminary hearing in
the Simpson case lasted longer than
most capital trials in Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. l3 '
For example, the trial in Georgia of
David Peek started one morning at
about 9:00 [a.m.], the jury was picked
by about 11:00 a.m., the guilt phase
evidence was all in by 4:30 p.m., and the
jury went out. At about midnight, with
the jury deadlocked, the foreman said
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that if the court would just remove one
of the jurors, that would probably improve the chances of reaching a verdict.
The court-appointed defense lawyer
agreed to that, and the juror was replaced. Three minutes later, the jury
did reach a verdict-of guilt. At 1:30
a.m., the penalty phase of the trial
started, and by 2:30 a.m., David Peek
had been sentenced to death. His whole
trial took one day.
In another Georgia case, Tony Amadeo
was one of three people tried on capital
charges in a single week in Putnam
County, Georgia. Tony's trial lasted two
days; one codefendant's trial lasted two
days; and the last case was tried on
Friday. These three death penalty cases
involving three young men from the
Marines were disposed of within a single
week. The same lawyers represented
the three defendants in those successive trials and received the fee payment
that was in place in that district at that
time: $2,500, plus $50 for each motion
you filed, up to five motions. That was
the limit. In each of the three cases, five
motions were filed. So, the lawyers got
the full fee available to them.
One of the things the Simpson case has
done is to educate people about the
adversary system and how it might really work, including the extensive use of
experts. Recently, the Philadelphia Inquirer did a study of twenty capital
cases from Philadelphia, all of which
went to death penalty verdicts, and
found that there had been experts in
only two of the cases. Both experts were
psychologists. One was paid $600 and
the other $500. What I see so much
more often in southern capital cases is
that the defense hires no expert at all.
At one point in the O.J. Simpson case,
there was an 800 number you could call
to provide evidence, including information about whomever you thought
might have done the crime. The defense had investigators who went out
and pursued those leads. In contrast,
the Philadelphia Inquirer study found
that in only eight of the twenty death
penalty cases examined had there even
been one defense investigator, and those

investigators were paid an average of
$605. You don't, in a complex homicide case, get a great deal of investigation done for that amount of money.
One of my clients, Darrell Grayson, was
sentenced to death in Shelby County,
Alabama, in a case where his sole lawyer
was paid a flat rate of $1,000 and was
given no money for any expert or any
investigator. The lawyer testified at one
point that he had a choice between: (a)
closing down his practice and devoting
everything to this case and not being
able to feed his family or keep his
mortgage paid; and (b) just simply
showing up for trial and trying the case.
He picked the latter, for better or for
worse-worse for Darrell Grayson.
O.J. Simpson has Alan Dershowitz and
Gerald Uelmen, both esteemed law professors who are providing assistance
with regard to other legal issues in the
case. Yet, one lawyer who has tried a
number of Georgia death penalty cases
was asked recently to name all the
criminal law decisions from any court
that he could recall. He thought about
it for awhile and then said, "Well,
everybody knows the Miranda decision." Then he thought a little longer
and said, "And then there's the Dred
Scott decision." Those were the only two
criminal cases that he could name. Of
course, Dred Scott is not a criminal case.
Larry Heath, a client of mine who was
executed two years ago, was represented in the Alabama Supreme Court
by a lawyer appointed byJudgeJohnson,
a local judge. The appellate brief was
one page long. It cited only one caseone which went against Heath's position. The brief had more typographical
errors than citations to authority. The
lawyer did not even show up for the oral
argument in this death penalty case.
One would think that any court concerned about justice would have
stopped at that point and said, "We
need to have the issues briefed. We
can't do our job as a court." But that
did not happen. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled on the one issue
presented to it. I guess it read the one
case cited in the brief and affirmed the
conviction and death sentence. It was
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client, Judy Haney. Unlike Simpson,
she was not the alleged abuser; she was
the abused. She endured fifteen years
of abuse and finally did what she
thought she had to do and had her
husband killed. She was represented by
two court-appointed lawyers in Talledega, Alabama. One lawyer was so
drunk during the trial that the judge
had to stop the trial for a day and send
him to the Talledega jail to sober up.
The next morning, the sheriff produced both the lawyer and Ms. Haney
from the jail and resumed the trial, at
which she was sentenced to death. The
other lawyer who represented her, Bill
Denson, was recently disciplined by the
Alabama Bar because he missed the
statute of limitations in two different
workmen's compensation cases. So Ms.
Haney's life hinged on the representation of two lawyers: one who was too
drunk to go on during the trial and the
other who was too incompetent to
handle a workmen's compensation case.

not hard for the State to prevail later in
the federal proceedings. As a result
Larry Heath was executed.
A federal district court in Georgia upheld Wiley Dobbs' death sentence. As
we see so often in death penalty cases,
Wiley was an African-American man
charged with a crime against a white
person. He was tried in Georgia. He was
represented by a lawyer who admitted
quite candidly in post-conviction testimony that he did not like AfricanAmericans and who thought that when
you hire an African-American you do so
with the knowledge he will steal something. He described Chattanooga as a
"black boyjungle." He said blacks make
good basketball players but can't be
teachers. This was the only lawyer that
Wiley Dobbs had. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the lawyer basically showed up, listened and then read
fromJustice Brennan's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia as his closing
argument.
The federal district judge in Dobbs'
case has ruled that the lawyer's representation of a poor person facing the death
penalty in Georgia was sufficient and
that the lawyer's racism was irrelevant.
That ruling is hard for me to understand because presenting the penalty
phase of a capital trial involves presenting the life and background of the
defendant-who he is, where he came
from and how he got there. How can
you do that if you don't associate with,
or deal with, or like, or understand, or
empathize with people of other races?
But the thing that really struck me
about this case is that you don't really
have to be a lawyer to do what the
defense counsel did in that case. Anybody with a fifth grade education could
show up and hear the trial and read
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion.
And we now have a ruling that as a
matter of constitutional law, that's all
the Sixth Amendment guarantees [as
representation] for a poor person facing the death penalty.

There's an old adage, "You get what
you pay for." I read a piece in The New
York Times about the Simpson case, in
which legal experts were asked how
much money Simpson would pay for
his legal defense. The answer was "All
he's got," which was a substantial
140
amount.
It is far more common, of course, for
poor people to receive only as much
justice as they can afford, rather than the
quality representation to which they
would be entitled if the ABA Guidelines
14 1
had actually been adopted anywhere.
6. The Importanceof Quality Legal
Representation:Nelson v. Zant142 ($15 to

$20 per hour) and Martinez-Maciasv.
Collins1 43 ($11.84 per hour)
144

In a recent Yale LawJournal article,
the critical importance in capital cases of
quality legal representation-and the failure of Strickland to guarantee quality
representation-was illustrated by two
examples:

I look at the size of the O.J. Simpson
defense team, all those lawyers and
resources, and I think about another
VOLUME
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derico Martinez-Macias, but they did
not receive it until years after they were
wrongly convicted and sentenced to
death. Nelson was represented at his
capital trial in Georgia in 1980 by a sole
practitioner who had never tried a capital case. The court-appointed lawyer,
who was struggling with financial problems and a divorce, was paid at a rate of
only $15 to $20 per hour. His request
for co-counsel was denied. The case
against Nelson was entirely circumstantial, based on questionable scientific
evidence, including the opinion of a
prosecution expert that a hair found on
the victim's body could have come from
Nelson. Nevertheless, the appointed
lawyer was not provided funds for an
investigator and, knowing a request
would be denied, did not seek funds for
an expert. Counsel's closing argument
was only 255 words long. The lawyer
was later disbarred for other reasons.
Nelson had the good fortune to be
represented pro bono in post-conviction proceedings by lawyers willing to
spend their own money to investigate
Nelson's case. They discovered that the
hair found on the victim's body, which
the prosecution expert had linked to
Nelson, lacked sufficient characteristics
for microscopic comparison. Indeed,
they found that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had previously examined
the hair and found that it could not
validly be compared. As a result of such
inquiry, Gary Nelson was released after
eleven years on death row.
Frederico Martinez-Macias was represented at his capital trial in El Paso,
Texas, by a court-appointed attorney
paid only $11.84 per hour. Counsel
failed to present an available alibi witness, relied upon an incorrect assumption about a key evidentiary point without doing the research that would have
corrected his erroneous view of the law,
and failed to interview and present
witnesses who could have testified in
rebuttal of the prosecutor's case. Martinez-Macias was sentenced to death.
Martinez-Macias received competent
representation for the first time when a
Washington, D.C. firm took his case pro

bono. After a full investigation and
development of facts regarding his innocence, Martinez-Macias won federal habeas corpus relief. An El Paso grand
jury refused to re-indict him and he was
45
released after nine years on death row.1
Despite his woefully inadequate performance, Nelson's trial attorney, though
eventually disbarred, was not found to
be ineffective.' 46 Conversely, Macias' trial
attorney had spent more than ten years
as a district attorney, had prosecuted
seven or eight capital murder cases, and
was partner in a prestigious El Paso law
firm at the time of his appointment to
represent Macias. In finding Macias' trial
attorney ineffective, a federal magistrate
noted that the attorney "is, and [at the
time of Macias' trial] was, one of the best
attorneys in El Paso. Thus, the trite-buttrue lesson is that 'it can happen to the
best of us.' "147
7. "Effective, "but Fatal,Counsel
Myriad cases in which defendants have
been executed confirm that Stricklands
minimal standard for attorney competence in capital cases is a woeful failure.
Demonstrable errors by counsel, though
falling short of ineffective assistance,
repeatedly have been shown to have had
fatal consequences. The case of John
Eldon Smith, the first condemned person to suffer death in Georgia after
Gregg, though illustrative, is not exceptional. 141 Smith was tried before and
sentenced to death by an unconstitutionally composed jury, from which women
had been excluded unlawfully. 14 9 Within
weeks of Smith's conviction and death
sentence, his common-law wife and codefendant, Rebecca Machetti, was tried
separately before ajury that suffered the
same constitutional defect.' 50 She, too,
was sentenced to death.
Machetti's lawyers challenged the composition of her jury in state post-conviction proceedings. Because Smith's lawyers were unaware of a dispositive U.S.
Supreme Court decision, they did not
challenge thejury's composition in state
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post-conviction proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a
new trial for Machetti, whose lawyers
had managed to preserve the issue. Following retrial, a jury that fairly represented the community sentenced Machetti to life. Smith was less fortunate.
Because his lawyers had failed to preserve the issue by objecting in state
post-conviction proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit refused to consider the
identical issue in his case-even though
that court had already granted relief to
Machetti-and Smith was electrocuted
soon thereafter.1 51 As one seasoned capital defense attorney observed, "If Machetti had been represented by Smith's
lawyers and vice versa in state court,
Machetti would have been executed and
Smith would have obtained federal habeas corpus relief. This is not how a
principled selection process should
work."

152

Similarly, in Dugger v. Adams,153 the
Court held that Aubrey Adams was disentitled to relief because his trial lawyer
failed to object to jury instructions that
unconstitutionally reduced the jury's
1 54
sense of responsibility for its decision.
An Eleventh Circuit panel had unanimously held that Adams had been unconstitutionally sentenced to die because of
those instructions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's five-to-four decision denying relief held that the mistake of Adams' trial attorney was fatal to his ability
to raise that constitutional claim, in part
because counsel's negligence did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 155 Adams was electrocuted in Florida

petent and adequately compensated"
counsel be provided "at all stages of
capital ... litigation," including postconviction challenges. 158 Similarly, ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, promulgated seven years ago,
require the appointment of at least two
experienced attorneys at each stage of a
capital case.159 Nonetheless, with the exception of temporary funding of postconviction defender organizations discussed below, 160 the practice in virtually
all death penalty jurisdictions has been
to ignore the ABA recommendations.
According to reliable estimates, nearly
200 death row inmates presently do not
161
have lawyers.
2. No ConstitutionalRight to Direct Appeal
Since 1894, the Supreme Court has
uniformly held that a state is not constitutionally required to provide appellate
review of criminal convictions. McKane v.
Durston162 left little room to argue that
this general rule should be modified in
capital cases under the Court's "death is
different" jurisprudence. According to
McKane:
An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute right,
independent of [state] constitutional
or statutory provisions allowing such
appeal. A review by an appellate court
of the final judgment in a criminal case,
however grave the offense of which the accused is convicted, was not at commonlaw and is not now a necessary element
of due process of law. It is wholly within
the discretion of the State to allow or
163
not to allow such a review.

on May 4, 1989.156

B. Many States Do Not Provide Counsel to
Death Row Inmates Seeking Post-Conviction
Review of CapitalConvictions and Sentences
and the Recent Defunding of Resource
Centers Has Crippledthe Right
to Counselfor CapitalInmates.
1. The ABA Policy
As noted above, 57 more than six years
ago, the ABA recommended that "comVOLUME

Thus, the right to appeal a criminal
conviction, whether state or federal, exists purely as a matter of legislative grace.
Nonetheless, all states, as well as the
federal system, provide some mechanism for review of criminal convictions.
Most states and the federal system supply
a statutory right to appellate review.
Several states simply provide the opporIV,
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tunity for appellate review at the discretion of the state's highest court.
3. ConstitutionalProtection
of Statutory Right
Once the right to appeal is granted,
however, constitutional protections attach. For example, states that choose to
provide an appeal are prohibited from
imposing "unnecessary impediments"
to the exercise of that right. 6 4 Thus, the
Court has held that due process was
violated where a defendant who successfully appealed his conviction was subsequently reconvicted and received a
greater punishment than originally imposed. 165 To punish more severely, and
overcome a "presumption of vindictiveness," the court must provide a reasonable explanation, on the record, for
increasing the sentence. Similarly, due
process may be violated where a prosecutor decides to increase the charge against
a defendant who successfully appeals
her conviction on a lesser charge. Again,
the key is vindictive motivation and the
concern is that prosecutors not be allowed to "up the ante" to discourage
defendants from exercising their appeal
166
rights.
Equal protection guarantees also safeguard the right to appeal, once granted.
Therefore, if a state decides to provide a
right to appeal, it may not condition the
exercise of that right in a way that
discriminates against indigent defendants. For example, the Court in Griffin
v. Illinois167 held that due process and

equal protection were violated when a
state that conditioned appellate review
on defendant's presentation of a trial
record refused to provide an indigent
defendant with a free trial transcript.
4. Right to Counsel on Direct Appeal
The Sixth Amendment by its terms
does not confer a right to counsel on
appeal. That amendment merely guarantees a person the assistance of counsel
"for his defence" in "criminal prosecutions." 168 Once convicted and sentenced,

a defendant's prosecution is completed.
Nonetheless, drawing upon the equal
protection and due process guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court has held that a state must provide
counsel for an indigent's first statutory
appeal as of right.1 6 1 Therefore, even
though a state is not required to provide
a right to appeal, when it does so it
undertakes the additional obligation of
providing counsel to indigents.
Where a constitutional right to counsel on appeal exists, counsel must be
effective. 17° Of course, effectiveness is
judged under the woefully inadequate
standard of Strickland v. Washington.171
5. No Right to Counsel on Certiorarior in
State orFederalPost-ConvictionProceedings
The importance of post-conviction
proceedings can not be overstated, particularly in capital cases. Insofar as many
capital defendants receive inadequate-if
not ineffective-counsel at trial and on
direct appeal, state post-conviction proceedings may provide the first real opportunity for a defendant to establish innocence or prove constitutional errors that
172
infected the earlier proceedings.
In Ross v. Moffitt,173 the Court refused

to extend the principles of Griffin and
Douglas to require appointed counsel to
assist indigent defendants in their second, discretionary state appeals and in
preparing petitions for certiorari to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Similarly, the Court,
in Pennsylvania v. Finley,174 held that
there is no right to appointed counsel in
state post-conviction proceedings. The
majority stated:
Post-conviction relief is even further
removed from the criminal trial than is
discretionary direct review. It is not part
of the criminal proceeding itself, and it
is in fact considered to be civil in
nature. It is a collateral attack that
normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through

direct review of his conviction. States
have no obligation to provide this ave-

nue of relief, and when they do, the
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fundamental fairness mandated by the
Due Process Clause does not require
175
that the State supply a lawyer as well.

Finley was not a capital case but Murray
1 76
v. Giarratano
was. In Giarratano,a plurality held that Finley should apply no
differently in capital cases than in non-

capital cases. The GiarratanoCourt reiterated that there is no right to appointed
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, even those brought by capital defendants. 1 7 7 The ABA filed an amicus brief
in Giarratano,urging that states provide
funding for the representation of death
row inmates in post-conviction proceedings.

17 8

According to one scholar, because the
Constitution does not require-and
many states do not provide-counsel to
capital inmates beyond direct appeal,
"the most significant role played by state
post-conviction proceedings in the administration of the death penalty is the
additional opportunities they provide
for forfeiting substantive constitutional
claims." 179 Lawyerless death row inmates
who fail to raise meritorious claims in
state post-conviction forfeit the opportunity to have those issues reviewed by
federal courts during habeas proceedings.1 80 Death row inmates fortunate
enough to have counsel during state
post-conviction proceedings are entirely
at the mercy of these attorneys. In the
event post-conviction attorneys render
inadequate or ineffective assistance, causing irreparable harm to their clients'
cases, there is no remedy. In Coleman v.
Thompson,18 1 the Court rejected a claim
that attorney error in failing to file a
state habeas appeal on time constituted
"cause" that should excuse petitioner's
procedural default. Earlier, the Court
had held that attorney error can be
"cause" only if it constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel violative of the
Sixth Amendment. Because there is no
constitutional right to an attorney in
state post-conviction proceedings, there
VOLUME

can be no claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in those
proceedings.
Thus far the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the issue of whether a
death row inmate has a constitutional
right to appointed counsel during federal habeas corpus proceedings. In all
likelihood, the Court would draw upon
Moffitt, Finley, and Giarrantanoand hold
that no such constitutional right exists.
Lower federal courts have held that the
Constitution does not provide the right

to counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings.1 8 2 Nonetheless, capital defendants currently do have a statutory right
to the assistance of counsel in federal
183
habeas corpus proceedings.
6. Defunding of the Death Penalty
Resource Centers
One critical recommendation, issued

by the ABA Task Force, is that death
penalty jurisdictions "should establish
and fund organizations to recruit, select,
train, monitor, support, and assist attorneys involved at all stages of capital
litigation and, if necessary, to participate
in the trial of such cases." 184 Virtually
nothing has been done to implement
this recommendation at trial and on
direct appeal. However, in 1988, acting
under the authority of the Criminal
Justice Act, 185 the federaljudiciary established twenty post-conviction defender
organizations (PCDOs) to help alleviate
the crisis in counsel facing capital inmates in state post-conviction and fed18 6
eral habeas corpus proceedings.
The PCDOs, also known as Resource
Centers, were extremely effective. Chief
Judge Tjoflat of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, testifying before the ABA Task Force, called
187
the Resource Centers "indispensable."
Similarly, Judge Arthur L. Alarcon of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
wrote that these organizations were "critical" to the efficient processing of capital
cases.188 The Cox Subcommittee on

Death Penalty Representation described
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the work of the Resource Centers as
follows:
Resource centers have both facilitated
the provision of counsel to death sentenced inmates and enhanced the quality of representation. The promise of
expert advice and assistance from resource center attorneys has encouraged private counsel to provide representation for death sentenced inmates.
Private lawyers who communicated with
the subcommittee almost uniformly expressed the view that they would not
willingly represent a death sentenced
inmate without the assistance of a resource center or similar organization.
State and federal judges agreed that
resource center assistance was critical
to the recruitment of private attorneys
to represent death sentenced inmates.
Furthermore, resource centers employ
staff who have developed significant
legal expertise in the fields of capital
punishment and habeas corpus law.
This expertise assists private appointed
counsel in providing quality representation. Resource centers can also enhance the quality of representation by
providing continuity of counsel over
89
the course of the case.'
Although the full Judicial Conference
subcommittee found that PCDOs facilitated the provision of counsel to capital
inmates, "enhanced the quality of representation and-by offering expert advice and assistance-encouraged private
counsel to provide capital representation ... the 104th Congress decided to
19 0
kill them."

Supreme CourtJustices, lower federal
court judges, state judiciaries, state bar
associations, and the ABA spoke out in
support of the Resource Centers. 9 1 Indeed, former ABA President George E.
Bushell publicly denounced the effort to
defund the Resource Centers. 192 None-

theless, the 104th Congress defunded
them all.

193

If Congress had hoped to save money
by defunding the Resource Centers, it is
likely to be disappointed. The average
salary of a PDCO staff attorney was

$30,000 per year, which translates to an
average hourly wage of $55. Courtappointed private attorneys in federal
habeas corpus cases earn an average
hourly wage of $138.194 Richard A. Arnold, Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
and head of the budget committee of
the Judicial Conference of the United
States, has put the increased cost in
perspective. According to Chief Judge
Arnold's estimates, the cost of representing death row inmates without PCDOs
will skyrocket in fiscal 1996, increasing
somewhere between 75 and 158 percent.
Whereas PCDOs cost taxpayers $21.2
million, representation of death row inmates without PCDOs will require be195
tween $37.2 and $51.1 million.
Economic projections capture only a
fraction of the costly consequences of
defunding. Earlier this year, a report of
the Bar of the City of New York assessed
the likely impact of Congress' refusal to
fund PCDOs:
The withdrawal of PCDO funding could
not have come at a worse time. At the
creation of the PCDOs in 1988, the
,death row population was 2,124. Seven
years later, the death row population
has increased by more than 43% to
more than 3,040. More than threequarters of death row inmates' cases
have yet to reach the federal courts.
There, and in the state courts, new
confusion and greater log jams will
follow PDCO funding. 196

C. FarFrom Embracingthe
Recommendations of the ABA, the Supreme
Court Has Pushed CapitalHabeas
Jurisprudencein the Opposite Direction and
Congress Has Eviscerated the Great Writ,
EnsuringLess Fairnessand Heightening
the Risk ofErrorin Capital Cases
As detailed below, the ABA in recent
years has devoted enormous resources
to studying habeas corpus in death penalty cases. No other organization has
monitored habeas corpus more closely,
developed greater expertise about the
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strengths and weaknesses of habeas corpus, or offered more detailed recommendations for habeas reform.
In 1981, the ABA publicly opposed
three bills then pending in Congress
that would have drastically restricted the
ability of federal courts to adjudicate
claims in habeas corpus.1 97 At the same
time, the ABA proposed alternative habeas reforms, designed to expedite habeas litigation, while acknowledging the
authority and responsibility of federal
courts to exercise independent judgment on the merits of constitutional
claims.

198

In 1988, an ABA Task Force began a
year-long project of gathering information from judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys on how to improve a
system virtually everyone agreed was unsatisfactory.1 99 In a comprehensive report, the Task Force concluded that "the
post-conviction process of reviewing capital convictions and sentences is, on the
one hand, too long and too slow and, on
the other hand, susceptible to unfair
outcomes due to the inadequate presentation of constitutional issues." 20 0 Accordingly, the Task Force proposed substituting a new process that would "achieve
greater fairness and facilitate rational
review." 20 1 The ABA endorsed this new
process and adopted the set of sixteen
recommendations contained in the Task
20 2
Force report.
Far from embracing the recommendations of the ABA Task Force, capital
jurisdictions have essentially ignored
them. Worse, recent Supreme Court decisions have pushed the law further in
the opposite direction. There is no reason to believe that the situation will
improve. To the contrary, recent legislation is certain to make matters signifi203
cantly worse.

1. Overview of The Great Writ204
In 1996, Congress gutted the writ of

Supreme Court during the past few
years.

205

The writ of habeas corpus traces its
roots to England and entered the fabric
of American law during the colonial

period. 20 6 The Supreme Court has recognized "the extraordinary prestige of the
Great Writ, ' 20 7 which Blackstone described as "the most celebrated writ in
20 8
the English law."
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution
reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require
it."' 20 9 Habeas corpus derives its name
from Latin and means "have the body."
As initially developed sometime before
the thirteenth century, the writ was a
form of mesne process by which courts
compelled the attendance of parties
whose presence would facilitate their
proceedings. It was not until the midfourteenth century that it came to be
used as an independent proceeding
designed to challenge illegal detention.

The subsequent characterization of habeas corpus as the Great Writ of Liberty-the alleged procedural underpinning of the guarantees of the Magna
Carta-stemmed primarily from battles
fought in establishing its effectiveness
against imprisonment by the Crown
210
withoutjudicial authorization.
In the United States, the very first

Congress expressly included the writ of
habeas corpus in the first Judiciary Act,
passed in 1789. According to that Act:
[T] he several courts of the United States

shall have the power to issue writs of...
habeas corpus which may be necessary
for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either
the justices of the Supreme Court, as
well as judges of the District Courts,
shall have power to grant writs of habeas

corpus for the purpose of inquiry into

the cause of commitment.2"

habeas corpus by placing limitations on

the remedy that sweep even further than
the rigid restrictions adopted by the

Originally, the writ only extended to
federal prisoners: those in custody "un-
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der or by color of the authority of the
2 12

United States." In Ex Parte Dorr, the
Supreme Court held that the common
law writ of habeas corpus did not extend
to state prisoners. 213 In 1867-the year
Amendment was
the Fourteenth

adopted-Congress passed a new Judiciary Act. Its provisions allowed state
prisoners "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States"
to challenge their confinement in federal court. 2 14 Ex Parte Dorr was thus
overruled.
Prior to 1915, courts limited the writ's
availability by restricting its use to state
prisoners who had been sentenced by a
court lacking proper jurisdiction. However, in Frank v. Mangum,2 15 the Court
took a more expansive approach to the
writ:
Frank v. Mangum, the Supreme Court's
first major twentieth century habeas
corpus decision, held that the habeas
remedy should be provided whenever
the state, "supplying the corrective process. ...deprives the accused of life or

liberty without due process of law." If
the state did not provide an effective
remedy to vindicate federal constitutional rights, the federal courts had
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions.
Nearly forty years later, in Brown v.
Allen, the Court made an even more
significant pronouncement, holding
that, assuming state remedies have been
exhausted, a state prisoner can petition
a federal court for adjudication of a
constitutional claim even when the state
corrective process is adequate.
From Brown until the 1970s, the Court
continued to support an expansive view
of the writ, to the point where it became available to virtually any state
prisoner with a constitutional claim
who had not deliberately bypassed the
state corrective process. But since the
mid-1970s, the Court, while not overturning Brown, has moved from heavy
reliance on habeas corpus as a means of
reviewing state court decisions to a
preference for state resolution of most
constitutional conflicts arising in crimi216
nal cases ....

The Court-led retreat from an expansive view of the writ continues to generate significant debate. As a practical
matter, this retreat has had an impact in
two areas: first, the type of substantive
claim a state criminal defendant may
bring in federal court; and second, the
extent to which habeas relief may be
foreclosed due to a criminal defendant's
failure to adequately litigate his claims in
state court or comply with other procedural requirements.
The retreat from an expansive view of
the writ is a result of at least three
factors. First, the Supreme Court expresses greater faith in the capabilities of
state courts. Second, the Supreme Court
hopes to promote comity between the
federal and state systems by showing
greater respect for, and thus increased
deference to, the decisions of state
courts. Finally, and perhaps most important, the Court repeatedly emphasizes
the need for finality in the judicial process and the burden that habeas petitions place on federal courts. 2 17 According to a majority opinion authored by
Justice Anthony Kennedy,
Finality has a special importance in the
context of a federal attack on a state
conviction. Reexamination of state convictions on federal habeas "frustrate [s]
...

'both the States' sovereign power to

punish offenders and their good-faith
attempts to honor constitutional
rights.' "Our federal system recognizes
the independent power of a State to
articulate societal norms through criminal law; but the power of a State to pass
laws means little if the State cannot
enforce them.
Habeas review extracts further costs.
Federal collateral litigation places a
heavy burden on scarce federal judicial
resources, and threatens the capacity of
the system to resolve primary dis218
putes.
In this regard, from time to time, various
Justices have expressed a desire to
shorten the appeals process for death
row inmates and to increase the pace of
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executions, in hopes of achieving some
deterrent effect.
2. Forty PercentReversal Rate
in CapitalCases

More than forty years ago, Justice
Jackson complained about the "flood"
of "stale, frivolous and repetitious [habeas] petitions." 219 JusticeJackson wrote,
It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood
of worthless ones. He who must search
a haystack for a needle is likely to end
up with the attitude that the needle is
220
not worth the search.

ous statement was sufficient to convict of the crime accused, and the
absence of any indication that the
defendant was made aware of the
significance of the changes in the
statement, created a suggestive environment that rendered the second
statement involuntary. [Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981).]
" The grand jury that indicted the
defendant was selected in a process
that systematically excluded African
Americans. [Vasquez v. Hillery, 474
U.S. 254 (1986).]
" The prosecution knowingly presented

Contrary to Justice Jackson's assessment, meritorious habeas petitions are
anything but "occasional," particularly
in capital cases. Recently, a Supreme
Courtjustice described the error rate in
' 221
state capital cases as "staggering."
Forty-six percent of state capital cases
reviewed in federal habeas corpus between 1976 and 1991 were found to
222
contain harmful constitutional error.
This alarming rate has only decreased
slightly, and has hovered at around forty
223
percent for the past several years.
And, of course, the forty percent reversal
rate includes at least some persons condemned to die who were later deter224
mined to be actually innocent.
Nor can the federal constitutional violations that led the surprisingly high
success rate for death row inmates be
fairly characterized as "technicalities." 225
Here are some examples:
A mentally deficient man gave the
police two vastly different statements
during forty-two hours of uncounseled questioning. The later of the
two confessions used words beyond
the defendant's capability and, unlike the first confession, distinctly
recited facts that qualified the defendant for the death penalty. The court
noted that the interrogators' zealous
intent to secure a statement that
would qualify the defendant for the
death penalty, even though the previ-

misleading evidence by using the
same expert witness to testify at the
defendant's trial that he must have
been the sole triggerman, when that
expert had previously testified at the
codefendant's trial that the codefendant must have been the sole triggerman. [ Troedel v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 670
(11th Cir. 1987), affg 667 F. Supp.
1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986).]
" The prosecution withheld its most
crucial witness' prior statement,
which corroborated evidence favorable to the defendant and would
have been material in challenging
the witness' trial testimony. [Carterv.
Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988)
(jury sentenced defendant to life on
three first degree murder charges).]
" The prosecutor withheld investigative reports containing substantial evidence indicating that someone other
than the defendant may have committed the murder. [Bowen v. Maynard,
799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 962 (1986).]
" The prosecutor deliberately withheld
the fact that his chief witness had
received a deal for his trial testimony,
and improperly misled the jury by
stating in his closing argument that
the absence of such a deal favorably
reflected upon the veracity of the
witness. [Brown v. Wainwright, 785
F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1986).]
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" The prosecution suppressed evidence
showing that the defendant did not
commit the killing. [Chaney v. Brown,
730 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1090 (1984).]

The prosecutor
withheld
investigative
reports
containing
substantial
evidence
indicatingthat
someone other
than the
defendant may
have committed
the murder
[Bowen v.
Maynard, 799
E2d 593 (10th
Cir), cert.
denied, 479
U.S. 962
(1986).]

" The defendant was insane at the time
of the trial and thus was not competent to assist his attorney. [Wallace v.
Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102 (llth Cir. 1985).]
After the federal court ordered a
retrial and the defendant was restored to sanity, he was acquitted.
" The district attorney devised a secret
scheme by which he got the jury
commissioners to underrepresent African-Americans and women. [Amadeo
v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).]
" Massive pretrial publicity in a small
town compromised nearly all jurors,
many of whom had attended the
victims' funeral. [Coleman v. Kemp,
778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); Isaacs v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).]
" The local sheriff handpicked thejury
in a case involving the murder of a
police officer. [ Thompson v. White, 680
F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1177 (1983).]
" Thejudge's charge to the jury unconstitutionally placed on the defendant
the burden of proof on a key element
of the alleged crime. [Francisv. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985).]
" The prosecutor based his argument
in favor of a death sentence on prior
felony convictions that he knew, although stipulated to by defense counsel, did not exist. [Lewis v. Lane, 832
F.2d 1446 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 829 (1988).]
" The defendant was sentenced to
death by ajury that had been unconstitutionally instructed that it could
not consider his brain damage, his
full cooperation with the police, or
his favorable prospect for rehabilitation as mitigating factors. [Hitchcock
v. Dugger,481 U.S. 393 (1987).]

" The jury was unconstitutionally instructed in a way that prevented it
from considering the defendant's
mental retardation as a factor that
would support a sentence other than
death. [Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989).]
" The prosecutor inaccurately told the
jury that a verdict of death would not
be final because the appellate courts
would correct any mistakes it made.
[Wheat v.Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621,624-29
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
930 (1987).]
" The defendant's attorney failed to
inform the jury (which convicted
and sentenced the defendant to
death) that the State's only witnessthe admitted killer, who testified in
return for a lesser sentence-did not
link the defendant to the murder in
his detailed confession to police.
[Smith v. Wainwright, 799 E2d 1442
(1lth Cir. 1986).]
" Defense counsel filed no pretrial motions, did not try to locate any defense witnesses, did not interview the
defendant's family or the State's witnesses, did not visit the crime scene,
failed to use possibly exculpatory evidence available from the State's scientific tests, and failed to seek a new
trial after evidence emerged that the
victims were alive after the last time
that the defendant could have been
in contact with them. [House v. Balkcom, 725 E2d 608 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984).]
" Defense counsel failed to present
significant evidence to the jury concerning the defendant's retardation,
limited education and "povertybacksocioeconomic
stricken
ground"-evidence that might have
persuaded the jury to impose a sentence other than death. [Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir.
1991).]
" Neither defense lawyer conducted
any investigation seeking evidence
that might persuade the jury not to
impose the death sentence, because
"[e]ach lawyer ...
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other was responsible for preparing
the penalty phase." [Harrisv. Dugger,
874 F2d 756, 763 (llth Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1011 (1990).]
*

crime. [Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d
1508, 1516-22 (10th Cir. 1995).]
" Defense counsel's failure to order a
mental evaluation prevented the presentation of mitigating evidence regarding defendant's mental state at
the time of the murder. [Antwine v.
Delo, 54 F.3d 1357, 1364-68 (8th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 133 L. Ed. 2d 700
(1996).]

Defense counsel did not investigate
or otherwise prepare for the capital
sentencing hearing because he was
confident that he could negotiate a
sentence other than death. [Osborn v.
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 624-30 (10th
Cir. 1988).]

*

Defense counsel failed to bring to
the jury's attention evidence relating
to the defendant's mental retardation, the fact that his IQ was below
41, that he was only seventeen years
old at the time of the crime, and was
not proven to have had any intent or
played any role in the homicide.
[Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1103
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1087 (1987).]

*

Defendant was denied the benefit of
the presentation of crucial mitigating evidence by the defense counsel's
failure to conduct a reasonable investigation to uncover information regarding defendant's mental retardation and psychiatric history. [Baxterv.
Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 385 (1995).]

*

The prosecutor's deliberate and repeated misrepresentations before the
jury, directly "aimed at discrediting
the core of the defense," rendered
defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. [Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1550
(11th Cir. 1994).]

*

The prosecution withheld information that three individuals, known to
be associates in criminal activity, had
previously been identified as being at
the scene of the crime, that one of
the individuals identified had confessed committing the crime to his
cellmate, that the same individual
was positively identified as having
forged endorsement on the money
orders taken during commission of
the crime, and that the same individual had committed manslaughter
by using a weapon of a similar caliber
as the one used in commission of the
VOLUME

" Confusion among defendant's counsel as to whose responsibility it was to
prepare for the sentencing phase of
trial resulted in a failure to follow up
on mitigating information regarding
defendant's life history and personal
hardship, rendering their assistance
"ineffective for failure to prepare for
the sentencing phase." [Jackson v.
Herring, 42 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.
1995).]
" The net effect of evidence suppressed
by the prosecution raised a reasonable probability that disclosure would
have produced a different outcome.
[Kylesv. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1560
(1995).]226

3.

The ABA Policy: The Task Force Report

The ABA's policy concerning federal
habeas corpus review of death penalty
cases is embodied in a comprehensive
set of sixteen recommendations, perhaps best described as a "carefully crafted
package of interconnected reforms designed as a whole to make the process
227
less complex and to preserve fairness."
These recommendations, which were approved by the ABA House of Delegates
in February 1990, are appended to this

Report as an Appendix.
In 1988, the ABA's Criminal Justice
Section formed a ten-member Task Force

to study judicial review of capital cases
that resulted in death sentences. 228 The
Task Force members included state and

federal judges, a deputy attorney general, capital trial and post-conviction

counsel, a court administrator, and several law professors. This broad base of
expertise facilitated full consideration of
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the diverse perspectives on habeas corpus review of death penalty cases. 229 The
Task Force presupposed the continued
existence of both capital punishment
and federal court review of capital
230
cases.
In its Background Report, released in
August 1990, the Task Force described
its mission as follows:
[Tio formulate a series of comprehensive recommendations that, when implemented, would produce state and federal review procedures in death penalty
cases that: are coordinated; are efficient
(in terms of the use of the time and
resources of both counsel and the
courts); result in certainty, to the extent
possible, that no person will be executed on the basis of a conviction that
is flawed by fundamental factual, legal,
or constitutional procedural error; and
are devoid of the chaotic character of
current "last minute," piecemeal, state
23
and federal reviews. '

The Task Force aggressively sought
input from all segments of the criminal
justice system and held six days of regional, public hearings in Dallas, San
Francisco and Atlanta. 232 More than
eighty witnesses, reflecting a rich sample
of criminal justice experts, testified at
these hearings. These witnesses included
a U.S. senator, the Governor of California, state legislators, federal trial and
appellate judges, state supreme court
judges and justices, state attorneys general, state and federal public defenders,
directors of death penalty resource centers, volunteer post-conviction counsel,
representatives of victims' rights organi233
zations, academics, and others.
Following extensive hearings and
meetings, the Task Force promulgated a
carefully crafted set of sixteen recommendations. 234 Perhaps most crucial to

fairness and efficiency in capital cases,
Recommendations One through Six require "the provision of competent counsel to assure that the streamlined process
is capable of fairly rectifying constitu-

tional errors." 235 The Task Force concluded that:
[C]apital litigation in the United States
today too often begins with poor legal
representation. Thereafter, the petitioner, the state, and society pay the
price as each successive stage of the
case becomes more complicated, more
protracted, and more costly. Poor representation after the trial is also not uncommon, and it, too, imposes costs-in terms
of both efficiency and fairness-at each
successive stage of the litigation. The
goals of better, more efficient, and more
orderly justice can be achieved when
the quality of legal representation at all
23 6
stages of capital cases is improved.
The Task Force considered the provision of competent counsel to be the
"keystone of the American Bar Association's recommendations."2 3 7 Although
the Task Force focused mainly on poor
trial counsel, it also recommended that
competent counsel be provided "at all
stages of capital cases."
The recommended standards for
counsel in capital cases, ultimately
adopted by the ABA, are actually far
more stringent than those proposed by
the Task Force. Nonetheless, the ABA's
recommended standards have largely
been ignored.
The Task Force also addressed three
other critical deficiencies in the legal
processes employed in capital cases. First,
the Task Force received testimony from
prosecutors and defense attorneys alike
about the "frenzied and scrambled litigation that occurs after an execution date
has been set." 238 There was broad agreerment that valuable resources were squandered needlessly in litigating artificial
execution dates, designed merely to
move the cases along. The Task Force
recommended that a death row inmate
should be entitled to a stay of execution
in order to pursue one round of postconviction litigation in state and federal
court.

239

Second, the Task Force Report examined the doctrine of procedural default
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in capital cases. The federal courts and
most state courts have contemporaneous objection rules or other rules that
preclude a court from considering a
legal issue that was not properly raised at
trial or on appeal.2 40 Consequently, many
meritorious legal issues go unaddressed
in capital cases because of the failure of
counsel to raise the issue at all, or in a
timely fashion, or in the proper manner.241 As a result, often capital defendants are put to death without any examination of serious constitutional defects
in either the guilt or sentencing phase.
To avoid manifest injustice of this sort,
the Task Force recommended that federal courts be required to consider issues that were not properly raised in
state court if the reason for the prisoner's default was the ignorance or neglect
of his attorney.242

Finally, the Task Force canvassed the
law regarding second or successive habeas petitions. 24 3 On this point, the Task
Force recommended that a prisoner
should be permitted to file a successive
habeas petition, providing the prisoner
raises a new claim that undermines con2 44
fidence in his or her guilt.

These three critical recommendations
have met the same fate as the Task
Force's recommendations regarding
counsel: none have been adopted. To
the contrary, rather than embrace these
recommendations, the Supreme Court
has only made things worse for habeas
petitioners. Presently, death row prisoners are not automatically entitled to even
a single stay of execution to permit them
to pursue post-conviction remedies. Federal courts are prohibited from considering claims not properly raised in state
court, even if counsel's ignorance or
neglect will mean the execution of an
inmate with serious constitutional defects in his trial or sentencing hearing.
And even prisoners who are able to
produce colorable evidence of actual
innocence are prohibited from filing
more than one habeas petition. 24 5 Indeed, since the Task Force Report was
VOLUME

published, the standards for successor
petitions have been dramatically altered
to extinguish the right of prisoners to
file a second petition seeking judicial
consideration of their claims, 246 the
Court has fashioned a new and more
difficult rule for harmless error in habeas cases, 247 and it has become far more
difficult for a death row prisoner to get
an evidentiary hearing in federal
court.

24 8

2 49

4. Teague v. Lane

In October 1989, the ABA Task Force
issued its recommendations and final
report. That same year, the Supreme
Court decided Teague v. Lane,250 and
sharply curtailed the availability of habeas corpus relief to death row inmates
whose convictions or sentences or both
were infected with serious constitutional
errors.25 1 According to the Teague doctrine, subject to two extremely narrow
exceptions, a "new rule" of law may not
become the basis for federal habeas
relief.25 2 The Court defined "new rule"

broadly to mean one that "was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final. ' ' 25 For purposes of Teague, a defendant's conviction becomes final after all
direct appeals are exhausted and when
either the time for filing a petition for
certiorari on direct review has lapsed, or
the Supreme Court has denied a petition for certiorari on direct review. It has
been noted that this standard "invites
federal courts to find that virtually any
holding in a case decided after a petitioner has exhausted his direct appeals is
a 'new rule' that cannot be applied
retroactively."

254

The ABA has formally opposed the
Teague nonretroactivity principle and, in
testimony before both Houses of Congress, ABA representatives have urged
255
that Teague be legislatively overruled.
Nonetheless, Congress has failed to follow the ABA's strong recommendation,
and Teague remains a formidable barrier
to habeas relief in capital cases.
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5. Herrerav. Collins

The probability
of convicting,
sentencing to
death, and
actually
executing
innocentpeople
is substantially
increased by the
draconianrules
that govern
procedural
default and
abuse of the
writ.

The Supreme Court has so drastically
curtailed access to federal habeas corpus
relief that federal courts are significantly
restricted from sparing from execution
prisoners who produce evidence of their
innocence. In Herrera v. Collins,25 7 the
Court held that a capital prisoner's claim
of actual innocence did not entitle him
to federal habeas relief.258 According to

the majority, "[c]laims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a
ground for federal habeas relief absent
an independent constitutional violation
occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding."

' 259

Justice Blackmun had this to say about
the Herreracase:

6. Innocence and the Death Penalty
There is "a quietly acknowledged danger in the American judicial system: the
virtual certainty of sometimes executing
innocent people. "261 Recently passed habeas reform legislation imposes rigid
time limits on the ability of deathsentenced inmates to seek review of
constitutional claims. 262 Without sufficient time for review, more innocent
persons will undoubtedly die.
The probability of convicting, sentencing to death, and actually executing
innocent people is substantially increased
by the draconian rules that govern proce-

2 63
dural default and abuse of the writ.
Moreover, claims of innocence based on
newly discovered evidence do not, by
themselves, state a ground for federal

264

The Court's refusal [in 1993] to afford
Leonel Torres Herrera an evidentiary
hearing, despite his colorable showing
of actual innocence, demonstrates just
how far afield the Court has strayed
from its statutorily and constitutionally
imposed obligations. In Herrera,only a

bare majority of this Court could bring
itself to state forthrightly that the execution of an actually innocent person
violates the Eighth Amendment. This
concession was made only in the course
of erecting nearly insurmountable barriers to a defendant's ability to get a
hearing on a claim of actual innocence.

Certainly there will be individuals who
are actually innocent who will be un-

able to make a better showing than
what was made by Herrera without the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The
Court is unmoved by this dilemma,
however; it prefers "finality" in death
sentences to reliable determinations of
a capital defendant's guilt. Because I no
longer can state with any confidence
that this Court is able to reconcile the
Eighth Amendment's competing constitutional commands, or that the federal
judiciary will provide meaningful oversight to the state courts as they exercise
their authority to inflict the penalty of
death, I believe that the death penalty,
as currently administered, is unconstitu260
tional.

habeas relief.

Notwithstanding procedural and substantive safeguards designed to protect
against mistakes, human error is inevitable. And in capital cases, human error

can be fatal. As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed, "No matter how careful
courts are, the possibility of perjured
testimony, mistaken honest testimony
and human error remain all too real. We
have no way of judging how many innocent persons have been executed, but we
265
can be certain that there were some."
According to a study published in
1987, more than 350 people in this
century have been erroneously convicted in the United States of crimes
potentially punishable by death. Of these,
116 were sentenced to death and twentythree were actually executed. 266 A 1993
Staff Report issued by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights identified forty-eight
people who were released from prison
since 1973 after serving time on death
row. 2 6 7

Noting that four former death

row inmates were released during the
first half of 1993 after their innocence
became apparent, the Report concluded,
"there is a real danger of innocent
people being executed in the United
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States." 26 8 As the Supreme Court has
warned,
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides which
call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language
which can fairly be understood and
applied by the sentencing authority,
appear to be tasks which are beyond
2 69
present human ability.

7. Recent Examples of InnocentPeople
Releasedfrom Death Row
At least four former death row inmates from three different states won
freedom in 1995 after establishing their
innocence. Rolando Cruz was twice tried
and sentenced to die for the 1983 abduction, rape, and killing of a ten-year-old
girl in Illinois. Following a third trial, a
judge ordered Cruz's acquittal on November 3, 1995. At the last trial, two
officers again testified that Cruz had
described to them a vision Cruz had in
which he killed the girl. The prosecutor's case fell apart when the officers'
supervisor admitted that he had lied
when he testified that the officers had
270
told him of Cruz's vision.
On December 8, 1995, prosecutors
dropped charges against Cruz's codefendant, Alejandro Hernandez, who had
also been sentenced to die for the murder. Hernandez spent more than a decade in prison, including several years
2 71
on death row.
An Arizona death row inmate, Robert
Charles Cruz, walked off of death row
when he was acquitted at his fifth trial
for the 1980 contract killing of a print272
shop owner and his mother-in-law.
Cruz, who spent more than fourteen
years in prison, won acquittal in June
1995.273

That same year, Oklahoma death row
inmate Adolph Munson was acquitted
following a retrial for the murder of a
convenience store clerk. 274 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals granted
Munson a retrial after finding that the
VOLUME

state had deliberately withheld a mountain of exculpatory evidence during the
original trial in 1985.275 On April 5,
1995, the jury found Munson not guilty
after deliberating a mere three hours.
Munson had spent nearly ten years await276
ing lethal injection.
In another Illinois case, Joseph Burrows spent nearly six years awaiting execution for the farmhouse murder of an
eighty-eight-year-old man. 277 Burrows was
released on his own recognizance in
September 1994 after the principal witnesses against him recanted their testi278
mony and one confessed to the crime.
During the first six months of 1993,
four death row inmates from four different states were freed after establishing
their innocence of the crimes for which
they were condemned to die. 279 In Maryland, Kirk Bloodsworth was sentenced to
die for the rape and murder of a young
girl. After serving two years on death
row, Bloodsworth was granted a new trial
and received a life sentence. Bloodsworth spent nine years in prison before
DNA testing confirmed his innocence
28 0
and he was released.
In Texas, Federico Martinez-Macias
left death row after the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
upheld the award of habeas corpus relief
on the ground of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 28 1 Assisted by effective lawyers for the first time, Macias was set free
on June 23, 1993 after a grand jury
refused to reindict him for the 1984
murders. 282 Before his release, Macias
spent nearly nine years on death row.
In Alabama, Walter McMillian was
freed after three witnesses recanted their
testimony and prosecutors admitted that
they had withheld evidence favorable to
the defense. 283 It took only two days for
McMillian-a black man-to be tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death for
the 1986 murder of a white female clerk
at a dry cleaning store. 284 Before his
release on March 2, 1993, McMillian
spent six years awaiting execution. Even
before his trial began, McMillian was
285
imprisoned on Alabama's death row.
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Finally, in Oklahoma, Greg Wilhoit,
who had been convicted of the 1987
murder of his estranged wife, was acquitted during a March 1993 retrial. 28 6 At

Wilhoit's trial, eleven forensic experts
As Justice
Blackmun
observed, "[t]he
problem is that
the inevitability
offactual, legal
and moral error
gives us a system
that we know
must wrongly
kill some
defendants, a
system thatfails
to deliver the
fair,consistent,
and reliable
sentences of
death required
by the
Constitution."

testified that a bite mark found on
Wilhoit's dead wife did not belong to
him. 287

These examples of persons wrongfully
condemned and belatedly exonerated
do not prove-as some suggest-that
the system works. As Justice Blackmun
observed, "[t]he problem is that the
inevitability of factual, legal and moral

error gives us a system that we know
must wrongly kill some defendants, a
system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death
required by the Constitution."

288

More-

over, "[i] nnocent persons have been executed, perhaps recently, and will continue to be executed under our death
penalty scheme."

289

8. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death PenaltyAct of 1996
Notwithstanding the steady and precipitous decline of due process protections in capital cases over the past several
decades, Congress recently attempted to
eviscerate the Great Writ. In a rush to
respond to the important issue of terrorism, Congress fashioned legislation intended in large part to expedite the
review process in capital cases. In doing

so, Congress ignored the well-considered recommendations that emerged
from the ABA Task Force's intensive
study of much-needed habeas reform.
Congress' efforts culminated on April
26, 1996. On that day, barely a year after
the Oklahoma City bombing, President
Clinton signed into effect the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, thus changing the face of
290
federal habeas corpus in this country.
The Anti-Terrorism Act brings significant and dramatic changes to federal
habeas review while endangering the
29 1
freedoms of all Americans.
The Anti-Terrorism Act represents a
political response to the complicated

issues of terrorism and crime and reflects the contradictions and struggles of
the fierce political battle over federal
habeas that has been waged in Congress
for the past forty years. 292 The Act is
poorly drafted 293 and will add confusion
and uncertainty in cases pending before
federal courts on habeas review. Moreover, portions of the statute appear to
overrule, undermine or contradict existing case law, 294 including such key cases
2 96
as Rose v. Lundy, 29 5 Townsend v. Sam,
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,297 McCleskey v.
Zant,298 Schlup v. Delo,299 Granberry v.
Greer,300 and Teague v. Lane.30 1 Undoubt-

edly, the newly minted Anti-Terrorism
Act will demand a substantial amount of
time and resources to clarify and unravel. 302
The long-term effects of the AntiTerrorism Act and the changes it will
impose on capital litigation are unknown. Nonetheless, it appears evident
that the new legislation will undermine a
defendant's ability not only to litigate
valid constitutional issues but also to
raise claims of actual innocence. The key
features of the new law include:
(1) restricting the ability of federal
courts to entertain a successive habeas corpus petition and requiring
any prisoner seeking to file a successive habeas petition to first obtain
permission from a panel of the
court of appeals;
(2) imposing a statute of limitations
for filing habeas petitions;
(3) amending the requirements for exhausting state remedies;
(4) altering the rules governing evidentiary hearings;
(5) changing the standard of review

for any issue or claim "adjudicated
on the merits" in state court pro-

ceedings;
(6) restricting the ability of a prisoner
to appeal to the federal court of
appeals by replacing the "certificate of probable cause" with the
"certificate of appealability"; and
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(7) adding to Title 28 of the United
States Code a new chapter setting
forth "Special Habeas Corpus Pro30 3
cedures in Capital Cases.
Among the critical changes worked by
the Anti-Terrorism Act is the effect that
federal courts must acquiesce to state
court decisions regarding federal constitutional claims. 30 4 In a sharp departure
from previous federal habeas law,30 5 Section 2254(d) now provides:
An application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
Under this provision, even if a federal
court concludes that a state court is
wrong as a matter of law and that a
defendant's federal constitutional rights
were violated, the federal court would be
barred from granting relief. Rather, before relief may be granted, the federal
court must determine whether the state
court's erroneous application of the law
was "unreasonable." Thus, not only must
the state court be wrong, it must be
unreasonably wrong before a federal
court may grant relief to the aggrieved
30 6
defendant.
In addition, the statute places new
burdens on the ability of federal courts
to review factual findings. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), "a determination
of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct. The

applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by
clear and convincing evidence." The Act
also severely circumscribes the availability of evidentiary hearings in federal
habeas to develop and review factual
questions. Section 2254(e) (2) now provides:
If the applicant has failed to develop
the factual basis of a claim in State
court proceedings, the court shall not
hold an evidentiary hearing on the
claim unless the applicant shows that(A) the claim relies on(i) a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could
not have been previously discovered through the exercise
of due diligence; and
(B) the fact underlying the claim
would be sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional
error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.
This provision significantly changes the
availability and role of evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings.
"Read literally [the new statute] eliminates any federal standards for the factfinding process in state court and thus
ostensibly establishes a presumption in
favor of a state finding of fact, without
regard for the process from which it
generated. ' 30 7 "In effect, only prisoners
who can make a persuasive showing of
factual innocence can obtain a federal
evidentiary hearing into facts that may
support a constitutional claim." 30 8 Serious due process problems are raised by
such a system of review, 30 9 and these
substantive changes run counter to the
merits of constitutional claims.
Other provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act focus on procedural changes

VOLUME IV, NUMBER

1 (FALL 1996)

Features

The AntiTerrorism Act
dramatically
changesfederal
habeas review
and the
independence of
the ftderal
judiciary.

and impose strict time lines and limitations on appellate review. These changes
profoundly affect the ability of capital
defendants to present legitimate, constitutional claims and undermine the faith
one can place in the federal oversight of
capital cases. Further, these procedural
changes must be considered in light of
the ever-increasing crisis of attorney availability and defunding of resource centers, and whether it is realistic or even
possible for defendants to comply with
the deadlines. The Anti-Terrorism Act
dramatically changes federal habeas review and the independence of the federal judiciary. Not only do the changes
brought about by the Anti-Terrorism Act
raise grave concerns about the future
ability of federal courts to assure that the
death penalty is carried out in accordance with due process and the Constitution, but also the new legislation marks a
dangerous path endangering the freedom of all Americans.
D. Discriminationon the Basis of the Race
of the Victim and the Race of the Defendant
Still Infects a Very Large Number
of CapitalCases

rows throughout the country and the
defendant-victim racial combinations in
offenses that have resulted in death sentences. Currently, although blacks comprise roughly twelve to thirteen percent
of our country's population, more than
forty percent of America's death row
population is black. 12 When other members of minority groups are included,
more than half of America's death row
313
population consists of people of color.
Of those defendants executed since the
1976 reinstatement of capital punishment, nearly thirty-nine percent were
black.
Defendant-victim racial combinations
likewise illustrate that the longstanding
patterns of racial discrimination "that
were pursued down one hole with procedural rules and verbal formulas have
come to the surface somewhere else,just
as virulent and pernicious as they were
in their original form." 314 Fully eightythree percent of persons condemned to
die were convicted of murdering white
victims.3

capital sentencing.3 10 In August 1988,

the ABA adopted the following policy:
Be It Resolved, that the American Bar
Association opposes discrimination in
capital sentencing on the basis of the
race of either the victim or the defendant.
Be It Further Resolved, that the American Bar Association supports the enactment of federal and state legislation
which strives to eliminate any racial
discrimination in capital sentencing
1
which may exist. 31

2. Legal Defense Fund Statistics
That race continues to play a major
role in determining who shall live and
who shall die is confirmed by an examination of the racial composition of death

By contrast, only twelve per-

cent of persons condemned to die were
3 16
convicted of murdering black victims.
3. ProsecutorialDiscretion

1. The ABA Policy
The ABA is clearly and firmly on
record as opposing discrimination in

15

Federal prosecutorial power derives
from Article II, Section 3 of the United
States Constitution, which provides that
the executive branch "shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed."
Most state constitutions contain similar
provisions.
Prosecutors enjoy broad discretion in
making critical decisions. Perhaps most
important is the charging decision: "the
determination whether a particular person should formally be accused of a
crime and, if so, on precisely what charge
or charges." 317 These decisions are unlikely to be disturbed. As the Supreme
3 18
Court stated in Bordenkircherv. Hayes,
[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or
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bring before a grand jury, generally
rests entirely in his discretion.

Regarding discrimination, it has been
said that "[i]t is usually the poor, the
illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the minority group-the man
who, because he is without means, and
is defended by a court-appointed attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial
lamb .. " Indeed, a look at the bare
statistics regarding executions is enough
to betray much of the discrimination. A
total of 3,859 persons have been executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 were
white and 2,066 were Negro. Of the
executions, 3,334 were for murder;
1,664 of the executed murderers were
white and 1,630 were Negro; 455 persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes, were executed for rape. It is
immediately apparent that Negroes
were executed far more often than
whites in proportion to their percentage of the population. Studies indicate
that while the higher rate of execution
among Negroes is partially due to a
higher rate of crime, there is evidence

Nonetheless, prosecutorial discretion
is not wholly unfettered. In certain situations, the Constitution itself may constrain a prosecutor's power. For example, discriminatory prosecutions are
prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause,3 19 and vindictive prosecutions
320
may violate the Due Process Clause.
According to Richard Burr, former
director of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc.'s Capital
Punishment Project, racial bias often
plays a role in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The first issue is that racial bias has very
frequently influenced the prosecutor's
judgment to seek death and the ability
to obtain it. Racial bias works in a
couple of ways; it creates an inflated
concern for the value of white people's
lives who are victims of murder and a
corresponding lack of concern for the
lives of black people who are the victims
of murder. The white victim [of] murder is invariably the more politically
popular murder to prosecute in any
jurisdiction in this country.
Additionally, racial bias impacts the sentencing process by influencing the prosecutor's evaluation of a crime, apart
from the race of the victim. There are
still many racist assumptions that work
against black defendants. Unfounded
presumptions about violent behavior
and tendencies.., can lead to a skewed
view of whether someone is guilty or
whether they have been so closely related to a horrendous murder that
death is the appropriate punishment. If
one takes a cross-section of death row
cases, race issues will have permeated at
least three-fourths of that cross-section
in some way or another. This will be
true whether the defendant is white or
black, but particularly if the defendant
321
is black.
Justice Thurgood Marshall's Furman
opinion was characteristically more
blunt.
VOLUME

of racial discrimination ....
In McGauthav. California,402 U.S. at 207, this

Court held "that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the
power to pronounce life or death in
capital cases is [not] offensive to anything in the Constitution." This was an
322
open invitation to discrimination.
As discussed below,32 3 the ABA strongly
supported the Racial Justice Act, a measure designed to rectify some of these
problems.
4. The Baldus Study
Numerous studies on the imposition
of capital punishment under current
statutes reveal racial discrimination based
on the race of the victim and, to a lesser
324
extent, the race of the defendant.
Perhaps the best known of these studies
was conducted by University of Iowa Law
Professor David Baldus. Using a staff of
law students and relying primarily on
official Georgia state records, Baldus
examined all homicides committed in
Georgia between 1973 and 1979. Using
this pool of more than 2000 murders,
Baldus identified and coded 230 nonracial variables.
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With meticulous care, 26 Baldus analyzed and then re-analyzed the vast information his team collected on Georgia
homicides in search of any explanationother than race-that might account for
the stark inequalities in the operation of
Georgia's capital sentencing system. He
3 27
found none.
Baldus' data indicated that defendants charged with killing white persons
received the death penalty in eleven
percent of the cases, but defendants
charged with killing blacks received the
death penalty in only one percent of the
cases.3 28 The Baldus study also divided
the cases according to the combination
of the race of the defendant and the race
of the victim. The study found that the
death penalty was assessed in twenty-two
percent of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; eight percent of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; one percent of
the cases involving black defendants and
black victims; and three percent of the
cases involving white defendants and
329
black victims.
According to the study, prosecutors
sought the death penalty in seventy percent of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; thirty-two percent of the cases involving white
defendants and white victims; fifteen
percent of the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and nineteen percent of the cases involving white
330
defendants and black victims.
The disturbing conclusion of the Baldus study-that in Georgia, a killer of a
white person was 4.3 times more likely to
be sentenced to death than someone
who killed a black person-is consistent
with statistics from many other jurisdictions throughout the country. For example, in Louisiana, defendants in white
victim cases are twice as likely to be
sentenced to death than are defendants
in black victim cases. In Florida, defendants in white victim cases are 3.4 times
more likely to be sentenced to death
than are defendants in black victim cases.
The multiplier in Arkansas is 3.5; in

Illinois, 4; in Oklahoma, 4.3; in North
Carolina, 4.4; in Mississippi, 5. Finally, in
Maryland, defendants in white victim
cases are 7.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than are defendants
331
in black victim cases.

5. McCleskey v. Kemp

32

Warren McCleskey, a black man sentenced to death for killing a white police
officer in Georgia, 333 urged the Court to
find that the Baldus study demonstrated
that Georgia's capital sentencing procedures discriminated on the basis of race
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In a five-to-four
decision, the Court refused.
McCleskey argued that the Baldus
study's conclusion that killers of white
victims are 4.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than killers of black
victims proved discrimination on the
basis of race, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. In addition, the Baldus study showed that blacks who kill
whites were sentenced to death "at nearly
22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks,
and more than 7 times the rate of whites
who kill blacks."' S 4 Although the Court
"acknowledge [d] that McCleskey ha[d]
demonstrated a risk that racial prejudice
plays a role in capital sentencing in
Georgia,"33 5 it nonetheless denied relief. Fatal to McCleskey's equal protection claim, according to the bare majority, was McCleskey's failure to prove that
either the Georgia legislature or a decisionmaker in his caseacted with a discrim3
inatory purpose.

36

McCleskey's Eighth Amendment argument that his death sentence was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore excessive, because racial considerations
influenced capital sentencing decisions
in Georgia was likewise rejected. 337 According to the Court, "[a]t most the
Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that
appears to correlate with race. Apparent
disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system." 3 8 Thus, although the Baldus study
identified a serious risk that racial preju-
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dice influences capital sentencing, the
risk was not "constitutionally unacceptable." 339 In denying relief, Justice Powell, writing for the five-member majority,
observed that McCleskey's arguments
"are best presented to the legislative
bodies. "340
6. Justice Powell's Change of Heart
The fragile distinction between life
and death decisionmaking in Warren
McCleskey's case became apparent years
later. Justice Lewis Powell, the author of
the five to four majority opinion that
sealed McCleskey's fate, retired within
months of the decision. Four years later,
in the summer of 1991, Powell was asked
whether he would change his vote in any
case. According to Powell's biographer,
the retired justice responded, "Yes,
McCleskey v. Kemp."' 341 Powell had come
to believe that capital punishment should
be abolished. 34 2 No doubt this change of
heart would have provided cold comfort
to Warren McCleskey, who died in Georgia's electric chair on September 25,
1991.343
7. The 1990 General Accounting

Office Study
A 1990 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed twenty-eight
different empirical studies that exam344
ined the effects of race in capital cases.
The GAO Report concluded that these
studies clearly documented a pattern
"indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing and imposition of the
death penalty. ' 345 Of the twenty-eight
empirical studies reviewed by GAO,
eighty-two percent concluded that the
"race of [the] victim ... influence[d]
the likelihood of being charged with
capital murder or receiving the death
penalty."

346

In an ABA-sponsored program, 347 Paul
Kamenar, Executive Legal Director for
the Washington Legal Foundation, a
conservative public interest group, attacked the methodology and conclusions of the Baldus study. Kamenar explained his group's position:
VOLUME

Our position is that there is really no
convincing evidence-you just heard
some anecdotal evidence-of racial bias
in the criminaljustice system in general
348
and the death penalty in particular.
Kamenar took particular issue with the
use of the Baldus study in the McCleskey
case. 349 Kamenar complained,
[I] n the McCleskey case, McCleskey murdered a white person, and the fact of
the matter was that the person happened to be a police officer, and 85% of
the police that are murdered are white.
Therefore, there are other factors counted
inthere. So, again, itjust seems difficult
even to try to make some sense out of
350
that.
Kamenar's criticism of the Baldus study
reveals a profoundly disturbing lack of
familiarity with the methodology used by
Baldus' team. The strength of the Baldus
study derives in substantial part from the
fact that the study took into account 230
nonracial variables, including the very
factors that Kamenar suggested were not
considered. 351 Indeed, after performing
its own re-analysis of the methodology
used, the GAO found the Baldus study
"to be quite robust in terms of its find352
ings."
8. Donald "PeeWee" Gaskins, Kermit Smith,
Thomas Grasso, and Robert O'Neal
Executions resumed almost immediately following the 1976 Gregg decision.
Gary Gilmore, a white man convicted of
murdering a white victim, waived all
appeals and died before Utah's firing
squad on January 17, 1977. The next
inmate executed wasJohn Spenkelink, a
white man convicted of murdering another white man. Spenkelink died in
Florida's electric chair on May 25, 1979.
However, not until late 1991, fourteen
years after executions resumed, was a
white inmate actually executed for the
murder of a black victim. After an unsuccessful suicide attempt, Donald "Pee
Wee" Gaskins, a white death row inmate
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in South Carolina, was electrocuted on
September 6, 1991 for the murder of a
fellow black inmate.
Prior to Gaskins, the last white person
put to death in this country for killing a
black person died in Kansas in 1944.
South Carolina had not executed a white
person convicted of killing a black person since 1880.
Since Gaskin's electrocution, only
three other white death row inmates
have been put to death for the murder
of a black person. Kermit Smith died by
lethal injection in North Carolina on
January 24, 1995.353 Thomas Grasso, who

waived all appeals and sought death, was
killed by lethal injection in Oklahoma
on March 20, 1995. 354 Finally, Robert
O'Neal of Missouri's death row died by
lethal injection on December 6, 1995.355

RacialJustice Act and it was deleted from
the crime bill.
Contrary to assertions by its opponents, the Racial Justice Act would not
have abolished the death penalty or
prevented its imposition.160 Rather, the
Act provided that no person shall be put
to death under federal or state law if the
sentence was imposed because of the
race of the defendant or the race of the
victim. A defendant challenging a death
sentence under the Act would be required to prove a pattern of racially
discriminatory death sentences in the
particular jurisdiction in which he was
tried and sentenced to die. Merely showing that blacks are sentenced to death
more frequently than whites for the
same type of offense would not entitle a
defendant to relief. Instead the defendant would have to show bias in the
61
particular sentence being challenged.

9. The RacialJusticeAct
Despite strong statistical evidence of
racial discrimination in capital cases, the
Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp
denied relief, in part because the problems of racism in capital cases "are best
356
presented to the legislative bodies."
Since McCleskey, the ABA has consistently
supported legislation directed towards
eradicating racism in capital cases. All
proposed bills that address the problems
identified in McCleskey have failed to
357
become law.

Congress came closest to remedying
the situation in 1994. That year, the
House of Representatives passed the Racial Justice Act as part of the omnibus
crime bill.

58

The Racial Justice Act en-

joyed the strong support of the ABA.
Under the Racial Justice Act, proof of
significant racial discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty
would have required the prosecutor to
demonstrate a non-race-based explana359
tion for the resulting death sentence.
Although the measure passed the House,
Senate Republicans threatened to filibuster if the omnibus crime bill included
the Racial Justice Act. In July 1994, the
White House withdrew support for the

10. Justice Harry Blackmun's Views
on Racism in CapitalCases
Racism as an ineradicable feature of
capital punishment prompted Justice
Harry Blackmun-after thirty-five years
of deciding capital cases-to conclude
that the death penalty was in all cases
unconstitutional. 362 Justice Blackmun

squarely and thoroughly addressed the
issue of race in his dissent in Callins v.
Collins.363
The arbitrariness inherent in the sentencer's discretion to afford mercy is
exacerbated by the problem of race.
Even under the most sophisticated
death penalty statutes, race continues
to play a major role in determining who
shall live and who shall die. Perhaps it
should not be surprising that the biases
and prejudices that infect society generally would influence the determination
of who is sentenced to death, even
within the narrower pool of deatheligible defendants selected according
to objective standards. No matter how
narrowly the pool of death-eligible defendants is drawn according to objective standards, Furman's promise still
will go unfulfilled so long as the sen-
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tencer is free to exercise unbridled
discretion within the smaller group and
thereby to discriminate. "The power to
be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
at 312, quoting K. Davis, Discretionary
Justice 170 (1973).
A renowned example of racism infecting a capital-sentencing scheme is documented in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987). Warren McCleskey, an African-American, argued that the Georgia
capital-sentencing scheme was administered in a racially discriminatory manner, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In support
of his claim, he proffered a highly
reliable statistical study (the Baldus
study) which indicated that, "after taking into account some 230 nonracial
factors that might legitimately influence a sentencer, the jury more likely
than not would have spared McCleskey's
life had his victim been black." 481 U.S.
at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Baldus study further demonstrated that
blacks who kill whites are sentenced to
death "at nearly 22 times the rate of
blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7
times the rate of whites who kill blacks."
Id. at 327.
Despite this staggering evidence of racial prejudice infecting Georgia's capital-sentencing scheme, the majority
turned its back on McCleskey's claims,
apparently troubled by the fact that
Georgia had instituted more procedural and substantive safeguards than
most other States since Furman, but was
still unable to stamp out the virus of
racism. Faced with the apparent failure
of traditional legal devices to cure the
evils identified in Furman, the majority
wondered aloud whether the consistency and rationality demanded by the
dissent could ever be achieved without
sacrificing the discretion which is essential to fair treatment of individual defendants:
"[I]t is difficult to imagine guidelines
that would produce the predictability
sought by the dissent without sacrificing the discretion essential to a humane and fair system of criminal justice

....The dissent repeatedly emphasizes

the need for 'a uniquely high degree of
rationality in imposing the death penalty' ... . Again, no suggestion is made

as to how greater 'rationality' could be
achieved under any type of statute that
authorizes capital punishment ....
Given these safeguards already inherent in the imposition and review of
capital sentences, the dissent's call for
greater rationality is no less than a
claim that a capital punishment system
cannot be administered in accord with
the Constitution." Id. at 314-315 n.37.
The fact that we may not be capable of
devising procedural or substantive rules
to prevent the more subtle and often
unconscious forms of racism from
creeping into the system does not justify the wholesale abandonment of the
Furmanpromise. To the contrary, where
a morally irrelevant-indeed, a repugnant - consideration plays a major
role in the determination of who shall
live and who shall die, it suggests that
the continued enforcement of the death
penalty in light of its clear and admitted
defects is deserving of a "sober second
thought." Justice Brennan explained:
"Those whom we would banish from
society or from the human community
itself often speak in too faint a voice to
be heard above society's demand for
punishment. It is the particular role of
courts to hear these voices, for the
Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not alone dictate the
conditions of social life. The Court thus
fulfills, rather than disrupts, the scheme
of separation of powers by closely scrutinizing the imposition of the death penalty, for no decision of a society is more
deserving of the 'sober second thought.'
Stone, The Common Law in the United
States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 25 (1936)."
Id. at 343.
In the years since McCleskey, I have
come to wonder whether there was
truth in the majority's suggestion that
discrimination and arbitrariness could
not be purged from the administration
of capital punishment without sacrificing the equally essential component of
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fairness-individualized sentencing.
Viewed in this way, the consistency
promised in Furmanand the fairness to
the individual demanded in Lockett are
not only inversely related, but irreconcilable in the context of capital punishment. Any statute or procedure that
could effectively eliminate arbitrariness
from the administration of death would
also restrict the sentencer's discretion
to such an extent that the sentencer
would be unable to give full consideration to the unique characteristics of
each defendant and the circumstances
of the offense. By the same token, any
statute or procedure that would provide the sentencer with sufficient discretion to consider fully and act upon the
unique circumstances of each defendant would "throw open the back door
to arbitrary and irrational sentencing."
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. at 912
(Thomas,J., concurring). All efforts to
strike an appropriate balance between
these conflicting constitutional commands are futile because there is a
heightened need for both in the administration of death.
But even if the constitutional requirements of consistency and fairness are
theoretically reconcilable in the context of capital punishment, it is clear
that this Court is not prepared to meet
the challenge. In apparent frustration
over its inability to strike an appropriate balance between the Furman promise of consistency and the Lockett requirement of individualized sentencing, the
Court has retreated from the field,
allowing relevant mitigating evidence
to be discarded, vague aggravating circumstances to be employed, and providing no indication that the problem of
race in the administration of death will
ever be addressed. In fact some members of the Court openly have acknowledged a willingness simply to pick one
of the competing constitutional commands and sacrifice the other.... These
developments are troubling, as they
ensure that death will continue to be
meted out in this country arbitrarily
and discriminatorily, and without that
"degree of respect due the uniqueness
of the individual." Lockett, 438 U.S. at

605. In my view, the proper course
when faced with irreconcilable constitutional commands is not to ignore one
or the other, nor to pretend that the
dilemma does not exist, but to admit
the futility of the effort to harmonize
them. This means accepting the fact
that the death penalty cannot be administered in accord with our Constitu36 4
tion.
E. Personswith Mental RetardationAre
Being Sentenced to Death and Executed
1. The ABA Policy
In February 1989, the ABA established a firm policy prohibiting the execution of persons who are "mentally
retarded" as defined by the American
365
Association of Mental Retardation.
The ABA policy provides as follows:
Be It Resolved, that the American Bar
Association urges that no person with
mental retardation, as defined by the
American Association on Mental Retardation, should be sentenced to death
and executed; and
Be It Further Resolved, that the American Bar Association supports enactment of legislation barring the execution of defendants with mental
3 66
retardation.
Notwithstanding these clear pronouncements of ABA policy, twentyeight capital jurisdictions currently permit the execution of mentally retarded
persons.3 67 Recent research suggests that
between twelve and twenty percent of
the death row population in this country
consists of persons with mental retardation.3 68 And, as is true of so many other
ABA policies, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution as permitting the execution of mentally retarded
offenders flies in the face of ABA policy.
369

2. Penry v. Lynaugh

In Penry v. Lynaugh3 7 0-decided just
four months after the ABA adopted a
resolution prohibiting the execution of
mentally retarded persons-the Supreme
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Court refused to hold that the execution
of a mentally retarded prisoner violated
the Eighth Amendment. Although several states proscribe executing mentally
retarded persons, most do not.

ry's mitigating evidence, the Court re3 78
versed Penry's death sentence.
AsJustice Blackmun recognized, Penry
exemplifies the "paradox underlying the
79

Penry v. Lynaugh3 7 1 involved a chal-

The Court earlier had held that Texas
had complied with Furman by carefully
38 0
channeling the sentencer's discretion.
Indeed, Texas had channeled discretion
by requiring that a jury unanimously
answer three questions affirmatively before a defendant would be sentenced to
death.38 1 Yet those same limitations
placed upon the sentencer's discretion
rendered Penry's death sentence uncon38 2
stitutional.
The ABA policy against executing
mentally retarded offenders recognizes
the dual nature of evidence of retardation in a capital sentencing context.
Even though most courts and legislatures consider mental disorders a mitigating factor that lessens an offender's culpability,jurors are susceptible to viewing
a mental disorder solely as an aggravating factor, particularly in jurisdictions
that employ future dangerousness as an
aggravating factor. The risk, then, becomes that a jury will sentence a defendant to die not in spite of the fact that he
is mentally retarded, but rather because
38 3
he is mentally retarded.

lenge to Texas' death penalty statute.
While on parole from a rape conviction,
Johnny Paul Penry was charged with the
brutal rape and murder of Pamela Carpenter.372 At trial, Penry raised an insanity defense and presented the testimony
of a psychiatrist, Dr. Jose Garcia. Dr.
Garcia testified that Penry suffered from
organic brain damage and moderate
retardation. As a result, Penry had poor
control over his impulses and was unable
to learn from experience. According to
Dr. Garcia, Penry's brain damage was
probably caused at birth but may have
been caused by beatings and multiple
injuries to the brain at an early age. In
Dr. Garcia's judgment, Penry was suffering from an organic brain disorder at
the time of the offense that made it
impossible for him to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to con373
form his conduct to the law.

Penry argued that under Texas law
the sentencing jury was prevented from
giving full mitigating effect to his evidence of child abuse and mental retardation. 3 74 Texas' sentencing statute then
required the jury, during a separate
sentencing phase, to answer three questions. The answers to these questions
would determine whether the defen37 5
dant would be sentenced to death.
Only one of the three questionswhether the defendant posed a "continuing threat to society"-was related to
Penry's mitigating evidence. 376 But Penry's evidence of child abuse and mental
retardation was double-edged: "it may
diminish his blameworthiness for his
crime even as it indicated that there
[was] a probability that he [would] be
dangerous in the future. '377 Because a
reasonable juror could have believed
that the Texas statute prohibited a sentence less than death based upon PenVOLUME

Court's post-Furman jurisprudence."

'3

3. Examples of Mentally RetardedPeople
Who Have Been Executed
Like children, mentally retarded adults
are easily led, susceptible to influence,
3 84
and ill-equipped to defend themselves.
These characteristics were particularly
true of Barry Fairchild, a mentally retarded black man condemned to die in
Arkansas for the 1983 kidnaping, rape,
and murder of Marjorie Mason, a white
nurse. 38 5 The bulk of the evidence against
Fairchild consisted of a videotaped interrogation during which Fairchild admits
to being an accomplice, but said that he
was sitting in a car when someone elsewhom he refused to identify-killed Ms.
Mason. 386 Fairchild, whose head is bandaged from injuries, is clearly shown on
the videotape glancing away from the
IV,
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coach as he
camera towards an apparent
38 7
himself.
incriminates
On IQ tests administered to Fairchild
years after his trial, he scored a Full Scale
IQ of 63, a Verbal IQ of 69, and a
Performance IQ of 61.388 Nonetheless,
relying on some higher test scores that
the state's psychologist attributed to
Fairchild, the federal district courtjudge
389
concluded that he was not retarded.
Although the threshold for retardation
in Arkansas was an IQ of 70, and the
evidence in Fairchild's case "was mixed,"
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's conclusion that Fairchild was not
retarded.39 0 An Arkansas statute, passed
the year before Fairchild's execution,
prohibited the execution of anyone with
an IQ under 65.391 Because Fairchild was
sentenced to die before the statute was
392
enacted, it did not apply to him.
Fairchild 393
died by lethal injection on August
31, 1995 .

old Jerome Bowden, a black man, and
Bowden was also arrested and charged.4"'
Graves, the juvenile, was convicted
and sentenced to life. Later, Graves was
adjudicated insane and was committed
to the Georgia state hospital for the
criminally insane. 40 1 Although no physical evidence linked Bowden to the murder, Bowden was convicted, largely because he signed a confession drafted for

Morris Mason, a black farmworker in
Virginia, was sentenced to die for the
3 94
murder of an elderly white woman.
Mason's long history of mental illness
earned him commitments in three state

telephone calls to his attorneys, Bowden
discussed the IQ test he had taken a few
hours earlier. Bowden said, "I tried real
hard. I did the best I could." Bowden

mental institutions. 395 In addition to

paranoid schizophrenia, Mason suffered
from mental retardation. Diagnoses revealed that Mason's mental age was eight,
and his IQ was 66. Although three psychiatrists independently determined that
Mason suffered from paranoid schizophrenia over an eight-year period prior
to his 1978 trial, the trial court denied
Mason's request for the assistance of a
39 6
psychiatrist to evaluate his sanity.

After exhaustingjudicial remedies, Mason's lawyers appealed to the governor
of Virginia for clemency on the grounds
of Mason's mental retardation and history of mental illness.39 7 The governor
refused to grant clemency, and Mason
was executed on June 25, 1985.398

When Kathryn Stryker, a fifty-fiveyear-old white woman, was brutally murdered in Columbus, Georgia in 1976,
police arrested sixteen-year-old James
Graves, a black juvenile.3 99 Graves gave a
statement implicating twenty-four-year-

him by the police. 40 2 Bowden was sen-

tenced to death, just fifty-six days following his arrest.

40 3

At age fourteen, Bowden scored "a
full scale IQ of 59 on the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children." Shortly
before his execution, Bowden was again
tested. This time he scored "a verbal IQ
of 71, a non-verbal IQ of 62 and a full
scale IQ of 65." ' 404 Remarkably, the psychological examiner suggested that
Bowden would need an IQ of 45 or less
to be spared. 40 5 In one of his final

was electrocuted on June 24, 1986.406

Perhaps because of the double-edged
nature of the potential mitigating evidence in the case of Mario Marquez, his
defense counsel decided not to present
any evidence of his severe childhood
abuse, mental retardation, and brain
damage. 40 7 If such evidence had been

presented, the jury would have learned
that since Mr. Marquez's infancy, his
father had routinely "beat him mercilessly, using boards, sticks, and fists[,]...
whip [ping] him with a horsewhip[,] and
on several occasions [binding] Mario's
hands and legs and [hanging] him from
a pole or tree and horsewhipp[ing] him
40 8
until he was unconscious."
When he was only twelve years old,
Mario was abandoned by his parents and
left to fend for himself and, initially,
several of his younger siblings. 40 9 The
siblings were later removed by county
authorities from the abandoned house
in which they lived, but for some reason,
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a. Rickey Ray Rector

Mario was left there without any adult
41 °
supervision from that point forward.

Mario's childhood beatings apparently resulted from his father's belief
that Mario was "slow." 41' 1 This was, in
fact, true: Mario was mentally retarded,
apparently from the time of his birth.4 12
A striking example of how his retardation had an impact on Mario's ability to
think and reason occurred while he was
eating the last meal before his execution. Mario set aside his dessert choice,
apple pie, because he wanted to "save it
for later."

413

Mario also was diagnosed as having
severe brain damage, merely one of the
effects of his father's ritual beatings that
severely damaged his cerebral cortex.4 14
The combination of Mario's brain damage, mental retardation, and childhood
abuse left him with the emotional and
4 15
intellectual maturity of a five year old.
The difficulties of Mr. Marquez's situation were compounded during the punishment phase of his trial when, after he
was involved in a minor altercation with
local television cameramen outside the
courtroom, thejudge ordered him shackled for the remainder of that trial phase.
Thejury, which was responsible for assessing whether Mr. Marquez would be a
danger to the community in the future,
could visibly see that even in a place as
"secure" as the courtroom, Mr. Marquez
had to have his hands cuffed behind his
back, his legs bound with leg irons, and
one leg immobilized by a clamp that
prevented knee movement. 416 Not surprisingly, that same jury voted for death.
Television news personality, Ted Koppel, among others, witnessed the execution of Mario Marquez on January 18,

Rickey Ray Rector shot and killed a
police officer, then shot himself through
the forehead. 419 The bullet tore com-

pletely through the front of Rector's
skull and lodged under the skin above
his right ear.4 20 Rector underwent emergency brain surgery, during which three
inches of frontal brain tissue were removed from his head. Although Rector
survived, the damage to his brain was so
severe that the surgery amounted to "a
classic prefrontal lobotomy." 42 1 A journalist characterized Rector's post-operative mental condition as follows:
The clinical effect of such a substantial
destruction of frontal brain tissue is
that Rector, as it was presented in testimony over the ensuing months, would
suffer from "gross memory loss," and
particularly that when dealing with
"content and meaning" he was "severely impaired," and would have a
near-total inability to conceptualize beyond a response to immediate sensations or provocations; in fact, he
"seemed unable to grasp either the
concept of past or future." A state
psychologist also noted that he had
"difficulty maintaining concentration
and attention to a task." In addition,
although Rector did "demonstrate ...

some abilities to handle his day-to-day
life in terms of actions which are repetitive," he also demonstrated what is
know as a flat affect, meaning that
"when it comes down to the issues of
emotion ... Rickey has absolutely no
involvement in any of the dire circum-

stances of his life." In fact, the Little
Rock clinical neuropsychologist found
him to be "lacking a will or an understanding of a way to fight his present
422
dilemma."

1995.417

4. The Execution of Other MentalDefectives
Since 1986, the Supreme Court has
prohibited the execution of persons
found to be insane. 418 Nonetheless, inmates who suffer profound mental defects that fall short of insanity are routinely executed. Here are several
examples.
VOLUME

Following a pretrial competency hearing, which produced expert testimony a
higher court would later characterize as
"hopelessly in conflict," Rector was
deemed fit to be tried.4 23 He stood trial
and was convicted and sentenced to
die.
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In the four days prior to Rectors
execution, his every move and utterance
were assiduously recorded in a "death
4 25
watch log" kept by prison guards.
Rector spent much of his time howling,
barking like a dog, stamping his feet,
snapping his finger, and laughing. Occasionally, Rector would scream, "Cold
Duck, Cold Duck," the nickname of an
old friend.4 26 From his death watch cell,
Rector learned that Arkansas Governor
Bill Clinton-who was running for president-refused clemency. Just hours before his execution, Rector sat with his
attorney and watched news broadcasts
detailing both Rector's imminent execution and sexual harassment charges leveled at Governor Clinton by Gennifer
Flowers. Rector mumbled to his attorney, "I'm gonna vote for him. Gonna
42 7
vote for Clinton."
Rector confided to a death watch
guard that "if you eat grass lethal injection won't kill you." 4 28 Rector devoured
all of his last meal except for dessert, a
large portion of pecan pie. As was his
habit, Rector put his dessert aside to be
eaten later-after the execution. 429 He
died by lethal injection on January 24,
1992.430

b. David Funchess
David Funchess, a black man, enlisted
in the Marines at age eighteen. 43 1 Two

years later he was sent to South Vietnam,
where he was involved in some of the
most intensive combat of the war. Funchess was severely injured from a land
mine explosion and spent three months
recovering in a naval hospital in Japan.
Funchess was sentenced to die for
killing two white people during a 1974
robbery of a bar.432 Years later, Funchess
was diagnosed as suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a
psychiatric disorder now known to afflict
a significant number of Vietnam war
veterans. However, at the time of Funchess' trial and early appeals, PTSD had
not yet been recognized as a clinically
433
identifiable disorder.

In 1982, a psychologist and leading

expert on PTSD examined Funchess in
prison and found that he suffered from
a particularly severe case of the disorder.43 4 According to the psychologist,
PTSD was produced by massive internalized stress, which could erupt, on occasion, into uncontrollable outbursts of
435
aggressive behavior.
Factual investigation, conducted for
the first time by Funchess' newly-appointed post-conviction lawyers, 436 confirmed the origins and documented the
symptoms of the disorder. Family and
friends testified that:
[D] espite a very poor and often brutal
family background, [Funchess] had
been a quiet, intelligent and ambitious
teenager, who did well at school. He
joined the Marines shortly after graduating from high school, apparently believing that a career in the [military]
would enable him to progress in life.
Described by his sisters as having had a
bright and easygoing personality, he
returned from Vietnam "shellshocked." He was unable to tolerate
noise, suffered from frequent "flashbacks," sleeplessness and recurring
nightmares. His family said that he
would not enter a house or room without first crouching down with an imaginary machine-gun as if ready for combat. Unable to spend time indoors he
would often build what his sister described as "foxholes" and sleep in them
under the house. Later he took to

sleeping in cars. His family and friends
believed that part of his drug addiction
was due to the continuing pain from his
war injury (prison medical records indicate that he still suffered some pain
from this years later). Unable to find
regular employment after leaving the
[service], he drifted into vagrancy and
437
petty crime.
Funchess was executed on April 22,
1986.438

c. ArthurFrederick Goode
Arthur Frederick Goode began exhibiting symptoms of mental disturbance
when he was three years old. 439 By age
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fifteen, Goode was receiving injections
of Depo-Provera to help control his
sexual urges. By the time he turned
eighteen in 1972, Goode had been arrested for pedophilia. 440 Eventually,
Goode was committed to a mental hospital, but he escaped in 1976 and fled to
Florida, where he raped, tortured, and
killed a ten-year-old boy. A psychiatrist
examined Goode before trial and found
him to be mentally incompetent. Nonetheless, three court-appointed psychiatrists found Goode competent and he
stood trial in 1977. Although Goode had
a court-appointed attorney, he represented himself at trial. Goode "brought
out evidence to assure his own conviction, testified in gory detail as to his
guilt, and argued to the jury that he
should be convicted and sentenced to
death. '4 41 Goode got his wish.
Although the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals expressed "serious doubts as
to Goode's competence," the court upheld Goode's conviction and death sentence. 442 Goode's severe mental impairment persisted in prison.
The men who ran the prison agreed
that Goode was mad. "I saw Arthur
every month," warden Dave Brierton
said. "He would come in for a talk, and
it was always the same: He couldn't
understand why society didn't allow
him to have sex with boys. I tried
explaining the historical development
of sexual taboos, but it never sank in.
He would start crying and asking why
he couldn't have a boy in his cell. He
was one of a kind, impossible. 'Soand-so didn't go to sleep last night,'
he'd say. Or, 'Your officer only checked
the cell block four times, not five.' Or, 'I
couldn't get Channel Six last night. I
got snow on my TV set.' One time he
comes in and says, 'I don't want to live
here anymore.' "
He didn't want to live there anymore.
Goode didn't get the picture, he missed
the point of punishment; as his father
put it, "He had no understanding."
That was the State's own test of sufficient sanity to be executed. A prisoner

had to understand what was happening
to him and why. "I don't think Arthur
ever understood that when you're executed, we can't come back the next
day and talk about it," said Richard
Dugger, Brierton's successor as warden.
"It was like dealing with a child. He
could make a rational appearance. He
could answer your questions and appear to carry on a conversation. But he
just didn't understand what you were
443
saying.
Three court-appointed psychiatrists
found that Goode was mentally fit to be
executed, and he was electrocuted on
444
April 5, 1984.
d. Johnny Frank Garrett
At the age of seventeen, Johnny Frank
Garrett was convicted of capital murder
in Texas and sentenced to death. 4 4 5 After his arrival on death row in 1982 for a
crime he could not remember having
committed, Mr. Garrett was diagnosed
with paranoid schizophrenia; among his
symptoms were auditory and visual hallucinations, including conversations with a
dead aunt.446 Uncontroverted evidence
indicated that Mr. Garrett had experienced these psychotic symptoms since
childhood.44 7 During all but two months
of his entire nine-year period of incarceration, prison doctors prescribed for
Mr. Garrett substantial doses of Stela448
zine, an antipsychotic drug.
In 1986, Mr. Garrett was evaluated by
Dr. Dorothy Otnow Lewis, a psychiatrist
participating in a 1986 research project
on the characteristics of juveniles sen449
tenced to death in the United States.
After performing a comprehensive examination of Mr. Garrett, Dr. Lewis concluded that he was "one of the most
psychiatrically disturbed inmates [she]
had interviewed over the past 10
years."450
Dr. Lewis reevaluated Mr. Garrett in
1992, once again finding that he suffered from auditory and visual hallucinations, delusional beliefs, paranoid ideation, and a sense of being controlled by
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nosed, for the first time, Mr. Garrett's
severe dissociative disorder, which resulted from repeated sexual abuse he
endured as a young child. 4 52 This illness
apparently was made manifest through
Mr. Garrett's hallucinations and his regular conversations with his dead Aunt
Barbara. Moreover, Dr. Lewis found that
Mr. Garrett had multiple, independent
personalities and personality fragments,
an illness often produced by extreme
abuse-particularly of a sexual nature453
during childhood.
Windell L. Dickerson, Ph.D., a psychologist and former head of Mental
Health Services at the Texas Department of Corrections, came to similar
conclusions after examining Mr. Garrett
in 1986. Dr. Dickerson determined that
Johnny Garrett was "one of the most
pervasively psychological impaired individuals [he] had encountered in over 28
years of practice." 454 As reported by Dr.
Dickerson, Mr. Garrett's mental illness
included paranoid ideation, delusional
thought, and misinterpretation arising
from neurological limitations. 455 Dr.
Dickerson also determined that along
with Mr. Garrett's hallucinations in which
he spoke with his dead Aunt Barbara,
Mr. Garrett also held the delusional
belief that this aunt would save him from
the effects of the lethal injection at his
456
execution.
Despite the arguments of his attorneys
that, among other things, Mr. Garrett's
severe mental illness prevented him from
adequately communicating with them
and understanding the nature of his
punishment, Johnny Frank Garrett was
executed by the state of Texas on February 11, 1992.
The ABA policy against executing
mentally retarded persons is based in
part on the fact that mentally retarded
persons have the mental ages of children. Thus they are more vulnerable to
be led to falsely confess and are less
equipped to assist in their defense. As

Judge Fitzpatrick observed in a capital
case:
No justification can be had for the
execution of a child of ten or eleven
years of age in any society that considers itself civilized. If a child of ten or
eleven should not be executed under
any circumstances, then surely a person
who may have a chronological age of
twenty, but a mental and emotional age
of ten or eleven, should not be put to
death. 457
The ABA policy on the execution of
juvenile offenders is discussed immediately below.
E Children Under the Age of 18 Are Being
Sentenced to Death and Executed.
1. The ABA Policy
Be It Resolved, That the American Bar

Association opposes, in principle, the
imposition of capital punishment upon
any person for any offense committed
while under the age of eighteen (18).
There are many reasons underlying

the ABA's position regarding the execution of juveniles. Children and adolescents are widely recognized as less responsible for their actions than adults,
458
and more amenable to rehabilitation.
Thus, the death penalty is particularly
inhuman as applied to juveniles.
In addition, other arguments typically
mustered in support of capital punishment lose force when applied tojuvenile
offenders.
[C]hildren and adolescents are more
liable than adults to act on impulse, or
under the influence or domination of
others, with little thought for the longterm consequences of their actions,
and they are unlikely to be deterred by
the penalty. Many young people who
commit brutal crimes themselves come
from brutalizing and deprived backgrounds. To impose the death penalty

in such cases, whether as retribution or
as an intended deterrent, violates basic
459
principles of decency.
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2. HistoricalBackground of Capital
Punishmentfor Children
The historical background of capital
punishment for children predates colonization. According to Professor Victor
Streib:
The United States inherited the bulk of
its criminal law, including the tradition
of capital punishment, primarily from
England but also from other European
countries. A fundamental premise of
this criminal jurisprudence was then
and is now that persons under age
seven were conclusively presumed to be
incapable of entertaining criminal intent and thus could not have criminal
liability imposed upon them. For persons from age seven to age fourteen,
the presumption of inability to entertain criminal intent was rebuttable, and
if rebutted, such a person could be
convicted of a crime and be sentenced
to death. No such presumption applied
to persons age fourteen or over. This
view of children's liability in the criminal justice system was accepted by the
United States Supreme Court in In re
Gault [387 U.S. 1 (1967) ]: "At common
law, children under seven were considered incapable of possessing criminal
intent. Beyond that age, they were subjected to arrest, trial, and in theory to
punishment like adult offenders [387
U.S. at 16 (1967)]."460
In 1983, the ABA reported that 191
juveniles had been executed in the
United States between 1900 and 1964.461
A twenty-one year moratorium on executing juveniles followed. However, executions ofjuveniles resumed in 1985462 and
have continued unabated since.
The role of evolving standards of decency on the ability of states to sentence
juveniles to death was at the center of
two Supreme Court cases, decided in
consecutive Terms.

held that the Constitution forbids the
execution of one who commits a capital
offense while under the age of sixteen. 466 William Wayne Thompson was
sentenced to die for a murder committed when Thompson was fifteen years
old. Along with three adult men, Thompson kidnaped and then killed Charles
Keene, Thompson's former brother-inlaw, who had been abusing Keene's
467
former wife, Thompson's half-sister.
Thompson was certified to stand trial as
an adult as permitted by an Oklahoma
statute. 468 Relying on many of the same
reasons that undergird the ABA resolution against the execution of persons
under age eighteen, 469 the Thompson
plurality found that the execution of
someone who commits a capital offense
under sixteen years of age is "nothing
more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering" and is
70
therefore unconstitutional.4
The following Term, the Court held in
Stanford v. Kentucky471 that the Eighth
Amendment did not prohibit the execution of an individual who committed a
capital offense at sixteen years of age.
Kevin Stanford was approximately seventeen years and four months old when he
committed murder. Stanford, like
Thompson, was certified to stand trial as
an adult, and was convicted and sentenced to die. 4 72 Stanford's case was
consolidated with that of Heath Wilkins,
who at age sixteen committed a murder
473
to which he later pleaded guilty.
Wilkins was likewise certified as an adult
4 74
and was sentenced to death.
Thus, Supreme Court precedent,
which draws the line of death eligibility
at age sixteen, squarely conflicts with
ABA policy, which draws the line at age
eighteen. According to the most recent
statistics available, forty juvenile offenders currently await execution in this
country.

3. Thompson v. Oklahoma4 63 and

4. Modern Executions ofjuveniles

464

Stanford v. Kentucky
In 1988, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,465 a
bare plurality of the Supreme Court
VOLUME
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Features
47 6
Of
eighteen have been put to death.

been put to death in this country since

the forty jurisdictions that permit capital
punishment, fourteen have selected age
eighteen as the minimum age for death

1985.488

eligibility.4 77 Five others have selected
age seventeen. 478 Twenty-one death penalty jurisdictions (fifty-two percent) per479
mit the execution of sixteen-year-olds.
Consequently, twenty-six out of forty
death penalty jurisdictions (sixty-five percent) are not in compliance with the
ABA policy.

Toward the end ofJames Terry Roach's
appeals, his attorneys raised objections
to his execution under international law.
For example, a complaint filed with the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (LACHR) alleged that Roach's
execution would violate the obligations
of the United States under international
customary law and the human rights
charter of the Organization of American

5. Examples of Children Who
Have Been Executed
On September 11, 1985, Texas became the first state to execute ajuvenile
in this country since 1964.480 Charles
Rumbaugh had been sentenced to death
for a crime committed while he was
seventeen years old.481 After more than
eight years on death row, Rumbaugh
dropped his final appeals and died by
482
lethal injection.
The next juvenile to be executed,
James Terry Roach, died in South Carolina's electric chair onJanuary 10, 1986.483
In 1977, at age seventeen, Roach pleaded
guilty to the murders of two white teenagers. An older codefendant, also sentenced to die, was executed in January
1985. A third codefendant who, like
Roach, was ajuvenile when the murders
occurred, turned in state's evidence and
484
was rewarded with a life sentence.
Although the trial judge found that
Roach acted under the domination of
his older codefendant, and despite psychiatric evidence that Roach had the
mental age of a twelve-year-old and suffered a personality disorder, he was sen485
tenced to death.
Several weeks before Roach was executed, a neurologist discovered that
Roach exhibited symptoms of Huntington's Disease, a hereditary illness that
causes mental deterioration. 486 Expert
testimony established that this disease,
which was not detected at the time of
Roach's trial, could well have affected
his mental state when the crime was
committed. 487 Seven otherjuveniles have

6. InternationalTreaties and Norms

States (OAS).

4 89

The Commission asked the U.S. government and the Governor of South
Carolina to grant Roach a stay of execution while the complaint was being considered.4 90 Similarly, on January 9, 1986,
the General Secretary of the OAS appealed to the Governor of South Carolina to "follow the current tendency of
almost all countries of this hemisphere"
and stay Roach's execution. 49 ' Both requests failed, and Roach was put to
death.
Although Roach's appeal to the U.S.
government and the Governor of South
Carolina fell on deaf ears, it is evident
that the execution of juveniles is an
aberration in the international community and is contrary to international
law.49 2 As of 1991, only seven countries
were known to have executed juveniles
in recent history.493 These countries include: Barbados, which executed one
juvenile and has since raised the minimum age for executions to eighteen;
Nigeria, which executed one juvenile;
Pakistan, which executed three young
people; Bangladesh, which executed one
juvenile, although the government disputes the age of the person executed;
and the United States, which leads the
group with its execution of four young
people. 494 Iran and Iraq also have ex-

ecuted an undetermined number of
495
young people.
The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) 49 6 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
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on persons who commit a death-eligible
offense when they were under the age of
eighteen. On June 8, 1992, the United
States ratified the ICCPR but with certain reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos. 49 7 In ratifying the
ICCPR, the United States specifically
rejected the ICCPR's prohibition of the
executions of juveniles. This rejection
places the United States not only at odds
with international law and treaties, but
also places the United States outside the
norm of recognized international human rights.
III. PROPOSAL THAT THERE BE A
MORATORIUM ON THE IMPOSITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DEATH PENALTY.

The language of the ABA's Final Resolution, as adopted February 3, 1997, by a
vote of 280 to 119, follows:

proceedings
Feb. 1990);

(iii)Striving to eliminate discrimination
in capital sentencing on the basis of
the race of either the victim or the
defendant (adopted Aug. 1988, Aug.
1991); and
(iv) Preventing execution of mentally retarded persons (adopted Feb. 1989)
and persons who were under the age
of 18 at the time of their offenses
(adopted Aug. 1983).
FURTHER RESOLVED, That in adopting this recommendation, apart from
existing Association policies relating to
offenders who are mentally retarded or
under the age of 18 at the time of the
commission of the offenses, the Association takes no position on the death
penalty.

[A]

RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, that the American Bar
Association calls upon each jurisdiction
that imposes capital punishment not to
carry out the death penalty until the
jurisdiction implements policies and procedures that are consistent with the following longstanding American Bar Association policies intended to (1) ensure
that death penalty cases are administered fairly and impartially, in accordance with due process, and (2) minimize the risk that innocent persons may
be executed:
(i) Implementing ABA "Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases"
(adopted Feb. 1989) and Association
policies intended to encourage competency of counsel in capital cases
(adopted Feb. 1979, Feb. 1988, Feb.
1990, Aug. 1996);

[A]

[A]

APPENDIX

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
ON DEATH PENALTY
498
HABEAS CORPUS
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION
REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES
RECOMMENDATIONS
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American
Bar Association urges that the following
measures be taken in the litigation of
death penalty cases:
(1) Because the defects and delays in
habeas corpus procedure are due
to the fact that the accused was not
represented by competent counsel, particularly at the trial level,
the state and federal governments
should be obligated to provide competent and adequately compensated counsel for capital defendants/appellants/petitioners, as
well as to provide sufficient re-

(ii) Preserving, enhancing, and streamlining state and federal courts' authority and responsibility to exercise independent judgment on the merits of
constitutional claims in state postconviction and federal habeas corpus
VOLUME
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RESOLVED,
that the
American Bar
Association calls
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death penalty.
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Jurisdictions
that have the
death penalty
should establish
andfund
organizationsto
recruit, select,
train, monitor,
support, and
assist attorneys
involved at all
stages of capital
litigation and, if
necessary, to
participatein
the trial of such
cases.

sources for investigation, expert witnesses, and other services, at all
stages of capital punishment litigation. The American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases should govern the appointment and compensation of counsel.
(2) The individual or organization responsible for appointing counsel
should enlist the assistance of the
local bar association and resource
center to seek the best qualified
attorneys available.
(3) Jurisdictions that have the death
penalty should establish and fund
organizations to recruit, select,
train, monitor, support, and assist
attorneys involved at all stages of
capital litigation and, if necessary,
to participate in the trial of such
cases.
(4) New counsel should be appointed
to represent the death-sentenced
inmate for the state direct appeal
unless the appellant requests the
continuation of trial counsel after
having been fully advised of the
consequences of his or her decision, and the appellant waives the
right to new counsel on the record.
(5) To avoid the delay occasioned by
the appointment of new counsel
for post-conviction proceedings and
to assure continued competent representation, state appellate counsel
who represented a death-sentenced
inmate should continue representation through all subsequent state,
federal, and United States Supreme Court proceedings.
(6) To assure that the state provides
competent representation and to
avoid procedural delays as well as
multiple review of the same issues,
the following procedural barriers
to federal habeas corpus review
should not apply with respect to
any state court proceeding at which
the state court, in deprivation of
the right to counsel recognized in
paragraph "1" above, failed to ap-

point competent and adequately
compensated counsel to represent
the
defendant/appellant/petitioner:
(a) exhaustion of state judicial
remedies;
(b) procedural default rules; and
(c) the presumption of correctness of state court findings of
fact.
(7) Federal courts should not rely on
state procedural bar rules to preclude consideration of the merits
of a claim if the prisoner shows that
the failure to raise the claim in a
state court was due to the ignorance or neglect of the prisoner or
counsel or if the failure to consider
such a claim would result in a
miscarriage ofjustice.
(8) State appellate courts should review under a knowing, understanding, and voluntary waiver standard
all claims of constitutional error
not properly raised at trial and on
appeal and should have a plain
error rule and apply it liberally
with respect to errors of state law.
(9) On the initial state post-conviction
application, state post-conviction
courts should review under a knowing, understanding, and voluntary
waiver standard all claims of constitutional error not properly preserved at trial or on appeal.
(10) The federal courts should adopt
rules designed to facilitate both
the presentation of all available
claims in the first habeas corpus
petition and the prompt exhaustion of any unexhausted claims in
order to eliminate the problem of
procedurally forced successive petitions.
(11) A rational process of review will
be facilitated by a stay of execution that remains in force until
the completion of the initial
round of state and federal postconviction review. Therefore, unless the state courts grant a stay of
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execution, the federal courts, in
preservation of their habeas corpus jurisdiction, should grant a
stay of execution to run from the
initiation of state post-conviction
proceedings through the completion for the initial round of federal habeas corpus proceedings,
and should be empowered to do
SO.
(12) The petitioner should have a right
of appeal from denial of an initial
federal habeas corpus petition
without the need to obtain a certificate of probable cause.
(13) A one-year limitations period
should be employed as a substitute mechanism to move the case
toward reasonably prompt completion, but only with adequate and
sufficient tolling provisions to permit full and fair consideration of
a petitioner's claims in state court,
federal court, and the United
States Supreme Court. The sanction for failure to comply with the
time requirements should be dismissal, except that the time requirements should be waived
where the petitioner has presented a colorable claim, which
has not been presented previously, either of factual innocence
or of the petitioner's ineligibility
for the death penalty.
(14) A federal court should entertain a
second or successive petition for
habeas corpus relief if:
(a) the request for relief is based
on a claim not previously presented by the prisoner in the state
and federal courts and the failure
to raise the claim is the result of
state action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United
States, the result of Supreme
Court recognition of a new federal right that is retroactively applicable, or based on a factual predicate that could not have been
discovered through the exercise
of reasonable diligence; or
(b) the facts underlying the claim
would be sufficient, if proven, to

undermine the court's confidence
in thejury's determination of guilt
on the offense or offenses for
which the death penalty was imposed; or
(c) consideration of the requested relief is necessary to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice.

(15) The standard for determining
whether changes in federal constitutional law should apply retroactively should be whether failure to
apply the new law would undermine the accuracy of either the
guilt or the sentencing determination.
(16) To afford the states a reasonable
time to adopt and implement
rules and procedures pursuant to
these Recommendations, the proposed federal statutory and rule
changes should take effect upon
adoption by the states of provisions in accordance with these
Recommendations, but not later
than two years from the date of
enactment of federal legislation.
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HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1979 MIDYEAR MEETING 22
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1986); see Brief of the ABA as Amicus Curiae at
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APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
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Symposium, Capital Punishment: Is There Any
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18 Death Penalty Useless: Patrick v. Murphy, USA
TODAY, Feb. 23, 1995, at llA (stating that the
police chiefs of America and veteran prosecutors
reveal the dirty little secret that the death penalty
hinders the fight against crime); see also Robert M.
Morgenthau, What Prosecutors Won't Tell You, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at A25.
19Morgenthau, supra note 18, at A25. Prosecutor

alty litigation, the labyrinthine nature of the
doctrines that such litigation has spawned,
the frequency with which federal courts overturn state-imposed death sentences, and the
lengthy delays that occur between the imposition of death sentences and their execution.
On the other hand, a different set of critics
claims that the Supreme Court has in fact
turned its back on regulating the death
penalty and no longer even attempts to meet
the concerns about the arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of death that animated its
"constitutionalization" of capital punishment in Furman. These critics note that the
Court's intervention has done little or nothing to remedy the vast overrepresentation on
death row of the young, poor, and mentally
retarded or the continuing influence of race
on the capital sentencing decision. Under
this view, in the anguished words of Justice
Blackmun, who twenty years after his dissent
in Furman radically changed course and argued for the abolition of the death penalty
altogether under the Eighth Amendment,
the Court has done no more than "tinker
with the machinery of death."

Morgenthau wrote to explain his opposition to
the reinstatement of capital punishment in New
York. Morgenthau explained that when he became District Attorney in 1975, there were 648
homicides in Manhattan. In 1994, there were 330.
"The number has been cut virtually in half
without executions-proof to me that they are
not needed to continue that trend." Id.
20 Nat Hentoff, A Prosecutor Who Boycotts the Death
Penalty,WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1995, at A15. District
Attorney Johnson has paid dearly for his opposition to the death penalty. Ultimately, New York
Governor Pataki called for Johnson to seek the
death penalty in the Gillespie case, which involved the murder of a police officer. Upon
Johnson's refusal, Pataki replaced Johnson as
District Attorney, an action for which he was
much criticized. Statement by AmericanJewish Congress on Decision by Governor Pataki to Remove Bronx
D.A. Over Death Penalty, PR NEWSwiRE, Mar. 21,
1996, at Domestic News.
21 Habeas Corpus Appeals of State Death Sentences,
Restrictions: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Const. Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S.
House of Representatives, 102d Cong. at 447 (statement of John J. Curtin, Jr., former ABA president) (1991).
22
Douglas W. Vick, PoorhouseJustice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 332-33 (1995) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Vick, Underfunded
IndigentDefense].

[W]e conclude that both sets of criticisms of
the Court's work are substantially correct:
the death penalty is, perversely, both overand under-regulated. The body of doctrine
produced by the Court is enormously complex and its applicability to specific cases
difficult to discern; yet, it remains unresponsive to the central animating concerns that
inspired the Court to embark on its regulatory regime in the first place. Indeed, most
surprisingly, the overall effect of twenty-odd
years of doctrinal head-banging has been to
substantially reproduce the pre-Furmanworld
of capital sentencing.

Professors Carol S. Steiker andJordan M. Steiker
provide the following assessment of modern death
penaltyjurisprudence:

Steiker &-Steiker, supra note 10, at 357-59 (footnotes omitted).
23 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994)

Virtually no one thinks that the constitutional regulation of capital punishment has
been a success. But oddly, and we think
significantly, critics of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence fall into two diametrically
opposed camps. On the one hand, some
critics claim that the Court's work has burdened the administration of capital punishment with an overly complex, absurdly arcane, and minutely detailed body of
constitutional law that, in the words of
Learned Hand in a slightly different context,
"obstructs, delays, and defeats" the administration of capital punishment. This set of
critics notes the sheer volume of death pen-

VOLUME

(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certioF. Pow-

rari); JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS

ELL,JR.: A BIOGRAPHY. 451-52 (1994).
24

See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text.

25 Douglas W. Vick recently suggested that full

implementation of the procedural and substantive protections erected by the Supreme Court in
capital cases might achieve the same result. Vick
concluded, however, that these procedural and
substantive protections-much like the ABA policies and recommendations-are rarely implemented. Vick, Underfunded Indigent Defense, supra
note 22, at 333.
26 See infta section II.
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This section draws in large part upon

RANDALL

COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 51-52, 91-121 (1994).

28 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
29

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
30 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
31

Id. at 87-88.

32

Id. at 99.

4s428 U.S. 153 (1976).
44 Id. at

3 Id. at 100-01.
34

Id. at 101.

36402 U.S. 183 (1971).

Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
46 Gregg,428 U.S. at 204.
47 428 U.S. 242 (1976).

Id. at 196.
-8 Id. at 204.
37

48 428 U.S. 262 (1976).

408 U.S. 238 (1972).

49 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

50 428 U.S. 325 (1976).

40 Id. at 239.
41

188.

45

5 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:
THE DEATH PENALTY 16 (1994).

39

the discriminatory effect of the discretionary
statutes. He wrote: "[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea
of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in
the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id.
at 256-57.

Id. at 238.

51

42 Id. at 239-40. Although the judgment of the

Court was announced in a terse per curiam
opinion, all nine justices wrote opinions setting
forth their disparate views on the subject. Justices
Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death
penalty was unconstitutional regardless of how it
was administered. According to Justice Brennan:
Death is an unusually severe and degrading
punishment; there is a strong probability
that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by
contemporary society is virtually total; and
there is no reason to believe that it serves any
penal purpose more effectively than the less
severe punishment of imprisonment. The
function of these principles is to enable a
court to determine whether a punishment
comports with human dignity. Death, quite
simply, does not.
Id. at 305.
Justice Marshall found that the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment on
two independent grounds. First, "it is excessive
and serves no valid legislative purpose." Injustice
Marshall's view, the death penalty was no more
effective a deterrent than life imprisonment.
Second, Justice Marshall considered the death
penalty to be "abhorrent to currently existing
moral values." Id. at 331-33, 357-60.
The other three members of the Furman majority,
Justices Stewart, Douglas, and White, agreed that
the systems of capital punishment then in existence were unconstitutional. However, these justices reserved judgment on whether capital punishment could be constitutionally administered
under some other system.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion focused on

Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258.

52 These capital offenses are: [1] "murder of a
peace officer or fireman; [2] murder committed
in the course of kidnapping [sic], burglary, robbery, forcible rape or arson; [3] murder committed for remuneration; [4] murder committed
while escaping or attempting to escape from a
penal institution; and [5] murder committed by a
prison inmate when the victim is a prison employee." During the guilt and innocence stage of
the capital trial, the jury is required to determine
whether the state proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed one of the
enumerated capital offenses. Jurek, 428 U.S. at
268-69.
51 If the jury found the defendant guilty of a

capital offense, Texas required the jury, in a
separate sentencing proceeding, to answer three
questions to determine whether a defendant
would be allowed to live in prison or be put to
death:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant
that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with
the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another
would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
TEX. CODE

1997).
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Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270.

55

Id.
Id. at 271.

56

without possibility of parole as a matter of
state law [Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S.
Ct. 2187, 2193-94 (1994)]. The Court also
has invoked the "death is different" doctrine
in post-trial proceedings to overturn a sentence based on a prior conviction that was
later invalidated [Johnson v. Mississippi, 486
U.S. 578, 584-87 (1988)], and to suggest that
some post-trial judicial consideration of
newly-discovered evidence of innocence may
be mandated when the inmate makes a
"truly persuasive" showing of actual (as opposed to legal) innocence [Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417].

57 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
58

428 U.S. 325 (1976).

59

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.

60 Id. at 302.
61 Id. at 303.
62

Id. at 302 (citing the conclusions of a NORTH

CAROLINA

COMMISSION

REPORT

OF

THE

SPECIAL

COMMISSION FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, NORTH CAROLINA POPULAR
GOVERNMENT 13 (1949)).

Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 397.
71 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. at 1132-33 (Blackmun,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

63

Id. at 303.

64

Id. at 304.

65

Id.

72 438 U.S. 586 (1978).

66

Id. at 305.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (opinion of Stewart, J.,

73 Id. at 604-05 (emphasis in original).

67

71

joined by Powell and Stevens,JJ.).

74

Id.

Id.

75 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).

68 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952-53

(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the denial of
certiorari).
69 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1132 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In a recent Harvard Law Review article,
Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker analyzed
the Court's expressed concern for "heightened
reliability" in capital cases. According to the
article, "taken together with the cases elaborating
the requirement of individualized sentencing,"
the following decisions represent the sum total of
the Court's applications of the death-is-different
doctrine:
The Court has invoked the notion of heightened reliability to permit voir dire concerning racial prejudice in cases involving interracial murders [Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28,
37 (1986)]; to invalidate a death sentence
based in part on a pre-sentence report that
was not made available to defense counsel
[Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-62
(1977) ]; to prevent prosecutors from deliberately misleading jurors about the consequences of their decision by misstating the
scope of appellate review [Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-30 (1985)]; to require the inclusion of a lesser-included offense instruction in cases in which the
evidence would support a guilty verdict for a
non-capital offense [Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980)]; and to permit the
defendant to inform the jury of the real
consequences of a "life" sentence when the
state argues that the defendant would be
dangerous in the future and "life" means life

VOLUME

76 U.S. CONST.

amend. VI.

77 TASK FORCE REPORT, supranote 8, at 8.

(1990), supra note 3,
at 15. Later that same year, the National Law
Journal(NLJ) published the results of a comprehensive six-month, six-state study of capital defense in the South. After examining thousands of
pages of trial transcripts in nearly 100 capital
78 THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

cases; conducting in-depth interviews with scores

of attorneys who tried and lost capital cases; and
questioning judges, prosecutors and experts in
capital cases; the NLJ reported the following "key
findings":
The trial lawyers who represented death row
inmates in the six states [Alabama, Georgia,

Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas]
have been disbarred, suspended or otherwise disciplined at a rate three to 46 times the
discipline rate for those states.
More than half the defense counsel questioned in an NLJ survey said they were
handling their first capital trials when their
clients, now on death row, were convicted.
Wholly unrealistic statutory fee limits on
defense representation-such as Mississippi's flat, unwaivable $1,000 cap, equivalent to
a fee of about $5 per hour for many lawyersact as disincentives to thorough trial investigation and preparation.
Inadequate or non-existent standards for
appointment of counsel can result, for example, in an oil and gas lawyer handling a
capital trial as his or her first criminal case.
Statutory standards that do exist for appoint-
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rights and to the integrity of the judicial process."
Id. at 1057-58. More recently, Judge Joseph W.
Bellacosa of the New York Court of Appeals noted
that there is "a death row counsel crisis in this
country." Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses
From the Death Penalty: "Old Sparky's"Jolt to the Legal
Profession, 14 PACE L. REv. 1, 13 (1994).
87466 U.S. 668 (1984).

ment of counsel are routinely ignored by
trial judges and violations are viewed on
appeal as "harmless error."
Capital trials often are completed in one to
two days-in contrast to the two-week to
two-month trials in some regions where sophisticated indigent defense systems operate.
Penalty phases-the capital trial's most important part-usually start immediately after a
guilty verdict and last only several hours and
in at least one case just 15 minutes.

88 Id.

Little effort-and in at least one-fourth of
the cases the NLJ examined, no effort-was
expended to present mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase.

91 Id. at 696. An attorney's errors do not violate

89 Id. at 687.
90 Id. at 694.

the right to counsel unless the attorney's performance as a whole falls outside the "wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689.
Under Strickland, courts must 'judge ... counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's
conduct." Id. at 690.

Judges routinely deny lawyers' requests for
expert/investigative fees.
State criminal justice systems are ill-equipped
to deal with mentally ill or retarded defendants unable to aid their defense attorneys.

92 Id. at 689.

And finally, compounding all of these problems, the U.S. Supreme Court decision that
lays out the test for ineffective assistance of
counsel is itself ineffective, according to capital law experts and defense lawyers. The test
has made it all but impossible for deathsentenced inmates to challenge the performance of their trial lawyers.
Marcia Coyle et al., FatalDefense: Trial and Errorin
the Nation'sDeath Belt, NAT'L L.J.,June 11, 1990, at
30.
79GUIDELINES, supra note 3.

Id. at 3. A rare example of a jurisdiction
adopting at least some of the ABA Guidelines is
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4393-94 (1988) (codified
at 21 U.S.C. section 848(q)); see also Crime Control Act of 1994, 21 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq. (1994).
81 GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 79.
80

8

2ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

§ 4-1.2

(3d ed. 1991).
83

AD Hoc COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN

CAPITAL

CASES,

REPORT

ON HABEAS

CORPUS

IN

CAPITAL CASES, 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)

3239
(Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter POWELL COMM. REP.].
84 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Capital Punishment, 102

HARv.L. REv. 1035, 1040 (1989).
85POWELL COMM. REP., supranote 83, at 4.

"Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Complex Procedurefor a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 1015, 1057 (1993). As Chief Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr., of the Third Circuit observed:
"[i]t is at the trial and direct appeal stage-not in
state collateral proceedings-where ineffectual
counsel do the most damage to their clients'

91 Id. at 707.
94 Id. at 710-11.

95 Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir.
1986) (Rubin,J., concurring).
96 For a sampling of various horror stories regarding counsel in capital cases, see infra sections
II.A.6 and II.A.7.
97 Stephen B. Bright, et al., Keeping Gideon From
Being Blown Away: Prospective Challenges to Inadequate Representation May Be Our Best Hope, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 1990, at 11.
98 Two justices of the Florida Supreme Court
would have held that Moran was ineffective during trial. Coyle et al., supra note 78, at 30.
99 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
100 Id. at 380 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 372.
102

A recent ABA-sponsored symposium addressed
the political pressures that confront elected state
judges who overturn death sentences because of
serious constitutional errors. Symposium, Politics
and the Death Penalty, supra note 6. During that
program, James Exum, Jr., Chief Justice of the
North Carolina Supreme Court, described how
the way he voted in capital cases became a central
issue during the judicial elections. Id. at 270-73.
13 ABA, Report of the Comm'n on Professionalism,
112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986).
104 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1039 (1995)
(Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
105 Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. Keenan, Judges

and the Politicsof Death: Deciding Between the Bill of
Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B. U.

Georgetown Journal on FightingPoverty
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L. REv. 759, 760, 765 (1995) (documenting case
after case in which "judges who do not listen and
bend to political pressures" have lost their positions on the bench).
106 Id. at 779 nn.88-89.
107Norris v.

Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (reversing because of racial discrimination injury selection); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 32 (1932)
(reversing because the accused were denied counsel).
108Bright & Keenan, supra note 105, at 765 n.32.
09 Id.

I10See generally id.
11 Id. at 760-61.
112

Id. at 761.

113Id.

"A law professor who watches the court

observed, 'One thing it shows is that when the
voters speak loudly enough, even the judiciary
listens.' " Id. (quoting Professor Clark Kelso)
(citation omitted).
114See generally id.
115Id. at

834 (footnote omitted).

116 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring). In his opinion, White concludes that in our
system of criminal justice, in which one primary
goal of punishment is specific deterrence of
future similar conduct by other individuals, the
infrequency with which the death penalty is
imposed has all but nullified its intended effects.
This phenomenon, White felt, emerged from the
sentencing authority of juries, where community
judgment comes to bear in "mitigat[ing] the
harshness of the law." Given this rationale, White
stated that "[a] penalty with such negligible
returns to the State would be patently excessive
and cruel and unusual punishment violative of
the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 311-13.
117Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The
Death Sentence not for the Worst Crime butfor the Worst
Lawyer, 103YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994) [hereinafter Bright, Counselforthe Poor]. Consider the effect
inadequate representation had in the conviction
and execution of Horace Dunkins:
[T]he failure of defense counsel to present
critical information is one reason that Horace Dunkins was sentenced to death in Alabama. Before his execution in 1989, when
newspapers reported that Dunkins was mentally retarded, at least one juror came forward and said she would not have voted for
the death sentence if she had known of his
condition. Nevertheless, Dunkins was executed.
Id. at 1837 (citation omitted).
118Id. at 1849. "Only 11 of the 36 states which
have the death penalty have statewide public

defender programs." (citing SPANGENBERG GROUP,
supra note 7, at 157).
119 Id. at 1849-50.
120

Id. at 1850.

121 Id.

122

Id. at 1851-52 (citations omitted). Consider

the following description of the current system of
indigent defense:
The structure of indigent defense not only
varies among states, it varies within many
states from county to county. Some localities
employ a combination of these programs. All
of these approaches have several things in
common. They evince the gross underfunding that pervades indigent defense. They are
unable to attract and keep experienced and
qualified attorneys because of lack of compensation and overwhelming workloads. Just
when lawyers reach the point when they have
handled enough cases to begin avoiding
basic mistakes, they leave criminal practice
and are replaced by other young, inexperienced lawyers who are even less able to deal
with the overwhelming caseloads. Generally,
no standards are employed for assignment of
cases to counsel or for the performance of
counsel. And virtually no resources are provided for investigative and expert assistance
or defense counsel training. The situation
has further deteriorated in the last few years.
This is largely due to the increased complexity of cases and the increase in the number of
cases resulting from expanded resources for
police and prosecution and the lack of a
similar increase, and perhaps even a decline,
in funding for defense programs.
It should be obvious that even if experienced
and competent counsel are available in capital cases, inadequate representation can still
result due to inadequate funding. Ample
funds are essential, not just to cover the
reasonable cost of attorneys' fees, but to pay
for critical services rendered by investigators
and experts.
Nationwide, examples of inadequate funding abound. Attorneys appointed to represent capital defendants in certain rural counties in Texas receive no more than $800 for
their services.

Marianne Lavelle, Strong Law Thwarts Lone Star
Counsel NAT'L L.J.,June 11, 1990, at 3.
An Alabama attorney appointed to represent a
capital defendant in a widely publicized case in
Alabama was allotted $500 for his services and
those of investigators and experts. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor,supra note 117, at 1847 (citing Deposition of Richard Bell, Grayson v. State (Cir. Ct.
Shelby County, Ala., Oct. 10, 1991) at 24-25). In
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Virginia, the hourly rate for capital defense services averages about $13. Richard Klein, The
Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not be Compelled
to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counse 68 IND.
L.J. 363, 366 (1993).
123 SPANGENBERG GRoup, supra note 7.
F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985). The Circuit
court, in applying the test enunciated in Strickland
v. Washington,upheld the district court ruling that
Shirley Tyler received ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to present mitigating evidence
at the sentencing phase. The two-part test announced in Strickland first asks, "did counsel in
fact render a deficient performance?" The Supreme Court said that this "test must be whether
counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." "In order to make the
second determination, it must be shown that the
acts of counsel that were outside the range of
competence were actually prejudicial." Id. at 744.
125 954 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated, 507 U.S.
124755

1026 (1993), on remand 20 F.3d 950 (9th Cir.
1994). Defendant appealed, citing numerous errors relating to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Circuit Court, after conducting a de novo
review of this Sixth Amendment issue, found that
"Paradis has failed to demonstrate that his trial
counsel's performance was ineffective because of
his inexperience." While recognizing that counsel had been admitted to the bar only six months
before the murder trial, the Circuit Court noted
that counsel "had been a police officer for many
years before he attended law school. [Counsel]
had extensive background in law enforcement
investigations and the court system. The record
also shows that [counsel] had previously tried
some misdemeanor cases for the prosecutor's
office." Id. at 491.
126 692 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 843 (1983). "[Defendant] argue[d on appeal] that his trial counsel was unqualified because he had never defended a criminal case all
the way to ajury verdict and because he had only
recently graduated from law school." Id. at 1008.
The circuit court affirmed the district court's
rejection of the defendant's argument. The circuit court noted that "a defendant is not entitled
to 'errorless counsel,' but to 'counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.' " Id. (citing Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1356 (5th Cir. 1981)). Additionally, the court noted that defense counsel had
interned in the district attorney's office as a law
student, had handled criminal cases for a respected law firm, had previously worked on a
number of civil cases, and had enlisted the help of
two experienced criminal lawyers while preparing
defendant's case. Id. at 1008-09.

127 548
128

So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989).
581 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), rev'd,

581 So. 2d 531 (Ala. Crim. App.), on remand, 581
So. 2d 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
129 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 954 (1993). The court of appeals found that
defense counsel's reliance on an unconstitutional
death penalty statute during the penalty phase
constituted ineffective assistance under the first
prong of the Stricklandtest: "petitioner must show
that ... the attorney's representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness." 1d. at
358. However, the court noted that petitioner's
argument failed prong two of the Stricklandtest in
that it demonstrated no actual prejudice.
[W]e simply cannot conclude that there is
any "reasonable probability" that, with effective assistance of counsel, Frey's jury would
have found that the balance of mitigating
and aggravating factors tipped the other way.
[Defense counsel's] misstatements about the
statute were corrected. All the evidence was
before the jury, which was properly in[T]he jury concluded that the
structed ....
mitigating factors paled in comparison to the
horrible nature of the contract killing.
Id. at 369.
130 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990) (per curiam). The
Georgia Supreme Court held that the defendant
had received ineffective assistance of counsel,
citing numerous problems with the defense team
and the defenses presented at trial. Among those
factors found dispositive to its ruling were the
following:
(1) "Indicating its belief that [retained counsel's] advanced age made him unable to
handle the unified appeal procedure,
the trial court appointed an attorney to
assist."
(2) The two defense attorneys never discussed their theory of the case until after
the state had rested its case in chief.
(3) Retained counsel placed defendant on
the stand without any preparation for
examination and over objection of appointed counsel. Defendant subsequently contradicted eyewitness and circumstantial evidence linking him to the
crimes.
(4) Defense attorneys presented mutually
exclusive defense theories during closing arguments: Retained counsel "asked
the jury to acquit based on reasonable
doubt that petitioner committed the
crimes, while appointed counsel continued to advance two theories involving
mental illness as well as arguing the
sufficiency of the evidence."
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5 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. 1991).
979 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).

Id.at 245.
131884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494

1

U.S. 1012 (1990). The circuit court observed that
the district court found that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.

144 Bright, Counselfor the Poor, supra note 117, at

The federal district court rested its grant of
relief upon the failure of [defense counsel]
to offer more extensive argument. The court
was persuaded that "the decision to not
present a more extensive argument at punishment 'precluded the jury from considering
any mitigating factors;' [for example, that
defendant was a teenager, that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense, and that his
violent family background might have made
his acts justifiable].... Finally, it concluded
that there was "a reasonable probability that
absent this deficiency, the jury would have
sentenced [defendant] to life imprisonment
rather than death." The district court then
ordered that the death sentence be "commuted to life imprisonment."
Id.at 876.
132 The circuit court reversed the district court,
reinstating the death sentence. The court based
its reversal in part on the facts that defense
counsel was an experienced attorney to whom the
district court should have granted wide latitude,
that "evidence of possible mitigating factors was
before the jury," and that defendant's behavior
during the trial did nothing to help counsel's
defense. "Indeed, at trial the lawyer found his
client laughing in the presence of the jury at the
grisly details of the slaying." Id. at 877.
133 Civ. No. 85-98-2MAC (M.D. Ga. 1985).
134 Id.

...
In re Dale, 247 S.E.2d 246, 248 (N.C. Ct. App.
1978) (pre-Stricklandcase).
136 Morgan v. Zant, 743 E2d 775, 780 (11th Cir.
1984).
137 Id.

138 That money matters in capital cases was con-

143

1835.
145 Id. at 1838-39 (footnotes omitted).
146

The district attorney who eventually dropped

all charges against Nelson noted, "IT] here is no
material element of the state's case in the original
trial which has not subsequently been determined to be impeached or contradicted." Jingle
Davis & Mark Curriden, Man Condemned for Murder of Girl IsFreed,ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 7,1991, at

06.
147 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Janet Ruesch, Martinez-Macias v. Collins, slip op.
at7 (Apr. 26, 1991).
148 See generally Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra
note 117, at 1859-60.
149Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.),
application for stay denied, 463 U.S. 1344, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
150 Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983).
151 See Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery: Procedural Bar of ConstitutionalClaims in Capital Cases
Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 679, 685 (1990).
152 Id. Bright observed that the second person
executed in Georgia following Gregg suffered
similar injustice in his case. According to Bright,
Ivon Stanley, a mentally retarded offender:
[W] as denied relief despite ajury instruction
which unconstitutionally shifted the burden
of proof on intent because his attorney did
not preserve the issue by raising an objection
at trial. His more culpable codefendant was
granted a new trial on the unconstitutional
instruction. Again, a switch of the lawyers
would have reversed the outcomes of the two
cases.

firmed again on March 12, 1996. On that date,
prosecutors in Delaware announced that they
would not seek the death penalty againstJohn E.
DuPont, a millionaire charged with shooting to
death Dave Schultz, a former Olympic wrestler.
Prosecutors Will Not Seek Death Penalty for DuPont,

Id. at 685-86 (1990). See Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d
921, 922 (1lth Cir.) (per curiam), applicationfor
stay denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984); Thomas v.
Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1987).

REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Mar. 12, 1996.

See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330
(1985) (capital sentencing jury must recognize
the gravity of its task and proceed with the
appropriate awareness of its "truly awesome responsibility").

153

489 U.S. 401 (1989).

154

131Stephen B. Bright, The O.J. Simpson Case and
CapitalPunishment, 38 How. L.J. 247, 262 (1995).
140 Id. at 262-65.

141 For other examples of examples of woefully
inadequate counsel in capital cases, see Scharlette
Holdman, CapitalPunishment:Is There Any Habeas
Left in This Corpus, 27 Loy. L. REv. 560 (1996).

155 Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.

1986), modified sub. nom, Adams v. Dugger, 816
F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1987).
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NAACP

LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND,

Row, U.S.A. 6 (1995) [hereinafter
DEATH Row USA].
157 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
INC., DEATH

158 GUIDELINES,

supra note 3, at 79; see also THE

HOUSE OF DELEGATES

(1990), supra note 3.
3, at 3, 41.

159 GUIDELINES, supra note

160 See infra notes 184-97 and accompanying text.
161

Texas alone reportedly has 75 unrepresented

inmates on death row. SPECIAL

COMM. ON CAPITAL

REPRESENTATION AND THE COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS,

YORK, The
Crisis in Capital Representation 1 (1996) [hereinafter Crisis in CapitalRepresentation].
162 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW

163

Id. at 687 (emphasis added). See

WAYNE

R.

H.
1136-37 (2d ed. 1992).

LAFAVE & JEROLD
164 CHARLES

ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

H. WHITEBREAD &

CHRISTOPHER SLOBO-

GIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES
AND CONCEPTS 691 (2d ed. 1986).
165

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).

166 See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note

164, at

691-92.
167 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
168 U.S. CONST.

amend. VI.

vacate or set aside a death sentence, any
defendant who is or becomes financially
unable to obtain adequate representation or
investigative, expert or other reasonably necessary services shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the
furnishing of such other services in accordance with paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and
(9).
21 U.S.C. § 848 (q) (4)(B) (1996).
184 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
185 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) (g) (2) (B) (1996).
186 See Crisis in Criminal Representation, supra note

161, at 25-31.
87

1 TASK FORCE REPORT,

supra note 8, at 59.

"I"Memorandum from Judge Alarcon to Judges
Cox and Cedarbaum (Dec. 7, 1994) (cited in Crisis
in CapitalRepresentation,supranote 161, at 27-28).
189 COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVICES,JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE SUB-

(1995).
See also Henry J. Reske, The Politics of DeathDispute over Defender Organizations Mirrors Debate
overDeath Penalty, ABAJ., Nov. 1995, at 20.
190 Crisis in CapitalRepresentation, supra note 161,
COMM. ON DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION

at 28.
191Reske, supra note 189, at 20.
Id.

169

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

192

170

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).

19"3
Crisis in CapitalRepresentation,ajoint report of

466 U.S. 668 (1984). For a discussion of how
the ABA policies on counsel exceed the minimum requirements imposed by Stricklandv. Washington, see supra notes 78-86 and accompanying
text.
172 See Crisis in Capital Representation, supra note
171

161, at 9-10.
173 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
174

481 U.S. 551 (1987).

175

Id. at 556-57.

176

492 U.S. 1 (1989).

177

Id. at 8-10.

Brief for ABA as Amicus Curiae at 4-5, Giarratano (Nos. 87-71518, 87-7519).
179
Vick, Underfunded Indigent Defense, supra note
22, at 414 n.406.
180 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
178

181

Id.

182

Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1993).

183 Section 848(q) (4) (B) of Title 21 of the United

States Code provides:
In any post conviction proceeding under
section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, seeking to

two committees of the Bar of the City of New
York, described the decision to defund PCDOs as
"deplorabl[e]" and noted that "[w]ithout the
PCDOs, the shortage of competent counsel will
worsen, as lawyers decline or drop cases for lack
of support services." Crisis in Capital Representation, supranote 161, at 2.
194 Marcia Coyle, Republicans Take Aim at DeathRow
Lauyers, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 18, 1995, at Al, A25
(citing David Sellers of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts) [hereinafter Coyle,
Republicans Take Aim]. During an ABA-sponsored
program, Andrea Lyon, Director of the Illinois
Capital Resource Center stated, "we were ...
defunded because we were not supposed to win."
Panel Discussion, Capital Punishment: Is There Any
Habeas Left in This Corpus?, supra note 6, at 523,
588. Lyon elaborated:
Prosecutors have what they call "The Fryers
Club." That's what the group of attorneys
general who prosecute death cases call themselves. They have a T-shirt that says, "hot
seats, safe streets."
But we can't have an organized defense,
because when we did, we were winning,
particularly in the federal courts, where federal judges have had the luxury of making
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decisions based on the facts and the law in
front of them with relatively little political
pressure on them. But we weren't supposed
to win. We were just supposed to be there.
Id. at 590.
195Coyle, Republicans Take Aim, supra note 194, at
A25.
191The Crisis in Capital Representation, supra note
161, at 30-31 (arguing that without PCDOs, innocent prisoners would have been executed).
197 Annual Report of the American Bar Association,
vol. 107, at 665 (Resolution of the House of
Delegates, Aug. 1982) (voting 116 to 98 to approve Report No. 4 of the Section of CriminalJustice).
198 Id. at 665-67.

199 Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1665, 1684-704 (1990).
200 TASK FORCE REPORT, supranote 8, at 5.
201

law now stands, an individual, who may be indicted in a Circuit Court for treason against the
United States, is beyond the power of federal
courts and judges, if he be in custody under the
authority of a state." Id.
214 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994). "The Supreme
Court, a justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgement of a State
court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States." Id.
215 237 U.S. 309 (1915).

While the Warren Court appeared to distrust
either the competence or the willingness of
state courts to enforce constitutional guarantees, the Burger Court evidenced a desire to
reinvigorate the parallel state system. This
'New Federalism' has several motivations.
First is a greater faith in the capabilities of
the state courts. Relatedly, the Court wishes
to promote 'comity' between the federal and
state systems by according judgments made
by the latter system greater respect. The
Court has also stressed the need for finality
in the review process and the burden that
habeas petitions place on the federal courts.

Id.

Berger, supra note 199, at 1684. The key
recommendations of the Task Force are discussed
infta section II.C.3.
203 For a discussion of recent habeas reform
legislation, see infta section II.C.8.
204 This section draws heavily on COYNE & ENTzEROTH, supranote 27, at 495-97.
205 See infranotes 291-310 and accompanying text.
WILLIAM

S.

CHURCH,

supra note 164, at

831 (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)).
2 17
WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 164, at
831-32.

202

206

WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN,

216

THE WRIT OF HABEUS

§§ 38-45 (San Francisco, BancroftWhitsey 1893); A.H. Carpenter, Habeus Corpus in

Id.

the Colonies, 8 AM. HIST. REV. 18 (1902).

218 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991).

CORPUS,

207

Fayv. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963).

219 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 536 (Jackson, J.,

208 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
209

U.S. CONSI. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

210 LAFAVE

concurring).
Id. at 537. At the time Justice Jackson complained about the "flood" of habeas petitions,
state inmates filed 541 petitions in federal court.
Id. at 536 n.8. By 1961, there were 1020 habeas
petitions filed; and by 1970, there were 9063. In
1991, state prisoners filed 10,325 habeas petitions. 1991 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 191. Although
the number of habeas petitions filed has increased substantially over the years, the error
rate, particularly in capital cases, remains alarmingly high.
221 McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2789
(1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting). "The continuing importance of federal habeas corpus in correcting constitutional error is well documented."
Id.
222 Id. at 2789 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, "the total reversal rate of capital cases at all
stages of review during the same time period was
220

& ISRAEL, supra note 163, at 1178. "The

common law writ of habeas corpus, simply defined, is a judicial order directing a person to
have the body of another brought before a
tribunal at a certain time and place. The writ
apparently takes its name from its directive, originally stated in Latin, that the court would 'have
the body.' " Id.
211 Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat.
81-82.
212 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
Id. at 105. "Neither this nor any other court of
the United States, or judge thereof, can issue a
habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner, who is in
custody under a sentence or execution of a state
court, for any other purpose than to be used as a
witness. And it is immaterial whether the imprisonment be under civil or criminal process. As the
213

VOLUME

IV, NUMBER 1 (FALL 1996)

Features
estimated at 60% or more .... This Court itself
frequently has granted capital defendants relief
in federal habeas corpus proceedings." Id. See
generally, The Crisis in Capital Representation, supra
note 161, at 32-41. "Reports illustrate the range
and variety of substantive claims in more than 250
cases in which federal habeas corpus relief was
granted in capital and non-capital cases between
1959 and 1994. What kinds of federal constitutional violations have led to the surprisingly high
success rate in habeas corpus for death row
inmates? Certainly not technicalities." Id.
223 See Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief
Amici Curiae of Benjamin R. Civiletti in Support
of the Respondent at 21, Wright v. West, 505 U.S.
277 (No. 91-542) (1992). "The rate of reversible
constitutional error found on habeas review of
state capital judgements has remained constant
over the period--42 percent between 1976 and
1984 and 41 percent between 1985 and 1991. The
annual rate has never gone below 28 percent." Id.
The actual rate of constitutional error detected in
capital cases is actually much higher. Not included in the 40 percent figure are the very many
cases in which federal judges have identified
constitutional errors but have found them to be
harmless. See Brecht v.Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619
(1993). See also DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 1995 YEAR END REPORT 2. In addition, "five
inmates were released from death row in 1995
after being acquitted at re-trial or after charges
were dropped. This brings the total number of
death row inmates released since 1973 because of
evidence of their innocence to 59." Id.
224 See infrasection II.C.6 and II.C.7.
225

Crisis in CapitalRepresentation, supra note 161,

at 13-18. The report lists 28 cases involving instances of egregious constitutional error in the
past 15 years. Id.
226 These examples are taken from Crisis in Capital
Representation, supra note 161, at 13-17 (footnotes
incorporated into text).
227 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
228

Id. at 5.

Id. "The composition of the Task Force was
balanced to include experts with many different
perspectives on the substance and process of
capital litigation." Id. at 45.
230 Id. at 5.
229

Id. at 46. The report stressed that it was
"particularly important to address the chaotic

231

character of ...

last minute

.

.. reviews in death

penalty cases," because they "present unique
problems and require special solutions." Id. at 5.
232 Id. at 45 n.121. These hearings were held in
1989 during the months of May (Dallas), June
(San Francisco), and August (Atlanta). Id. Follow-

ing each regional hearing, the Task Force met as a
deliberative body. In addition, the Task Force
convened on three other occasions. These additional meetings took place in Washington D.C.
(December 1989) and New Orleans (April 1989 &
October 1989). Id. at 46 n.123.
233 Id. at 45-46.
234

TASK FORCE

REPORT,

supra note 8. For a sum-

mary of the recommendations, see Ira P. Robbins,
Toward a MoreJust and Effective System of Review in
State Death Penalty Cases, 1990 ABA SEC. CRIM.
JUST. 1-3 [hereinafter Robbins, State Death Penalty
Cases].
235 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. The
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848
(1994), somewhat ameliorated the failure of most
jurisdictions to provide competent counsel in all
stages of capital cases by providing death row
petitioners a statutory right to counsel in federal
habeas corpus proceedings. Of course, by the
time competent counsel has been provided in
federal habeas proceedings, the often fatal damage of incompetent counsel has been done. And,
significantly, the Supreme Court has held that
there is no constitutional right to an effective
lawyer beyond the direct appeal stage.
236 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
237

Id.

Id. at 119-20. For example, Caprice Cosper, an
Assistant District Attorney in Houston, remarked
that the setting of execution dates "is perhaps the
single most substantial impediment to the orderly
administration of capital habeas cases in Texas....
It makes a chaotic mess out of the system of
administering these cases." Id. at 118.
239 Id. at 26-27.
238

A narrow exception to the procedural default
rule generally exists for those errors that, although not preserved for review, are considered
"fundamental." E.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 496 (1986). Because so very few trial errors
are considered "fundamental," this exception
permits review of procedurally defaulted constitutional claims in only the rarest of cases. Id.
241 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
240

242

This recommendation espoused a return, in

part, to the doctrine of Fay v. Noia. 372 U.S. 391
(1963). Noia held that a prisoner who had failed
to comply with state procedural rules in raising
claims of error could nonetheless seek relief in
federal court based on those same claims, provided that the prisoner did not "deliberately
bypass" the state procedure. Beginning with Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court retreated from the
deliberate bypass rule and significantly increased
the burden on all inmates seeking to avoid
application of the procedural default doctrine.
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433 U.S. 72 (1977). In Sykes, the Court held that
procedurally defaulted claims could only be considered by federal courts if the prisoner could
demonstrate both "cause" for not complying
with the state procedure and actual "prejudice"
resulting therefrom. Id.
243 Successive petitions are governed by Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1994 &
Supp. 1996) and Rule 9(b), Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts, 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2254 (1994). For a more
thorough analysis of successive petitions, see TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 148-59.
244 TASK FORCE REPORT,

supra note 8, at 35.

245

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).

246

McCleskey v.Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631-32
(1993), held that federal courts may not grant
relief in habeas cases unless the error "had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict." This is a far more
onerous standard than the harmless error test of
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967),
which applies to errors raised at trial or on direct
appeal. Under Chapman, the beneficiary of the
harmless error-usually the government-must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt "that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict."
Id. Thus, if overwhelming error-free evidence
supports the conviction or sentence, it will not be
reversed.
248 Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
247

249

489 U.S. 288 (1989).

250

Id.

251

Although Teague was not a capital case, the

Court ruled in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989), that Teague's restrictive principles would
apply with equal force in capital cases.
252 489 U.S. at 307-08 (1989). See generally Timothy
J. Foley, An Overview of the State's Affirmative Defenses in Federal Habeas Corpus Litigation (Part 2),
CHAMPION, at 39 (May 1994).
253 489 U.S. at 301.
254

Vick, Underfunded Indigent Defense, supra note
22, at 419. AsJustice Brennan noted in his dissent,
"[flew decisions on appeal or collateral review
are 'dictated' by what came before. Most such
cases involve a question of law that is at least
debatable." Teague, 489 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
255 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Civil
and Const. Rights of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 445-501 (1991) (statement of
John R. Curtin, Jr., president, ABA, and James S.
Liebman, professor of law, Columbia University
School of Law) for statements by ABA President

Curtin urging Congress to overrule Teague, at
least in capital cases. The ABA has not been alone
in urging that Teague be legislatively overruled.
Former ChiefJudge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Donald P. Lay, has
stated:
There are many criticisms of Teague. For one,
the new principles of retroactivity have
spawned a debate over whether a contention
is a "new rule," once again requiring excessive examination and inefficiency in federal
habeas procedures. In addition, Teague undermines the historical development of the writ
of habeas corpus, which, by its very nature,
assumes disruption of conventional notions
of finality. Perhaps Justice Brennan best
summed up the pernicious effect of Teaguein
the final sentence of his dissent, when he
stated that "the plurality would deprive us of
the manifold advantages of deciding important constitutional questions when they come
to us first or most cleanly on collateral review.
Lay, supra note 86, at 1042.
256 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
257

Id.

258

Id. at 400.

259 Id. The Court suggested that executive clem-

ency was the appropriate remedy for claims of
innocence like those of Herrera. Id. at 417.
260Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994)

(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
261 Andrew H. Malcolm, Tainted Verdicts Resurrect
Specter of Executing the Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1989, atAl8.
262 See infta section II.C.8.
263 See supra section II.C.1. and II.C.2.
264

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. at 404-05.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,367-68 (1972)
(Marshall,J., concurring).
266 Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, MiscarriagesofJustice in Potentially CapitalCases, 40 STAN.
265

L. REv. 21, 36 (1987). See also CHARLES L. BLACK,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 17-21 (1974). For a more
contemporary account of people wrongfully convicted of capital crimes, see RADELET ET AL., IN
SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992) (chronicling the or-

deals of 400 Americans wrongfully convicted of
crimes punishable by death).
267 Innocence and the Death Penalty: Assessing the
Danger of Mistaken Executions, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., Oct. 21, 1993 (identifying as reasons for
wrongful convictions in capital cases racial prejudice, the pressure to prosecute, inadequate counsel, and official misconduct) [hereinafter Inno-
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cence and the Death Penalty]. See also EXECUTING THE
INNOCENT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, DEATH PENALTY

INFORMATION CENTER (1992) [hereinafter EXECUTING THE INNOCENT].
268 EXECUTING THE INNOCENT,

supranote 267, at 2.

For a discussion of recent examples of innocent
people released after serving time on death row,
see infra notes 271-90 and accompanying text.
269 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204
(1971).
Death Row Inmate Acquitted at 3rd Trial, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 5, 1995, at 9A.
271 No Fourth Murder Tria4 NAT. L. J., Dec. 25-Jan.
270

1, 1996, at A8.
272 Brent Whiting & Pamela Manson, 5th Trial
Clears Man in 2 Murders, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 2,

1995, at Al.
273 Id.

274 Richard L. Fricker, Reasonable Doubts, ABA J.,
Dec. 1993, at 39.
271 State v. Munson, 886 P.2d 999, 1003 (Okla. Ct.

Crim. App. 1994) (noting that the State of Oklahoma unlawfully withheld 165 photographs and

300 to 500 pages of police reports, much of which
was exculpatory).
276 Randall Coyne, Abe Munson's Near-DeathExperience, OKLA. OBSERVER, Apr. 25, 1995, at 9.
277 Inmate Freed After 5 Years on Death Row, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at All.

(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
289 Id. at 1138 n.8 (Blackmun,J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citations omitted). In an
interview with Nina Totenberg of National Public
Radio, broadcast shortly after his Callins dissent
was published, Justice Blackmun addressed the
inevitability of human error and the imperfections in the criminal justice system. He acknowledged that he believed it possible that, during his
tenure as Justice, "genuinely innocent people"
whose cases came before the Court had been
executed. All Things Considered: Blackmun Dissents
in DeathPenalty Case (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 22, 1994).
290 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66 (1996)).
291 No fewer than four attorneys general warned
that the habeas corpus provisions of the antiterrorism bills were unconstitutional. Letter of Dec. 8,
1995, to President WilliamJ. Clinton, from Benjamin R. Civiletti,Jr., Edward H. Levi, Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach, and Elliot L. Richardson.
292
L.W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus
Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
293 Id.
294 Id. For an in-depth analysis of the effects of the
Anti-Terrorism Act on existing Supreme Court
precedent, see id.
295 455 U.S. 509 (1982).

96 372 U.S. 293 (1963).

278 Id.

279 Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 267,
at 7-8.
280 Id. at 7. Unlike most wrongfully condemned
inmates who gain their freedom, Bloodsworth
was awarded $300,000 from the State of Maryland
after Governor William Donald Schaefer pardoned him. Paul W. Valentine & Richard Tapscott, Maryland to Give Cleared Man $300,000,
WASH. POST, June 23, 1994, at B1.
281 Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 267,

29 7
298

N9 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
300 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
301

489 U.S. 288 (1989).

302

See generally Yackle, supra note 292.

303 COYNE

Id.

283 Id.

284 Mark Hansen, The Murder Case That Unraveled,
ABAJ.,June 1993, at 30.
285 Peter Applebome, Alabama Releases Man Held
on Death Row for Six Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993,
at Al.
286 Innocence and the Death Penalty, supra note 267,
at 8.
287

Id.

288 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994)

&

ENTZEROTH,

supra note 27, at 101

(Supp. 1996-1997); Yackle, supra note 292.
304

Yackle, supranote 292.

305

Previously, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provided that:

at 7.
282

504 U.S. 1 (1992).
499 U.S. 467 (1991).

In any proceeding instituted in a Federal
court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual
issue, made by a State court of competent
jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the
applicant for the writ and the State or an
officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion,
or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless
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the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit(1) that the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the state court
hearing;
(2) that the fact-finding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately
developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction
of the subject matter or over the person
of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and
the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint
counsel to represent him in the State
court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full,
fair, and adequate hearing in the state
court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied
due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8)or unless the part of the record of the
State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was
made, pertinent to a determination of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and
the Federal court on a consideration of
such part of the record as a whole
concluded that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record;
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of
such factual determination has been made,
unless the evidence of one or more of the
circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs number (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown
by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is
admitted by the respondent, or unless the
court concludes pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph numbered (8) that the record
in the State court proceeding, considered as
a whole, does not fairly support such factual
determination, the burden shall rest upon
the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the
State court was erroneous.
306 This limitation on the power of federal courts
appears to be a clear violation of due process. As
the Supreme Court has observed, the test is
whether a measure "offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

Critics of the deference standard have noted that
"[I]ndependent review of state criminal judgments by the Federal courts has existed since the
nation's founding, first by 'writ of error' and since
1867 by writ of habeas corpus." Benjamin R.
Civiletti,Jr. & Eliot Richardson, The Constitutionon
Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1996, at A21 (op.
ed. of two former attorneys general).
307
Yackle, supranote 292.
308 Id.
309 See id. The legislation appears to overrule
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
31
0 As described below, racism is not confined to
the sentencing phase of capital cases, but can and
does pervade every aspect of death penalty cases.
See infra notes 313-65 and accompanying text.
Even today, defense attorneys who depend upon
court appointments for economic survival may
refrain from challenging the systematic exclusion
of blacks from jury service for fear of losing
future appointments. See, e.g., Gates v. Zant, 863
F.2d 1492, 1497-1500 (11th Cir. 1989). Likewise, it
is not at all unusual for white defense attorneys to
use racial slurs when referring to their black
clients. Consider the following opening statement in a capital trial that resulted in a death
sentence:
You have got a little ole nigger man over
there that doesn't weigh over 135 pounds.
He is poor and he is broke. He's got an
appointed lawyer.... He is ignorant. I will
venture to say that he has an IQ of not over
80.
Transcript of Opening and Closing Arguments at
39, State v. Dungee, Record Excerpts at 102 (11th
Cir.) (No. 85-8202), decided sub nom. Isaacs v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1164 (1986) (cited in Bright, Counsel for
the Poor supra note 117, at 1857).
311 ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK (1988).

More recently, in August 1991, the ABA adopted a
resolution in support of mitigating the disproportionate impacts which then-pending federal death
penalty bills would have on Native Americans.
That resolution provides as follows:
Be It Resolved that the American Bar Association, while taking no position on the enactment of general federal death penalty legislation, supports in principle legislative measures
which would prevent or minimize any disproportionate effects such legislation would have
on Native Americans subject to federal jurisdiction.
ABA, SUMMARY OF AcTION OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, 1989 ANNUAL MEETING (August 1991).
312 DEATH Row USA, supra note 156, at 1.
313

Id.
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Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
314

315 NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND,

INC., EXECUTION UPDATE, at 1 (Jan. 27, 1996). See
also SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH
AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL

SENTENCING (1989).
316 EXECUTION UPDATE, supra note 315, at 1.
317 CHARLES

H. WHITEBRFAD

& CHRISTOPHER SLOBO-

GIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES
AND CONCEPTS 508 (3d ed. 1993).
318
3 19

320

434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

ISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MIS-

TAKE (2d ed. 1981). In Black's view, arrest, conviction, sentencing, appeal, and the exercise of
clemency are equally subject to the application of
inexact standards of decision-making. The inevitable result is a high degree of arbitrariness in the
determination of who is ultimately executed.
Black concludes that the possibility of mistake in
the infliction of the death penalty and the presence of standardless arbitrariness in its imposition are ineradicable features of death penalty
administration. Id.
Richard Burr, Representing the Client on Death

Row: The Politics of Advocacy, 59 UMKC L. REv. 1
(1990). Similarly, a study of 1017 homicide cases
in Florida concluded that race "functions as an
implicit aggravating factor in homicide cases."
Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and
ProsecutorialDiscretion in Homicide Cases, 19 L. &
Soc'Y REv. 587, 615 (1985).
322

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364-65 (Mar-

shall,J., concurring).
See supra notes 357-62 and accompanying text.

324

RonaldJ. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?Or Should

the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act be Enacted to
Substantially Diminish RacialDiscriminationin Capital Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE
777, 780 (1990-1991) [hereinafter Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?]). For a collection of citations to
many of these studies, see id. at 780 n.9.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481

U.S. 279, 286-87

(1987).
326

329

Id.

330

Id. at 287.

331 DOUBLEJUSTICE: RACE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

(Diann Y. Rust-Tierney & Kerima Wicks 1993).
One commentator has attempted to place these
statistics in perspective:
[S]mokers are 1.7 times more likely to die of
coronary artery disease than nonsmokers of
similar ages. Thus, while smoking cigarettes
greatly increases the risk of dying from heart
disease, the impact of smoking is considerably less than the race-of-victim effect on
capital punishment.
Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?, supranote 324, at 781.
332 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
s3 In 1978, Warren McCleskey was convicted in
Fulton County, Georgia, of robbing a furniture
store and killing Frank Schlatt, a white police
officer. McCleskey's jury, composed of 11 whites
and one black, sentenced him to life for the
robbery and death for the murder. McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 283-85.
334 481 U.S. at 327 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Id. at 324 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
336 Id. at 292-93. The requirement that McCleskey
335

323

325

Dec. 12, 1983.
328 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Charles

Black argues that each step in the criminal justice
system presents an opportunity for the exercise of
broad discretion. CHARLES L. BLACK, CAPITAL PUN-

521

called the Baldus study "the most sophisticated
statistical study ever done" on racial discrimination in capital sentencing. See 136 Cong. Rec.
S6873, 6893 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement
of Senator Adams). The year following the McCleskey decision, Professor Baldus was appointed by
the New Jersey Supreme Court to review the
effect of racism on that state's capital sentencing
statute. See Order, New Jersey Supreme Court,
July 29, 1988. See also Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant?,
supra note 324, at 781 nn. 11-12.
327 David Bruck, Decisions of Death, NEW REPUBLIC,

The U.S. Supreme Court, which considered

the Baldus study in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 286
(1987), described Baldus' work as "sophisticated." Id. at 291 n.7. A 1990 report of the
General Accounting Office (GAO) referred to
the Baldus study as a "high quality" study. Former
federal prosecutor, U.S. Senator Brock Adams,

show that a particular actor in his case-prosecutor, judge or juror-acted with a discriminatory
purpose is at odds with the historic Furman
decision. In that case, Anthony Amsterdam demonstrated a pattern of arbitrary and capricious
capital sentencing. He was not required to nor
did he show that a particular legislator, prosecutor, judge or juror acted in Furman's case in an
arbitrary or capricious manner. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). As the McCleskey majority
acknowledged, the Court has accepted statistics
as proof of intent to discriminate in other contexts, including a state's selection of the jury
venire and statutory violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 293-94.
331 Id. at 308.

Georgetown Journal on FightingPoverty

Report RegardingImplementation of the ABA's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerningthe Death Penalty
Id. at 312. The Court's decision was "informed" by the recognition that McCleskey's
claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into
serious question the principles that underlie the
criminal justice system. The Eighth Amendment
is not limited to capital cases, but applies to all
other criminal penalties. 481 U.S. at 314-15.
339 Id. at 309.Justice Brennan, dissenting in McCleskey, commented on the Baldus study's attempts to
quantify the risk of impermissible discrimination
in capital sentencing.

whites, and six of the seven executed were
black. Such execution figures are especially
striking in light of the fact that, during the
period encompassed by the Baldus study,
only 9.2% of Georgia homicides involved
black defendants and white victims, while
60.7% involved black victims.

338

The Baldus study indicates that, after taking
into account some 230 nonracial factors that
might legitimately influence a sentencer, the
jury more likely than not would have spared
McCleskey's life had his victim been black....
Furthermore, even examination of the sentencing system as a whole, factoring in those
cases in which the jury exercises little discretion, indicates the influence of race on capital sentencing. For the Georgia system as a
whole, race accounts for a six percentage
point difference in the rate at which capital
punishment is imposed. Since death is imposed in 11% of all white-victim cases, the
rate in comparably aggravated black-victim
cases is 5%. The rate of capital sentencing in
a white-victim case is thus 120% greater than
the rate in a black-victim case. Put another
way, over half-55%--of defendants in whitevictim crimes in Georgia would not have
been sentenced to die if their victims had
been black. Of the more than 200 variables
potentially relevant to a sentencing decision,
race of the victim is a powerful explanation
for variation in death sentence rates-as
powerful as nonracial aggravating factors
such as a prior murder conviction or acting
as the principal planner of the homicide.
These adjusted figures are only the most
conservative indication of the risk that race
will influence the death sentences of defendants in Georgia. Data unadjusted for the
mitigating or aggravating effect of other
factors show an even more pronounced disparity by race. The capital sentencing rate for
all white-victim cases was almost 11 times
greater than the rate for black-victim cases.
Furthermore, blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death at nearly 22 times the rate of
blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times
the rate of whites who kill blacks. In addition,
prosecutors seek the death penalty for 70%
of black defendants with white victims, but
for only 15% of black defendants with black
victims, and only 19% of white defendants
with black victims. Since our decision upholding the Georgia capital-sentencing system in
Gregg, the State has executed seven persons.
All of the seven were convicted of killing

VOLUME

Id. at 325-27 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
For an argument that five of the McCleskey justices-the four dissenters plus Justice Scaliaagreed that the Baldus study successfully proved
racial discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discriminationin Administering the Death Penalty:
The Need for the RacialJusticeAct, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 519, 527-28 (1995).
340
34 1
342

McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279.
supra note 23, at 451.

JEFFRIES,

Id.

Although Justice Powell confessed his belief
that the death penalty should be abolished in
1991, his change of heart on the issue of capital
punishment was not widely known until the 1994
publication of John C. Jeffries' book, JUSTICE
LEWiS F. POWELLJR., supra note 23.
343

344

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTYN

SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RA-

ciAL DISPARITIES (1990) [hereinafter GAO Report]. Although the GAO considered conducting
its own empirical studies, it decided to perform
"an evaluative synthesis-a review and critique of
existing research." Id. at 1.
345 Id. at 5.

Id. at 5. The GAO Report described the studies' conclusions regarding race-of-defendant discrimination as "equivocal." Id. at 6.
346

347 Conference, Death Penalty in the Twenty-First

Century, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 238 (1995) [hereinafter
Conference, Death Penalty].
348 Id. at 328.
349 Id. at 347.
350

Id. at 336.

351

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 325.

352

Conference, Death Penalty, supra note 347, at

347.
353 DEATH Row USA, supra note 156, at 8.

354 Id. at 9. Grasso confessed to the murder of

Hilda Johnson, an 87-year-old black woman from
Tulsa. Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1993).
355 MissouriDouble-MurdererExecuted,REUTERS LTD.,

Dec. 6, 1995.
356 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
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See generally Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of
Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Impositon of
the Death Penalty in the 1980's, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 797 (1986); Chemerinsky, supra
note 339.
358 H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The
357

Racial Justice Act would have added to Title 28,
United States Code, a new chapter 177: "Racially
Discriminatory Capital Sentencing."
359 H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).

Conservative commentator George F. Will
claimed that "the real purpose of the [Racial
Justice Act] is to end all executions." George F.
Will, RacialJustice Act is Ploy to Kill Death Penalty,
CHI. SUN TIMES, May 19, 1994, at 31. But, as
Professor Chemerinsky replied:
360

[T]his is no more true than the contention
that allowing statistical proof of discrimination in employment cases is meant to end all
hiring. The Racial Justice Act would allow
executions to continue unless the defendant
can prove discrimination, and the court finds
the proof to be statistically significant, and
the prosecutor fails to offer sufficient racially
neutral explanations for the discriminatory
pattern.
Chemerinsky, supranote 339, at 533.
361 H.R. 4017, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). See
Chemerinsky, supra note 339, at 530.
362 For a discussion ofJustice Blackmun's transformation in capital cases, see Randall Coyne, Marking the Progress of a Humane Justice: Harry Blackmun's Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 KAN. L. REv. 367
(1995).
114 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
363

Id. at 1135-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
364

ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, 1989 MIDYEAR MEETING (Feb. 1989).
365

366 Id. Additionally, Mental Health Standards pro-

mulgated by the ABA state that an individual
should not be executed if:
[A]s a result of mental illness or mental
retardation,... [the individual] cannot understand the nature of the proceedings, what he
or she was tried for, the reason for the
punishment, or the nature of the punishment [or] lacks sufficient competence to
recognize or understand any fact which might
exist which would make the punishment
unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to
convey such information to counsel or to the
court.
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS

§ 7-5.6(b) (1983) (emphasis added).

The ABA Resolutions and Mental Health Standards that address mental retardation are based
on a definition that describes "mentally retarded
persons" as having "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the development period."
AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION

ON MENTAL

DEFICIENCY

(now Retardation), CLASSIFICATION INMENTAL RETARDATION 1 (H. Grossman ed. 1983). According
to Professor James Ellis, a leading expert on
mental retardation, all 12 jurisdictions that prohibit the execution of mentally retarded persons
utilize this definition. Telephone Interview with
James Ellis, Professor of Law, University of New
Mexico School of Law (Feb. 10, 1997) (memorandum on file with the GeorgetownJournalon Fighting
Poverty).
In 1992, the American Association of Mental
Retardation adopted a revised definition of "mentally retarded person." The 1992 definition provides:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly sub-average intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the
following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social
skills, community use, self-direction, health
and safety, functional academics, leisure, and
work. Mental retardation manifests before
age 18.
Susan Lee, Note and Comment, Heller v. Dee:
Involuntary Civil Commitment and the "Objective"
Language of Probability, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 457,
460 (1994).
367 Telephone Interview with James Ellis, Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of
Law (Feb. 10, 1997) (memorandum on file with
the Georgetown Journal on Fighting Poverty). Ellis
reports that 11 death penalty states, plus the
federal government, prohibit the execution of
mentally retarded persons. However, of the states
with the largest death row populations and highest execution rates, only Georgia has a statute that
exempts mentally retarded persons from capital
punishment. Id.
368 EMILY V. REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 39 (1993). See a/soJamie M. Billotte, Is It
Justified?-The Death Penalty and Mental Retardation, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 333,
337 (1994);John H. Blume, Representing the Mentally Retarded Defendant, CHAMPION, Nov. 1987, at
32 (estimating that, in 1987, 250 mentally retarded people were on death row in the United
States).
369 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

Georgetown Journal on FightingPoverty

Report RegardingImplementation of the ABA's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty
370

Id.

371

Id.
Id. at 307.

372

Id. at 308-09. Penry testified in his own defense. Although he initially appeared intelligent
and knowledgeable, defense questioning revealed that he could not read or write, did not
know how many nickels are in a dime, could not
name the days of the week or the months of the
year, was unable to count to 100, and did not
know who was President of the United States.
Virginia Ellis & Dale Rice, Retarded andSentenced to
Die, DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Sept. 11, 1988.
373

374 492 U.S. at 318.
375 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.,

art. 37.071 (c)-(e)

(West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
376 492 U.S. at 323.
377
378

Id. at 324.

Id. at 326.

Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
380 SeeJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
379

381

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37-071 (c)-(e)

(West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. at 1134 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).Justice Blackmun did not write separately in
Penry. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1988).
Instead, he joined portions ofJustice O'Connor's
opinion of the Court. Specifically, Justice Blackmun joined with Justices O'Connor, Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens to hold that Penry's argument-that his jury was unable to fully consider
and give effect to mitigating evidence of his
mental retardation and abused background in
answering Texas' three special issues-sought a
result dictated by Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976) (upholding Texas' death penalty statute
in the face of a constitutional challenge). Consequently, Penry was not seeking a "new rule"
which, under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),
would not be cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Under Teague, "new rules" may not generally
be applied or announced in cases on collateral
review. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Justice Blackmun
alsojoined the entirety ofJustice Stevens' opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 492
U.S. at 349. These two justices agreed that the
Court should not apply Teague's nonretroactivity
principles to capital cases without the benefit of
briefing and oral argument. Id. Moreover, even if
Teague were held to apply to capital cases, Justices
Stevens and Blackmun agreed that an exception
to the retroactivity doctrine applied. In their view,
rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
382
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status or offense are excepted from Teague's
draconian doctrine. Id. Justice Brennan's opinion,joined byJustice Marshall, suggested that the
execution of mentally retarded offenders was
always unconstitutional. Id. at 341. Thus, Justice
Blackmun and three others (Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens) concluded that executing mentally
retarded persons is unconstitutional. A bare majority (Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, White
and Kennedy) held otherwise.
For an excellent discussion of the paradox created by Furman's promise of consistency and
Lockett's requirement of individualized sentencing, see Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox:
Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147
(1991).
383 Consider the following account from a local
newspaper in South Carolina:
Down in Conway, a circuit judge has handed
down a no-nonsense decision upholding law
and order.... The case involves convicted
killer Limmie Arthur, 28, who has the social
intelligence of a 10- to 12-year-old and the
mental ability of a 7-year-old. This was enough
sense to enable him to kill William "Cripple
Jack" Miller in 1984.... It appears to us that
there is all the more reason to execute a
killer if he is also insane or retarded. Killers
often kill again; an insane or retarded killer
is more to be feared than a sane or normal
killer. There is also far less possibility of his
ever becoming a useful citizen.
Upholding Law and Order, HARTSVILLE MESSENGER,
June 24, 1987, at 5B, col. 1. See generally John
Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally
Retarded to Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41
ARK. L. REV. 725 (1988).
384 Earl Washington, a mentally retarded black
man from Virginia, fit this profile perfectly. In
1982, Rebecca Lynn Williams was raped and
murdered in Culpepper, Virginia. One year later,
Washington was arrested in Warrenton, twenty
miles away, for assaulting his brother-in-law. Washington, who had an IQ of 69, had been up all
night drinking, and was interrogated for two days.
Although the assault charges were dropped, during this interrogation, Washington confessed to a
variety of other crimes, including the rape of a
Warrenton woman. Officials investigated each of
these crimes and concluded that Washington
could not have committed them.
Because he believed that Washington was keeping
something from him, an officer asked: "Earl, did
you kill that girl in Culpeper? ... I mean the
woman you stabbed in Culpeper?" Washington
"shook his head yes and started crying." Washington never mentioned rape.
As Washington volunteered certain "facts" about
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the crime, he was repeatedly corrected. For example, Washington said that Ms. Williams was
black. She was white. Although Washington said
his victim was "kind of short," Ms. Williams was
5'8" tall. Washington claimed that he gained
entry by kicking in a door, but the door was not
damaged. Washington said he had stabbed her
between one and three times. Ms. Williams had
38 stab wounds. Washington claimed that the
victim was alone, but police who arrived shortly
after the murder found a baby in a playpen and
Ms. Williams' three-year-old daughter. Officers
drove Washington by the crime scene three times.
Twice he failed to identify it. The third time, an
officer asked, "Earl, isn't this the place?" and
Washington said yes.. Although numerous fingerprints were found in the victim's home, none
matched Washington's.
Washington's trial attorney received no psychiatric or psychological assistance in preparing Washington's defense. Washington was sent to the state
mental hospital, which certified his competence
both to stand trial and to waive his Miranda
warnings. Soon thereafter, Washington was convicted and sentenced to die.
Years later, Washington's post-conviction lawyers
tested semen stains on the bedding where the
rape took place and seminal fluid recovered from
the victim. The tests excluded Washington as the
rapist. ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE? 54-56
(1991). Ultimately, after much media attention
and political pressure, the governor of Virginia
commuted Washington's death sentence to life.
Peter Baker, DNA Test to Free Man Imprisoned in

395 Id.

Id. at 82-83. In 1985, the Supreme Court ruled
that states must provide indigent defendants with
psychiatric assistance in cases where sanity is an
issue. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
396

197 THE

399 PERSKE, supranote 384, at 28.
400 Id.
401

Id.

402

Id. at 29. At trial, Bowden testified that he told

the police that he did not participate in the
crime. Also, he swore that he agreed to sign the
confession, which he could neither read nor
understand, only after a detective told him that
he would not be sentenced to death if he signed
it. Id.
403

Id. at 28.

404
405

Id. at 32.
Id.

406

DEATH Row USA, supa note 156, at 5. Strong

public reaction to Bowden's execution culminated on April 8, 1988, when Georgia Governor
Joe Frank Harris signed a bill that banned the
execution of persons with mental retardation. Of
the states with the largest death row populations
and highest execution rates, Georgia alone has
such a statute. Id.
407 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-7, Marquez
v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 215 (1994).
Trial counsel did not present any of this
information to the jury.

385John Brummett, The FairchildIssue Won't Die,

386

Id.

387

Id.

388 Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1431
(E.D. Ark. 1989).
389 Id. at 1461. The state's psychological examiner

390 Fairchild,900 F.2d at 1295.

ZETrE, Sept. 1, 1995, at 5B.

Id.

Id.
40s

Id. at 6. Since his infancy, this torture was a

4o Id. at 7 n.4. Mario was forced to care for his
siblings for one year.
410 Id. (citing State Court Finding of Fact 1, Claim

I).

393DEATH Row USA, supranote 156, at 9.
39 4

In the state

daily experience.

391 MurdererExecuted in Arkansas, CHARLESTON GA-

392

. ..

habeas corpus hearing, trial counsel explained that, as they understood the Texas
capital sentencing statute and the case law
governing its application at the time of trial,
the type of evidence set forth above could
not be considered by the jury as a basis for a
sentence less than death, and instead, could
only be considered as aggravating evidence
under Texas special issue number two to aid
the state in providing its case for a death
sentence.

Aug. 29, 1995, at 7B.

used a revision of the antiquated Beta examination, and claimed that Fairchild's IQ was actually
87. The Beta is a picture test used for World War I
draftees who were unable to read or write. PERSKE,
supranote 384, at 102.

DEATH Row USA, supranote 156, at 4.

398

Virginia Rape, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1994, at Al.
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZErE,

DEATH PENALTY, supranote 394, at 82-83.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

UNITED

STATES

OF

AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY 82 (1987) [hereinafter THE DEATH PENALTY].

411 Id. at 6. Mario was singled out for his father's

wrath because he was "slower" than his other
fifteen siblings. Id.

Georgetown Journal on FightingPoverty

Report RegardingImplementation of the ABA's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerningthe Death Penalty
Id. at 6 (citing State Court Finding of Fact No.
1, Claim 1).
413 Jonathan Freedland, Eyes Right: More and More,
Americans Distrust Their Government, MONTREAL
412

GAZETTE, Apr. 6, 1996, at B6.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Marquez,
115 S. Ct. 215 (citing State Court Finding of Fact
3-14, Claim 1). Mario also suffered from brain
damage because of an addiction to sniffing spray
paint that developed shortly after being abandoned at the age of twelve. This addiction acted
as a psychological anesthetic for Mario. Id.
415 Id. His mental deficiencies rendered Mario
414

incapable of exercising judgment or learning
from past mistakes and behaviors, and impaired
his control over strong emotions, especially in
stressful situations. Id.
416 ld. at 9-10 (citing Vol. XXVIII at 7, 9; Vol.
XXVII at 105, 191). This altercation took place as
Mario was taken to the jail for lunch. Three
cameramen were walking directly in front of
Mario, were shining lights into his eyes from three
or four feet away, and were pointing cameras at
his face. Mario responded by spitting on one of
the cameramen and by knocking the camera off
another's shoulder. As Mario was restrained, one
bailiff testified that Mario said something to the
effect that "Next time I'll just run so you all can
shoot me." The judge's ruling came without any
request from the prosecutor or the bailiff and
without a hearing. The jury was allowed to see
footage of the incident during the prosecution's
sentencing phase presentation.
417 See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Executing the Retarded in
OurName, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 21, 1995.
418 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Several rationales have been offered in support of
the Supreme Court's ruling that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of insane
persons:
(1) executing insane persons offends humanity;
(2) executing insane persons does not further the penological goals of deterrence
or retribution;
(3) insanity itself is adequate punishment;
(4) it is unfair to execute someone who
cannot appreciate the moral significance of the relationship between her
crime and her punishment; and
(5) it is unfair to execute someone who
cannot prepare for her death.
Id. at 407-09. See COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note
27, at 199.
419 Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 22, 1993, at 105.
420 Id. at 111.

Id. The damage to the brain resulted in diffuse
impairment involving both hemispheres.
422 Id. One study characterizes front-lobotomy
patients as appearing like a mature adult but
existing as a very young child.
423 Id. at 115. The medical specialist for the
421

defense testified that Rector was manifestly incapable of assisting his attorneys in any real way. A
neuropsychologist testified that there was no
possibility that Rector was shamming them during their examination and that he was trying to
do the best he could on those tests. Some of the
prosecutor's specialists did not read the surgeon's
report on Rector's operation until the morning
of their testimony. One specialist had no idea how
much brain tissue had been removed and based
his testimony on a brief examination of medical
records and a 20-minute interview with Rector. Id.
at 114.
424 Id. at 115. The all-white jury took only 15
minutes to find Rector guilty of capital murder.
425 Id. at 122-23. Rector claimed to his guards that
Cold Duck had been a hit man 12 times in prison
and that Rector used to run with him. Rector said
that he sure would like to see him again. Id.
426 Id. at 123.
427

Id. at 105.

428

Id. at 122.

429 Id. at 128. It was Rector's habit to put his

dessert aside and eat itjust before going to bed.
430 DEATH Row USA, supra note 156, at 7.
431 THE DEATH PENALTY,
432

supranote 394, at 84.

Id.

433 Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was first

recognized as a clinically identifiable disorder in
1980. That same year it was included in the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) Diagnostic
Standards Manual, 3d ed. THE DEATH PENALTY,
supra note 394, at 84 n.16.
supra note 394, at 85. The
PTSD was a result of his war time experiences, the
murder of his brother shortly before his tour in
South Vietnam, and certain other incidents in his
childhood.
435 Id. In addition to Vietnam veterans, others
particularly susceptible to PTSD include hostage
and kidnap victims.
436 Funchess' trial lawyer conducted no investigation of his client's history or background because
he mistakenly believed that the Florida statute
then in effect prohibited a lawyer from presenting this type of mitigating evidence to a capital
sentencer. Id. at 86.
434 THE DEATH PENALTY,

437 Id. at 85-86.
438 DEATH

Row, USA, supranote 156, at 5.
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439 THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 394, at 81.
440

Id.

441

Defendant's Appellate Brief, Goode v. Wain-

wright, 704 F.2d 593, 601 (11th Cir. 1983).
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